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Abstract
Although there are both common and specialised senses of the term "variation,"
(the OED lists dozens) there seems to be no well defined use of this term in philosophy.
The main task of my thesis is to demonstrate that variation can be defined as
a cognitive technique.  I suggest that variation has been frequently used by
philosophers, although not always in an overt manner.  Moreover, I attempt to show
that it is reasonable to talk about the relative importance of variation by examining
the role of variation in Locke's Essay, Husserl's and Reinach's phenomenology,
cognitive science, and thought experiments.
v
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Rolf George for his guidance, help,
and support.  As well, I would like to thank Richard Holmes, who was a second reader,
for his many insightful suggestions.  Fred Kersten, my external examiner, and Paul
Thagard helped me envision some new directions that my thesis research may take.
It would take too long to list all graduate students, faculty, and staff who, over
the years, made me feel at home in this department.  Let me, instead, thank all of
them as someone who shares their commitment to philosophy.  It is nice to know that
I am not the only one who believes that it takes much friendship and humanity in
order to be a philosopher.
vi
Dedication
To Silva and Katarina
vii
Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1
Locke's Ideas and Variation:
A Jig Saw Puzzle Work of the Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
Free Variation in Husserl's Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
Reinach, Material Necessity and Free Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
The Role of Variation in Cognitive Science:
Structured Imagination and Conceptual Combinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Ernst Mach: Variation and Thought Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
1
  Introduction
This thesis will largely examine the single explicit account of variation
available in philosophical literature: free variation in phenomenology.  I will
discuss the notion of free variation, introduced into philosophical discussion by
Edmund Husserl, its roots, history and development, and what appears to be its
tacit application in domains of philosophy other than phenomenology.  However,
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I will not only discuss the origins of this notion but also critically examine and
appraise its nature and the extent of its application.
Whether this extent is narrow or broad will largely depend on how free
variation is defined.  It might be narrowly defined as a specific
phenomenological procedure, dependant on numerous other phenomenological
procedures and techniques, employed in order to "search for essences."  Taken in
this sense, the notion of free variation would remain faithful to its origins but it
would also lose, I believe, much of its broader potential relevance and
applicability.
Free variation may also be more widely defined in an attempt to
demonstrate that recourse to the freedom of varying ideas, thoughts, or images 
is essential for constituting many judgments, actions and complex ideas.  This
activity would then be seen as essential, not only in finding out what things,
concepts, and events might turn out to be, but also to find out with greater
insight and precision, what they are.  In other words, defining free variation
widely would imply that several traditions and styles of philosophy, other than
phenomenology, have tacitly depended on this procedure.  It would also imply
that free variation is not just a minute and obscure technique of a specialized
philosopher but a frequently used and easily employed cognitive tool.  My thesis,
I hope, will be one step in that direction.
Put more generally, there are two fundamental properties of variation. 
These two basic properties of this cognitive operation, inherent in the very
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notion of this cognitive activity, are its freedom and its closure.  On the one
hand, variation implies an apparently unrestricted freedom of the human mind
to present some particular part or aspect of one's objects of knowledge as capable
of being something else, or capable of being replaced by something else.  To
illustrate this, it is sufficient to consider ordinary expressions like: "This house
would look way better with a red roof" or "This blouse should have blue instead
of green buttons."  On the other hand, variation by its nature implies rigid
constraints imposed on the procedures, structures, and manners of varying. 
Hume, in his Enquiry, said something closely related to this twofold nature of
variation.  He suggested that nothing, at the first blush, may seem more
unbounded and more free than human thought, which seems unrestricted by the
limits of nature and reality.  Yet at the same time one has to realise that our
thought is,
....really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative
power of the mind amounts to no more than the activity of compounding,
transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the
senses and experience (Hume 1993, 19).
Note the abundance of activities which, Hume suggests, go on in the human
mind.  Yet the contents of the thoughts seem to be only or largely materials
"afforded" by the senses and experience.  Taken in this sense, variation of
thoughts would not affect any of the properties of the "empirically given."  In his
Treatise of Human Nature, Hume criticized the view that belief consists of
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merely combining new ideas with the set of concepts already established in the
human mind.  He remarks that:
The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite,
mix and vary them, as it pleases; so that if belief consisted in a new idea,
annex'd to the conception, it wou'd be in a man's power to believe what he
pleased (Hume Treatise, 623-624).
For present purposes, the most important lesson to be drawn from Hume
is that, in giving a satisfactory account of variation, one needs to be particularly
attentive to its limitations.  On the one hand, the power of variation to affect the
properties of the empirically experienced is quite limited.  On the other hand,
the power of the human mind to form beliefs by mere process of variation seems
equally limited.  What, then, is the technique of variation?
I will begin by examining the origins of the notion of variation in Locke's
thought.  One of the results of my interpretation of Locke's notion of variation
will be to provide a ground for Locke's distinction between artifacts, mixed
modes, and substances.  This examination will reveal that Locke's conception of
human cognition was, by and large, the source of the notion of free variation in
Husserl's phenomenology.  
I will continue by giving an account of the roots of free variation in
Husserl's Investigations.  I shall argue that, in order to be able properly to
understand Husserl's original and strict use of free variation as a cognitive
technique, one has to reach an understanding of the role of variation in his
theory of parts and moments.
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Subsequently, I will critically examine the development of the notion of
free variation in Husserl's thought.  According to the understanding of free
variation which I advance in this chapter, Husserl's later indiscriminate use of
"free variation"  and "free fantasy" was a result of a confused and uncritical
widening of the scope of his phenomenology.
The importance of free variation in the thought of Adolf Reinach, one of
Husserl's colleagues and followers, will be one of my concerns.  I will attempt to
sketch the role of variation in Reinach's account of a special kind of necessity
which he introduced to philosophy, material necessity.  As well, I will discuss
Reinach's understanding of the a priori and point to its dependence on the
technique of variation.
As well, I will trace what appears to be an activity of free variation in
some research topics of contemporary cognitive science.  Those topics are:
conceptual combination and structured imagination.  By examining them, I will
attempt to illustrate that variation, as a cognitive technique, is frequently used
by cognitive scientists.
Finally, I will point to crucial role of variation in Ernst Mach's
understanding of thought experiments.  It seems that the thought experiments




Locke's Ideas and Variation:
A Jig Saw Puzzle Work of the Mind
(a) Simplicity and Complexity in Sense-Experience
The aim of this chapter is to examine a particular conception, explicitly
elaborated by Locke, of human cognition understood primarily as a set of various
activities of manipulating simple ideas, producing thereby collections and
clusters of more or less complex and abstract ideas.  I will describe to what
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extent some aspects of this Lockean conception of human cognition represent the
origin of the notion of free variation.  I would like to claim, additionally, that
inquiry into the principles of free variations may help account for the nature and
origin of what Locke calls complex ideas.
Several commentators have noted that Locke based important parts of his
epistemology on a psychological analogue of the corpuscularian physics of the
day.  This intellectual background recognizable in Locke's thought draws on a
tradition far older than the physics of the time.  For example, M.A. Steward
points out (Steward 1979, 66) that Locke appeals to letters of the alphabet to
explain the combinatorial wealth of complexes of simple elements.  Since the
time of Democritus, the alphabet had been used as a metaphor for the particles
of physics.  Here is an account of Democritus' theory, offered in Aristotle's
Metaphysics (A4, 985b4):
Leucippus and his associate Democritus hold that the elements are the
full and the void.... These two men say that the difference in atoms are the
causes of other things.  They hold that these differences are three - shape,
arrangement and position.... A differs from N in shape, AN from NA in
arrangement, and Z from N in position (G.S. Kirk and J.A. Raven 1964,
406-407).
Locke, in a somewhat different way, uses the alphabet in order to suggest
that a potential of human thought is vast and perhaps even infinite, arguing
against the possible objection that sensation and reflection may deliver too few
elements to account for the rich diversity of thought.  He suggests that few
simple ideas can, through combination and arrangement, provide a great wealth
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of complex ideas, capable of encompassing any possible thought and knowledge
that may occur in the mind.  Locke claims that it may not be so strange to
consider,
....these few simple ideas sufficient to employ the quickest thought, or
largest capacity; and to furnish the materials of all that various
knowledge, and more various fancies and opinions of all mankind, if we
consider how many words may be made of the various composition of
twenty-four letters; or if, going one step further, we will but reflect on the
variety of combinations that may be made with barely one of the above-
mentioned ideas, viz. number, whose stock is inexhaustible and truly
infinite: and what a large and immense field doth extension alone afford
the mathematicians? (Essay 2.7.10).
As well, Locke refers to the simple ideas in a complex having their own "number
and order," key relations in the concept of matter, using terminology reminiscent
of the Aristotle's account of Democritus.
However, it would be a mistake to interpret Locke's use of the traditional
and mechanistic scientific outlooks as being based on a belief that simple ideas
occur individually or joined in a linear series.  Locke's theory implies that
perceived objects are wholes which combine qualities and necessarily possess a
particular structure, while the ideas they generate in the mind are ideas of the
elements of the complex.  This may be easily illustrated by numerous passages
from the  Essay, for instance,
Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves,
so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between
them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the
senses simple and unmixed (Essay, 2.2.1).
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However, accounting for simplicity and complexity of the ideas is not so easy a
task.  First, it is not obvious what "simple and unmixed" meant for Locke. 
Second, some commentators do not appear to recognize that there are problems
with representing ideas, such as the ideas of colour and shape, as simple and
unmixed.  For example, this is how Steward accounts for this mixture of unity
and distinctness associated with simple ideas:
To say at 2.2.1. that ideas, e.g. of colour and figure, enter "simple and
unmixed" is to say that (a) each is irreducible of its kind and (b) we cannot
possibly confuse them: no one thinks that seeing the colours of the mat is
seeing its shape unless he thinks that colours are shapes, nor that it is
reducible to seeing something else (Steward 1979, 67-68).
I see problems with the notion "irreducible of its kind."  In a sense, of
course, colours and shapes are kinds, i.e. the experienced and mature mind can
tell colours from shapes and will not think it plausible that one might be
reducible to another.  It does not follow from this that there is a sense in which
these elements enter the mind "simple and unmixed," i.e. separately.
Carnap explored this idea of "elementary experience" in his Aufbau.  He
argued that under certain circumstances it is possible to analyze, and in a sense
break up, unanalyzable units by the means of "quasi analysis."  Quasi analysis
parallels the procedure of proper analysis except that its elements do not "really"
constitute parts -- one always works with pair lists.  Quasi analysis presupposes
a pair list of elementary experiences to be given, whose relation extension R has
the same general formal property as the relation-extension which forms the
basis of proper analysis (Aufbau, paragraph 71).  Thus, one could use so-called
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"compound" chords as a domain of unanalyzable units.  As a phenomenon (e.g.
given in sensation) a chord is a uniform totality, not composed of constituents. 
Imagine a perceiver who lives in a purely auditory world in which there are only
chords, and no individual tones.  Then imagine a chord consisting of the keys
c,e,g.  This chord is akin to all the chords which contain c and furthermore to all
chords which contain e and g.  Thus it belongs to three chord classes, which
creates the impression that it has three parts.  Carnap further acknowledges
that we are capable of determining "similarity circles," i.e. sets of similar objects,
in this way.
In the case of tones and chords, the similarity circles are identical with
the quality classes, but normally they are not.  One can imagine creating
similarity circles by adopting the following procedure: cutting out the
geometrical shapes (triangles, circles, squares) of different colours (red, yellow,
blue).  One could mix the coloured geometrical shapes randomly and form
similarity circles by selecting similar objects.  This selection procedure may be
based not on any "simple" properties (such as the shape and colour) but on the
combination of several properties (selecting as similar, for example, the objects
of the same colour and the same shape).
This procedure, without direct access to the "proper" constituents of
examined objects or phenomena, is called quasi analysis.  The procedure of quasi
analysis, as I have suggested, may be applied not only to chords but also to the
classes of coloured shapes.  In the case of chords, we assign the classes of c,e, and
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g as quasi constituents to the chord c-e-g.  However, this chord does not, properly
speaking, consist of three parts.  Instead, it just creates the impression of
tripartition, which is the result of an intuitively performed quasi analysis.
Carnap's most important point regarding this kind of Lockean
hypostatization of constituents as parts of objects (such as their shapes and
colours, for example) is that a quasi analysis enables an examiner to treat
constituents not in the sense of parts, but in the sense of directions in which we
can proceed from the constituents to the classes of objects or phenomena which
stand to one another in the relation of kinship.  As Carnap's method of
construction shows, it is not obvious that the sense specific sensations come in
simple and unmixed: they are neither simple in the sense of primitive nor simple
in the sense of being generated individually.
Locke, however, assumes that simple ideas are both "simple and unmixed"
and "blended" at the same time.  How does the human mind, to put it in more
contemporary terms, run both the operations of recognizing the distinct features
as well as that of blending complementary features in cognition?  Are there some
regularities, some sort of structure in those operations?  In order to answer this
question, I will raise a couple of related questions.
(b) General Background: Descartes and Locke
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Michael Ayers, in his monograph on Locke, sketches the changes in
epistemology and theory of science which influenced Locke's thought. 
Aristotelians saw the soul as the "form" of the living thing, the principle of life
which activates its "matter."  In this view, when human cognition functions
properly there is conformity or congruity between things as they exist in reality
and things as they exist in the mind, in other words between "formal" and "real"
existence.  Finally, this conformity is reflected in deep linguistic and logical
structures.
The so-called "new mechanics," which already figured in Western thought
before Locke, was formed in sharp opposition to Aristotle's model of cognition. 
This new mechanistic hypothesis saw every event in the material world as
reducible to motions of matter according to mechanical laws.  There was,
consequently, little room for the "forms of the mind" dependent on what is
perceived or imagined in objective existence.  According to Descartes, what
occurs in any part of the body can only be the motion of matter.  Sense-data can
thus only be the result of mechanical occurrences systematically caused by the
perceived objects.  Beyond this relationship of correspondence there need be no
"conformity" or "congruence" of any kind between the object and its corporeal
"image."  Consequently, this new conception dispensed with the Aristotelian
intentional objects or intrinsically intentional states.
However, at this point, the following question emerges: if we dispense
with intentional objects and intentional states, how do we then penetrate to the
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core or essence of things?  If things are represented by nothing but clusters of
mental occurrences causally triggered by them why should our ideas reflect their
essences and fundamental properties?  In what way are they like them; or
accurately depict them?
To this question Descartes provided a simple and frankly metaphysical
answer.  As Michael Ayers phrased it, Descartes believed that "the intellect can
spin knowledge from its own entrails" (Ayers 1991, 33) precisely because the
intellect was created by God.  In the process of creation, the intellect was
furnished by innate knowledge of essences and fundamental principles, which
also contain sufficient and necessary requirements for understanding
experience.  In order to reveal and make explicit this implicit knowledge one
needs to employ a proper method of analysis.  Only then can this knowledge be
applied synthetically in the scientific explanation of the world as we experience
it.  However, one may wonder how this general framework is applied to the
objects of perception.  Michael Ayers's account of the argument Descartes offered
to account for the application of inner knowledge to the empirical world, the
famous wax experiment in the Meditations, is worth quoting at length:
Descartes pointed out that each and every quality of a piece of wax
(including its size, since the wax can appear to expand and contract
according to temperature) may be replaced by a different one as
circumstances change.  His conclusion was that our ordinary idea of wax
as something which survives such alteration is the purely intellectual idea
of a thing or substance which is extended and mutable.  Elsewhere he
argued that the change proper to an extended substance is mechanical
change, i.e. motion and rest subject to intelligible laws.  This looks like a
very Aristotelian procedure of stripping off accidents to reveal the simple
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essence, extension, and the properties necessarily connected to the
essence; but it was for Descartes the application of a wider method.  He
was following the principle (as Spinoza put it in his exposition of
Descartes' philosophy) what is complex and not understood should be
broken down into what is simple and intelligible and evidently true (Ayers
1991, 33).
Plainly Descartes, in his experiment, followed a wider method of breaking
down the complex and obscure into the simple and intelligible.  However, I see
Descartes' method differently.  Following the central thesis of my dissertation, I
will call this procedure "free variation," aimed at revealing simple essences by
altering the accidents.  After all, Descartes replaced each and every sensible
quality of a piece of wax by a different one as circumstances change. 
Consequently, I believe that it would be more accurate to say that Descartes
varied the accidents rather than "stripped the accidents off."   If one were to strip
the accidents off one would as a result reach the more general and abstract
genera.  As we will see later in this chapter, this view of framing abstract ideas
was developed and defended by Locke.  Additionally, it is not clear how one could
actually "strip the accidents off." 
To vary the accidents of certain objects, as opposed to stripping them off,
is to discover properties necessarily connected to the essence of that object.  In
the process of varying, one's mind is synthesizing: one has to be aware of the
identity of the chosen object while that object undergoes, in some cases
numerous and deep, changes.  In Descartes' experiment, the wax is first hard
and cold, it has very recently been taken from the honeycombs, it has not as yet
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lost the fragrance of its honey, it makes a sound if you rap on it with a knuckle. 
If brought close to fire, the odour vanishes, the colour is changed, it becomes hot
and liquid, and does not emit any sound when you knock on it.  One notices that
almost all of its properties vary with the change of temperature.  One could
further imagine the ways in which the properties of wax would vary with the
change of pressure, chemical environment and so on.
Locke's approach to the structure of knowledge was very similar to the
Cartesian in some respects and quite opposed to it in others.  The fundamental
disagreement between Locke and Descartes is the following: Locke did not
believe that there was a way of moving from the complexity of experience to the
unitary essence or core of the object as it is in itself.  The only way to cognize a
substance, according to Locke, is to experience accidents (sensible qualities)
together with the obscure idea of something to which they belong.  Since we can
have no knowledge of the essence of things, we must rest with ideas of things
which are logically composite, combining the idea of an unknown substance with
the ideas stemming from the realm of the experienced.
The way in which those composite ideas arise is yet another point of
disagreement between Descartes and Locke.  For the former, composite ideas are
formed by the paradigmatic simple ideas which are innate and for the latter
simple ideas stem from the senses.  Because of this disagreement, Locke and
Descartes had radically opposing views on what should count as "simple" and
what should count as "complex" in cognition.  Colour, for example, would be
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simple for Locke and complex for Descartes.  The general and determinable
concept of extension would be a "simple notion" for Descartes, whereas for Locke
this concept would fail to satisfy his definition of simplicity.
Note that compositionalism, i.e. the doctrine that complex ideas are
composed out of simple ideas, has nothing to say about what ties thought to
reality: one may subscribe to compositionalism and believe either that there are
innate structural and interpretive principles or that there are reliable
experiential building-blocks.
For Locke, simple ideas are necessarily elements of any true account of
the experience.  This is so since the terms employed in such an account get their
meaning precisely by association with such elements of experience, alone or in
combination.  One might additionally say that the determinate combination of
sense qualities does not manifest something about the "real" substantial nature,
it instead constitutes the nominal "essence" of the object by means of genus and
species difference.  The next section of this chapter will examine Locke's attempt
to produce a taxonomy of the nominal "essences" produced by the combination of
sense qualities.
(c) The Active Power of the Mind in Locke's  Essay
One feature of Locke's thought, which is generally recognized by his
commentators, is his emphasis on the active role of the mind.  However, Locke's
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empiricist epistemology required some further qualification of this role of the
mind: the mind is not capable of inventing simple ideas.  Consequently, the mind
has to be receptive, at least in respect to simple ideas.
Locke's simple ideas are classified according to their origin in sensation
and reflection.  There are four classes of them received from the following four
sources: one sense only, several senses, reflection only, or both sense and
reflection.  Colours and tastes would belong to the first class and extension, rest,
and motion to the second.  Reflection leads to a special group of ideas such as
perception, memory, or thinking, which include the acts of remembering,
knowing, discerning, etc.  The fourth group combines reflection and sensation
producing the ideas of pleasure and pain, power, succession, and others.  All
other ideas result from various combinations of these primary ones, and all
knowledge is framed with their help.  It has been suggested that Locke's
classification of ideas in book II of his  Essay should be understood as a
deliberate attempt to set up a doctrine of categories which would be a rival of the
traditional scholastic doctrine of categories (Ayers 1991, 23).
The active powers of the mind come into play in the formation of new
complex ideas.  Locke recognises the following relevant acts of the mind in
formation of complex ideas: combining, comparing, and separating.  This should
be taken not as an exclusive distinction since any act of comparing, for example,
would naturally imply some sort of combining and separating, coupled with at
least some level of abstraction.
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Locke classified the results of all possible cognitive operations under three
headings: modes, substances, or relations.  He defined modes as "[complex] ideas
which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting
by themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or affections of
substances" (Essay, 2.12.4).  Substances are: "[combinations] of simple ideas as
are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves"
(Essay, 2.12.6).  He provides an example of the idea of lead: it is formed by
joining the simple idea of certain dull whitish colour with the idea of hardness
and coldness.  One should perhaps add that in the case of substances the mind
appears to receive particular combinations of ideas by the very act of
experiencing.  Relation is defined as consisting in: "[the] consideration and
comparing one idea with another" (Essay, 2.12.7).
I will begin by examining Locke's understanding of variation and continue
by examining substances, contrasting them with the mixed modes and with the
artifacts, and close this chapter by discussing his theory of abstraction.
(d) Locke's Understanding of Variation
As far as variation is concerned, Locke seems to confine it entirely to
simple modes.  He terms the simple modes variations, or different combinations
of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other ideas.  In his own
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example, a dozen is the idea of so many distinct units added together in an
operation of simple variation, or combination.
Of these modes there are two sorts which deserve distinct consideration:
First, there are some which are only variations, or different combinations
of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other... (Essay,
2.12.5).
As R.S. Woolhouse points out, (Woolhouse 1983) it is not entirely clear whether
"variation" and "combination" are meant to be two things or just stylistic
variants of the very same concept.  Woolhouse proposes an interpretation of
Locke's simple modes which allows for attributing different meanings to
variation and combination.  In that case, Locke's example of the dozen may be
termed "combination," since a dozen implies not twelve ideas of a single thing
but rather a single idea of twelve things.  In other words, this mode combines
various substances or simple ideas into one idea.  However, Woolhouse
understands Locke's treatment of "variation" in a different light: "Talk of
`variations', on the other hand, is given content by a different range of cases. 
There are ones where the relation between simple modes and simple ideas is
akin to that between determinates and determinables" (Woolhouse 1983, 119). 
To illustrate the difference between determinates and determinables, let me
take the following example: "having a mass of one pound" and "having a mass of
one and a half pounds."  These two properties have something in common in one
sense yet they differ in another sense.  In platonic interpretation two things with
different masses still have something in common - a property which they share
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(that of having a mass).  This which they have in common is called
determinable; the two distinct properties not shared by two things (those of
having a mass of one pound and having a mass of one and a half pound) are
called determinates.
The most important difference between combination and variation is the
following: combination appears not to involve any sense of genus-species
dependence.  Any twelve objects, for example, can constitute a dozen.  However,
the case of variation seems to require some sort of genus-species dependence. 
While talking about the latter, Locke (Essay, 2.18.2.) uses the term
"modification" mentioning sliding, walking, tumbling, creeping, etc. and
presenting them as variants of the general concept of a certain species (man)
doing all of these things.  It seems that he believed that we have the ability to
form simple and distinct ideas of particular events of movement, having in mind
the more abstract idea of motion.  At the same time, this more abstract idea of
motion is formed by observing those simple ideas and comparing them.  There is
a certain sense here of mutual dependence between abstract or general and
simple or particular.
Locke also uses the example of particular sounds, modification of which in
one's mind leads to more abstract entities - tones, harmonies, and chords.  Much
like the case of motion, there seems to exist a mutual dependence between
sounds (particular) and tones (general):
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Sounds also, besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts, are modified by
diversity of notes of different length put together, which make that
complex idea called a tune, which a musician may have in his mind when
he hears or makes no sound at all, by reflecting on the ideas of those
sounds, so put together in his own fancy (Essay, 2.18.3.).
This understanding of variation, which seems to suggest that the human mind is
capable of producing complex ideas by freely combining the simple ones, has
some important implications in Locke's thought.  It leads to yet another mode of
variation which is implicitly used by Locke.  This mode of variation involves
replacement of simple ideas in complex substances.  For example, when Locke
considers complex ideas of substances (Essay, 2.30.5.) he points out that complex
ideas of substances are real when they agree with the existence of things. 
Fantastical creatures, on the contrary, are made up of such collections of simple
ideas as were really never united.  This occurs, for the most part, when one
modifies some parts of the known and existing substances.  One can, for
example, take a substance such as a horse and vary some of its parts in
imagination.  If one took a human head and put it in place of horse's head, one
would create a centaur.
(e) Substances and Mixed Modes
Locke characterizes particular substances in the following manner: they
stem from the general idea of substance, which is the basis of all existing
qualities.  He does not have much to say about substance in general except that
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it supports, in some unknown manner, all existing qualities.  In other words, we
cannot imagine the existing qualities without something to "uphold" them
(Essay, 2.23.2.).  Locke does not dwell on this abstract and confused idea, he
hastens to particular sorts of substances.  Particular substances collect such
combinations of simple ideas which are taken as existing together by experience
and observation:
An obscure and relative idea of substance in general being thus made we
come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting such
combinations of simple ideas as are, by experience and observation of
men's senses, taken notice of to exist together; and are therefore supposed
to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of
that substance.  Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold,
water, etc.; of which substances, whether any one has any other clear idea,
further than of certain simple ideas co-existing together, I appeal to every
one's own experience (Essay, 2.23.2.).
Locke does not offer much justification or explanation of the notion that
certain simple ideas always exist together, he simply appeals to experience and
common sense.  In other words, he seems to claim that, by routinely collecting
certain combinations of simple ideas, we become convinced that the properties of
these combinations flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown
essence of that substance.
Examples of particular substances such as gold and sun appear quite
uncontroversial.  In the case of sun, one's experience collects, with little
ambiguity, warmth, brightness, roundness, and typical shades of colour
associated with sun (bright yellow, red, etc.).  Therefore, the experience of this
particular substance appears to be quite regular.  An example at the other end of
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the scope of difficulty would be complex and compounded ideas constituting the
substance of a swan.  As Locke points out, the idea of a swan compounds white
colour, long neck, red beak, black legs and whole feet, and all these of a certain
size, with a power of swimming in the water and making certain noise (Essay,
2.23.14.).  One should perhaps add that swan's neck is curved in a typical
manner.  It seems that the nature of swan's substance is quite complex and
loosely determined.  Locke did not say, for example, what are the limits of the
length of swan's neck.  If one varied the length of its neck and perhaps some
other of its features, one can imagine converting swan into a goose or a stork.
Mixed modes involve a higher level of abstraction.  Beauty would be an
example of a mixed mode, i.e. a mode compounded of simple ideas of several
kinds, put together to make one complex idea; it may, for example, consist of a
certain composition of colour and figure causing delight to the beholder.  Mixed
modes differ from substances in several important respects.  First, they are
distinguished from substances and from simple ideas by not referring to really
existing things.  Second, the framing of complex ideas in a mixed mode proceeds
in a somewhat arbitrary manner in contrast to the framing of simple ideas of
substances.  In other words, mixed modes are framed by putting together, in
one's mind, scattered and independent ideas, whereas substances are formed by
joining ideas that belong together "naturally."
From this brief contrast between mixed modes and substances it follows
that mixed modes are not ideas of material things.  They have no unity in nature
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and are largely independent of nature.  Locke suggests that mixed modes are
conventional or institutional.  He uses terms such as "lie," "obligation,"
"hypocrisy," and "sacrilege" to show that mixed modes are largely institutional
in nature.  However, this does not mean that modes are compounded in an
arbitrary manner.  What are the principles, then, under which mixed modes are
formed and changed?  It seems that the very existence of mixed modes is
dependent on their being defined in a certain way by various societies and
cultures, in sharp opposition to substances which exist independently of people
recognizing their existence.
Mackie attempted to illustrate the difference between substances and
mixed modes by discussing the difference between a suicide (a mixed mode) and
gold (a genuine substance-term).  The best we can do in defining mixed modes,
such as suicide, is to produce a sufficient and necessary condition for recognizing
a certain act as an act of suicide.  However, we could always change the
particular terms and circumstances used to describe suicide (for example, we
may talk about one's emotional conditioning or else about certain kinds of social
pressure).  Consequently, the counterfactual "scenarios" employed to describe
suicide would in each case be different.  One could readily postulate that there
are various kinds and types of actions which would count as suicide.  However,
with genuine substance terms, the situation is quite different.  In Mackie's
words:
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If we have framed and confirmed a theory about the atomic structure of
what we now recognize as gold, and then consider (regarding it still as
counterfactual) the possibility that some material with a different atomic
structure should mimic all the really detectible properties and powers of
gold, we are most likely to refer to this not as the possibility that there
should be an additional kind of gold, but rather as the possibility that
something which is not gold should be very like gold" (Mackie 1976, 91).
Mackie further points out that, when it comes to "framing" (naming, or
defining), Locke's distinction between substances and mixed modes does not hold
fast.  To illustrate this, let me consider the case of artifacts, which are the source
of number of problems for Locke's distinction.
(f) Artifacts, Mixed Modes and Substances
Locke talks about invention as an activity which puts together several
simple ideas in some new and original ways: "so he that first invented printing
and etching, had an idea of it in his mind before it ever existed" (Essay, 2.22.9). 
Once invented, a printing press becomes a common object, existing in reality. 
Should one say, then, that artifacts have a miraculous capability of descending
from a laboratory of someone's mind right into the real world?
A table, for example, is a substance, but the notion of "picnic table"
belongs somewhere in between substances and mixed modes.  To represent a
picnic table as a substance would imply taking "picnic" to be a simple idea.  One
has to remember that Locke defined substances as particular objects consisting
of simple ideas.  On the other hand, a picnic table cannot be taken as a mixed
26
mode in the strict sense of that term since one can always point out that a picnic
table is, after all, a particular object with quite characteristic properties.
In determining whether artifacts should be seen as substances or mixed
modes, one seems to confront the problem of defining the objects which are
largely determined by their functions, i.e. by conscious human purposes.  For
example, a log turned on its side can serve as a picnic table.  The difference
between this log taken as a substance (a chunk of particular kind of wood) and
as a mixed mode (an object which belongs to the notion of "picnic table") is
primarily a matter of representation.  An oak or a fir log may be represented as
such by someone who does not know any of its possible uses.  But once we
consider its use, e.g. as a picnic table, it represents a mixed mode.  This is
particularly true of things such as a log; the same physical object may be used to
serve several purposes, such as ballast, a car prop, fire wood and so on. 
Additionally, the difference between any object taken as a substance and as a
mixed mode can be seen as a difference in one's approach to testing the nominal
essences of ideas.  This account would make Locke's distinction between
substances and mixed modes tenable even in the case of artifacts.  However, one
would have to add that the difference between substances and mixed modes, at
least in the case of artifacts, does not lie in the ideas themselves but in
reasoning about ideas.
On the one hand, the nominal essences of certain objects may be
discovered by abstracting and combining ideas merely by thinking.  According to
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my previous example, one would be capable of determining whether a normal log
can, in principle, be seen as a "picnic table" by variation; we imagine it set on its
side, rotate it in the mind.  One could also determine that a coffee cup could
belong to the set of objects capable of being "picnic table" if one is prepared to
mentally vary its size.  However, in the case of a dust ball, for example, one
would have to perform too many adjustments in the course of free variation in
order to make a dust ball into an object capable of serving as picnic table.  The
nature of all these testing procedures, which belong to mixed modes rather than
substances, makes empirical testing not only unnecessary but superfluous.
Other types of testing require observation and experiment, as opposed to
testing by mere thinking.  For example, to test whether some log's substance is
oak would involve empirically examining its texture.  In this case, mere thinking
used as a testing procedure would produce very poor results.
I would like to further generalize this distinction between these two
procedures of testing, drawn in respect to discovering the nominal essences.  In
Locke's epistemology, the scope and nature of complex ideas belonging to modes
is, in principle, tested entirely in the mind and by the mind.  This comes as a
natural consequence of Locke's defining mixed modes as complex ideas which
don't contain in themselves the supposition of subsisting.  Therefore, it would
not be reasonable to inquire into the nature of modes empirically.
For example, to test which objects and which actions potentially satisfy
complex ideas such as "lie" and "justice" one does not look around in order to
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discover an empirical measure of deceiving statements and just actions.  In case
of justice, for example, the best one can do is to mentally vary a particular
instance of a given action against the background of some other known and
similar actions which are typically considered just.
Locke readily concedes that the complex ideas, belonging to mixed modes,
are formed in a somewhat arbitrary manner.  Thus, it is possible that the
perception of justice and beauty may vary from society to society.  Since the
abstract ideas of mixed modes are not based on rigid standards, Locke inferred
that they must be based on tradition and custom:
That the abstract ideas of mixed modes, being men's voluntary
combinations of such a precise collection of simple ideas, and so the
essence of each species being made by men alone, whereof we have no
other possible standard existing anywhere but the name itself, or the
definition of that name; we having nothing else to refer these our ideas of
mixed modes to, as a standard to which we would conform them but the
ideas of those who are thought to use those names in their most proper
significations; and so as our ideas conform or differ from them, they pass
for true or false (Essay, 2.32.12).
However, there are obvious limits to the kind of conventionalism he
endorses.  In order to cast doubt on the view that mixed modes arise merely
through the adopted usage of certain combinations of terms it suffices to
consider the abstract ideas in mathematics.
(g) Locke on Abstraction
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There are two basic and primary functions of language, according to the 
Essay.  The first one may be called expressive, i.e. the language serves the
function of expressing ideas in the mind of the speaker.  The second one is a
communicative one, i.e. the language is used effectively to communicate
thoughts.  The second function of language requires the use of general terms. 
This is what would happen, in Locke's words, had people been unable to use
general terms in communicating: "Men would in vain heap up names of
particular things, that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts"
(Essay, 3.3.3).
Since general terms are indispensable for communication and since people
express ideas by using language, it follows that general terms must be
expressing general ideas.  However, Locke's empiricist tenet that all ideas derive
ultimately from particular elements of experience makes it difficult to see how
general ideas are formed out of particular sense-impressions.  In order to solve
this problem, Locke had to generate an useful and convincing theory of
abstraction.
We notice certain  recurring features in the immense variety of sensory
stimulations to which we are continually subjected.  For example, we notice
something similar in the visual experience of the piece of chalk which we see
today and the jug of milk which we saw yesterday.  We pick out this feature of
the complex sensory patterns which we receive, isolate it from the features
which accompany it on the particular occasion of perceptions and assign a name
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to it.  Thus we ignore the shape of the chalk, the taste of the milk, etc. but
instead focus on their "whiteness."  By doing so, we build a standard or pattern
which enables us both to apply the term "white" and to classify something as
white.  This is a concise description of Locke's theory of abstraction, given by
Mackie:
Locke's basic theory of abstraction, then, is that it consists in paying
selective attention to one feature in a complex particular object of
experience and ignoring the other features which are in fact occurring
along with it, and in associating verbal expressions (or other signs) with
the selected feature in such a way that one is ready to apply them to other
objects that are like this one with respect to this one feature (Mackie
1976, 112).
Locke believed that this omission of properties can proceed in stages until
we reach the most abstract terms which would be the most vacuous one, or the
ones containing the least properties:
Of the complex ideas signified by the names man and horse, leaving out
but those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those
wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct complex idea, and
giving the name animal to it, one has a more general term, that
comprehends with man several other creatures.  Leave out of the idea of
animal, sense and spontaneous motion, and the remaining complex idea,
made up of the remaining simple ones of body, life, and nourishment,
becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive term, vivens
(Essay, 3.3.9).
One can hardly avoid noticing that both the scope and kind of examples
and the underlying method behind the examples presented in this quote look
Aristotelian.  This is not surprising since Locke, although an enthusiastic critic
of the scholastic tradition, received his education in the tradition of scholastic
logic.  This particular strategy of reasoning stems from Aristotle's doctrine of
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"predicables" (species, genus, difference, property, and accident).  According to
this doctrine, the intellect can penetrate to the core or essence of the substance,
achieving an understanding of a unitary network of attributes necessarily
connected to that core.
This is, in short, Locke's theory of creating general ideas by the process of
abstraction; it has often been criticized, from Berkeley onward.  One possible
objection consists in pointing to its circularity.  If a recurrent aspect of particular
sense-impressions is picked out and made general by being separated from those
other various aspects which necessarily accompany it then that aspect is
something general by its nature.  In other words, the recognition of that aspect
presupposes the ability to classify and sort out sense-data, which is the ability
that Locke's theory of abstraction is supposed to explain.
Abstraction is explained by the ability to notice similarity and to ignore
other irrelevant features.  However, there are two theories of abstraction.  The
first one may be attributed to Locke, the second to Carnap.  Locke's theory of
abstraction holds that we notice similarity in certain respects which holds
between two or more objects.  Therefore, this understanding presupposes that
the respects in which objects or phenomena are similar are "built" into those
very objects or phenomena.  This theory is riddled with problems.  One of the
most obvious, as I suggested above, is its circularity.
According to Carnap, we notice that two or more things are just similar
and that is sufficient to generate abstract concepts.  In order to be able to
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analyze similarity of objects or phenomena without committing himself to
identification of their constituents, Carnap employed the following strategy.  He
believed that did not need to identify "respects" before discovering similarity
because he interposed similarity circles between elementary experience and
quality classes.  Similarity circles are sets of objects that are just similar, e.g. a
red triangle, a blue triangle, and a red square are a similarity circle formed by
starting with the red triangle; there is no quality that they all share.  Carnap
then proceeds to forming quality classes from similarity circles.
Another objection to Locke's theory of abstraction is that it simply
assumes that things resemble one another in various respects and that we can
observe this, even when the two partially alike things are not present at once. 
In order to illustrate the indeterminacy and open-ended nature of the notion of
resemblance, let me examine one of the simplest examples: comparing books A
and B, physically present in front of the observer.  These two books may be
considered more or less similar or equal.  If they are not considered equal then
they can resemble each other in various respects: first by being books, second by
having approximately the same number of pages or being written in the same
language, etc.  Let us assume that they resemble each other in being two copies
of the same edition of a book, the closest possible form of resemblance. 
Consequently, whatever can be truly said about the salient features of A can be
truly said about salient features of B.  For example, whatever is said truly of the
number of letters on any given page in case of A must hold in case of B. 
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However, there is a number of changes that A and B may have undergone, i.e.
changes which do not affect any of its salient features.  Imagine that A has some
pages underlined and that B belongs to a library.  We could nevertheless say
that the pattern of underlining in A resembles that in B.  However, the latter
properties of A and B are considered irrelevant for their being two copies of the
same book.  As we have seen, determining in which aspects two objects, A and B,
are judged to be equal also determines which properties of these object are to be
considered salient and which ones are not.  "Mere" resemblance fails to
constitute any salient features of objects.
The third major criticism of Locke's theory of general ideas attacks his
very concept of ideas.  In Locke's terminology, it is not clear whether he is
referring to having a sensation of white or to thinking about a white object.  This
ambiguous use of the term "idea," most commentators agree, was deliberate on
Locke's part.  The danger of this use is in the temptation to think of the
perceiving of grey, for example, as differing from the conceiving of black only in
having more specific content.  This confusion is the result of Locke's attempt to
maintain the continuity of perceptions, images, and abstractions.  Perceptions
would, therefore, become conceptions through omission of context.  In Locke's
terminology, all of this occurs under the general heading of ideas: experience
consists of ideas let into the mind by the senses, memory consists of ideas lodged
in memory, abstract ideas consist of the ideas being transformed by the mind. 
Yet one would tend to think that identifying perceived quality of colour with the
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idea of colour does not solve, but rather additionally confuses, the problem of
creating general ideas.
However, despite of all its shortcomings Locke's theory of abstraction is
quite relevant for understanding the activity of free variation.  For one thing,
Locke used free variation in his  Essay in order to address the difference between
"real" and "nominal" essences.  Locke held that the essences of species are
nothing other than the abstract ideas we have in our mind.  Had it been
otherwise, we would not have been able to determine which alterations may be
or may not be made in a horse or lead without making either of them to be of
another species:
And therefore the supposed real essences of substances, if different from
our abstract ideas, cannot be the essences of the species we rank things
into.  For two species may be one, as rationally as two different essences
be the essence of one species: and I demand what are the alterations
[which] may, or may not be made in a horse or lead, without making
either of them to be of another species? (Essay, 3.3.13).
The only creature capable of manipulating real essences would be God, in the
very act of creation in which essences of the things would be created and
annihilated with the creation and dissolution of the individual things which they
constituted.  However, human beings are only capable of grasping abstract ideas
which, in turn, are created by the human mind.  Locke points out that even a
moderate skill in different languages reveals that certain complex ideas collected
in one language under a single name may not be collected into any specific ideas
in some other languages (Essay, 3.5.8.).  The latter shows that abstract ideas are
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creatures of the human mind in linguistic practice.  However, the best way to
prove, in principle, that the abstract ideas are nothing but creations of the
human mind is to make use of a minute and readily employable strategy:
varying certain features in our abstract ideas to examine the nature and scope of
those ideas.
This strategy of free variation proves to be quite effective in the case of
substances.  Additionally, the latter case makes it reasonable to accept Locke's
distinction between real and nominal essences.  An animal, such as a horse for
example, has a nominal essence, i.e. certain properties which we usually
associate with the notion of "horse," as opposed to the real essence, which
consists of the fundamental arrangement of particles or some sort of internal
constitution on which all those properties depend.
However, in the case of mixed modes it is not always clear how to employ
the distinction between real and nominal essences.  On the one hand, it is
obvious that nominal essences of modes have to do with what we mean by the
idea we have of that particular mode.  As I attempted to show in the previous
section of this chapter, it may be claimed that modes owe their existence to the
fact that their nominal essences are tested entirely in the mind and by the mind. 
But what about real essences?  Are modes supposed to have any real essences? 
Locke speaks about the real essences of modes.  Here is just one of several
passages concerned with real essences and mixed modes: "Another thing we may
observe from what has been said is, That the names of mixed modes always
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signify (when they have any determined signification) the real essences of their
species" (Essay, 3.5.14).  At some other places (3.3.18.) Locke states that real and
nominal essences coincide in the case of mixed modes.  For example, if we know
the essence of a triangle, we can potentially deduce the rest of its properties. 
Therefore, the real essence would, in this case, only be the nominal essence fully
expressed in its definition.
In the case of triangles, it is attractive to suppose that they have their
properties (their internal angles are equal to two right angles, etc.) as a result of
their real essence.  In this case, we can think of a real essence as a specification,
or a set of instructions for constructing a certain geometrical figure.  However,
there are more controversial cases such as the mixed modes "beauty," "lies," and
"patricide" (to mention just a few Locke's examples).  If one were to see their
nominal and real essences coincide, then one would insist on the mutual
dependence between the principles upon which these terms are constructed and
these term's essential properties.  However, there are two difficulties with this
view.  First, it may be difficult to distinguish between the fundamental
principles and properties of mixed modes.  Thus, one may claim that what is
originally seen as a property of a triangle  (an object with internal angles which
are equal to two right angles) may in turn be used as a principle for constructing
a triangle.  This difficulty is even more pressing in cases such as "beauty" and
"justice."  Second, and more general, the difficulty is that mixed modes which
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capture complex ideas stemming from, for example, the sphere of social
behaviour may have no rigid fundamental principles.
(h) Conclusion 
Let me close this chapter with the case which caused the most difficult
problems for Locke, and which was chosen by his critics as the easiest target for
attack.  Locke maintained that the mental operations of abstracting and relating
ideas are necessarily guided by certain deliverances of experience.  He held that
"nature" has made things alike in certain respects.  The mind has
 a capability of signifying many particulars only on the grounds of the testimony
of sense to the presence of a likeness or similar qualities in a number of
individual existent.  This presumed likeness is the regulator of the abstraction
and generalization, and their application to appropriate members of the species.
This balance between sense-perception and the mental operations of
abstraction and generalization holds reasonably well in the case of taxonomies
such as the ones drawn on the principles of botany and zoology.  Even there, one
would have difficulties in establishing the general idea pertaining to any natural
kind.  "Man," for example, would have to be neither tall nor short, neither dark
haired nor grey, and so on.  Moreover, with the mathematical ideas and the
species of natural substances Locke encountered grave difficulties.  Here is
Locke's characterization of the general idea of triangle:
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For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general
idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive,
and difficult,) for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither
equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once.  In
effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some
parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together (Essay,
4.7.9).
This particular claim, that "general idea of a triangle" must be "all and none" of
the several types of triangles at once represents a confused and inconsistent
claim.  One can only sympathise with Berkeley's insistence that it is utterly
impossible for someone to have and not to have an idea of a triangle in his mind.
Berkeley emphasized the impossibility of collecting, in one's mind, all of
the properties, and none of the properties, of a triangle as a general idea: "In
effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of
several different and inconsistent ideas are put together" (Berkeley Principles,
32).
However, if one were to approach this problem in terms of free variation,
most of the difficulties would disappear.  One would have to begin making a
sharp distinction between observing triangles (and in this sense having ideas of
several different particular triangles, according to Locke) and cutting up and
recombining ideas of triangles in the mind.  In observation, some triangles are
equilateral, some are not equilateral, some are scalene, some are isosceles, etc. 
If one were to reason about triangles solely by the means of observation, it is
possible to imagine that one could not be aware that certain properties of the
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general triangle are inconsistent with one another.  In other words, one would
simply encounter representations of several particular  instances of triangles.
On the one hand, in mentally varying (recombining) particular properties
of triangles one appears to have discovered certain limitations essential to
constructing a triangle.  Only in the process of variation, as opposed to sense-
perception, one becomes aware that there are limits to varying properties of a
triangle.  For example, one may attempt to mentally construct a triangle as
scalene and vary some of its properties it order to test whether a scalene triangle
can be continuously transformed into an equiangular triangle.  Only in this
sense can Locke's infamous claim, that none of the mutually inconsistent
properties of triangles can exist at once, be taken seriously.  Another corollary of
employing variation in constructing Locke's triangle is the dissolution of
Berkeley's criticism of Locke.  In simple terms, Locke was not talking about the
actuality of combining various ideas, some of which may turn out to be
inconsistent.  Instead, he was talking about the potentiality of such combination
in the sense in which one can potentially ascribe two or more inconsistent
properties to the same object.
On the other hand, in the course of varying (recombining) ideas one
appears simply to follow the rules essential for constructing a triangle. 
However, there is always freedom in the process of implementing the rules.  For
example, one may never complete an imaginary construction of any particular
triangle.  As well, one may toy with various elementary properties of a triangle. 
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This would be a plausible way of understanding Locke's claim that one is
having, at least potentially, all of the properties of triangles at his disposal.
This seemingly paradoxical mixture of freedom and restraint in free
variation will be of particular interest for the next chapter, which will examine
the discovery and application of this idea in Husserl's phenomenology.
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Chapter Two
 Free Variation in Husserl's Phenomenology
(1) Introduction
This chapter will focus on a single method or, more accurately, a cognitive
strategy frequently used in phenomenology: free variation.  Although free
variation received some attention by Husserl scholars, I believe that there is a
need for greater clarification and more precise examination of this cognitive
strategy.  I will thus examine its origin and its development in Husserl's work.  I
believe that, by doing so, I will be reviving and recovering one of the best
elements in phenomenological inquiry.  As well, I believe that this discussion
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will prove to be relevant for the study of other contemporary philosophical
issues.
Free variation has often been used by phenomenologists as a means of
moving from the "natural attitude" to rigorous phenomenological descriptions. 
Completing this move convincingly and completely has been one of the most
difficult tasks in phenomenology.  That is the primary reason why
phenomenologists have often been ambivalent about the role of the natural
attitude.
On the one hand, they acknowledge that the natural attitude has been
qualified in most philosophical traditions and doctrines as a set of mere
opinions, often erroneous and always volatile.  Philosophers have sometimes
called this mode of knowledge "doxa."  In simpler terms, this knowledge roughly
encompasses the domain of "common sense."  It traditionally carried very modest
authority and it was seen as a ground for opinions, but not for knowledge.
On the other hand, phenomenologists would still like the natural attitude
to serve as the broadest and the most fundamental basis or ground of belief.  In
order to enable the natural attitude to serve the latter role, phenomenologists
strove to transform or to "distil" the natural attitude using procedures such as
"bracketing" and free variation.
Phenomenology was conceived by Husserl as a rigorous, descriptive,
eidetic science.  Phenomenological descriptions constituted the most
fundamental method of capturing essences.  Consequently, phenomenologists do
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not argue, they describe.  In other words, they do not revise their beliefs on the
grounds that their judgments have been true or false; they redescribe their
beliefs and keep adjusting their descriptions in accordance with the experiential
evidence.  The nature of their descriptions is such that they have to be as
rigorous as they can possibly be.  One has to bear in mind that the mathematical
ideal of rigour has always been one of the pivotal elements of phenomenology.
Husserl, and indeed most phenomenologists, also maintained that
phenomenology captures some of the most fundamental features of all scientific
endeavour.  First, he maintained that all sciences are constituted by means of
some sort of eidetic intuition, or insight, into meanings.  Although science, as an
empirical enterprise, primarily accepts conclusions which agree with the
observed facts, "bare" facts alone, as disclosed in the natural attitude, have no
scientific significance apart from insight into their essential meaning.  Second,
he believed that all scientific meaning consists in the process of abstracting and
idealizing from the basis of the prescientific level of meanings.
Both claims have been vigorously attacked by contemporary empirically
minded philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.  Generally speaking,
Husserl's presuppositions run counter to the empiricist project of naturalizing
epistemology and science.  Naturalized epistemology does not favour meanings
and essences and relegates them to "folk psychology."
Since phenomenologists, by their own decree, start their descriptions from
the natural attitude, there is a strong need in phenomenology to develop some
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       Husserl deals with variation in the Investigations, Experience and Judgment, and Formal and1
Transcendental Logic.  In the Investigations, references to free variation are scattered throughout the whole
second volume.  Variation is used in analyses of instances of inseparable contents, e.g. visual quality and
extension and their relation (p. 440).  Also, the variation is used to test interdependence of intensity and
quality (p. 441).  Free variation is then employed to define isolability (p. 443) and to define the notion of
aggregate, i.e. how it happens that the aggregate is indifferent to its matter (p. 480).  Finally, free variation
is used to account for a possibility of varying both act-quality and act-matter in judgments (p. 586).
In Experience and Judgment, Husserl examines free variation as the foundation of essential seeing
(p. 340).  He considers in some detail the arbitrary structure of the process of the formation of variants and
the process of retaining the multiplicity of variants as the foundation of essential seeing.  As well, congruence
way of advancing beyond that stage.  Various kinds and levels of
phenomenological reduction have been employed to overcome this problem.  One
of the easiest and most natural ways of illustrating a phenomenological
reduction or to engage in one, is to engage in free variation.
The naturalness of free variation also explains why it has always had a
high pedagogical value in phenomenology.  Students are usually invited to
perform a series of imaginative variations in their minds.  By doing that, they
learn to look at the objects discovered and constituted by the natural attitude as
nothing but mere phenomena.  Additionally, they learn to place the existence of
the world in suspension, making thereby a transition from the natural attitude
to the attitude of transcendental phenomenology.
This introduction into the place and role of free variation should not
induce the reader to believe that free variation is, and has always been, a well
defined concept.  Quite the contrary.  It seems to have eluded not only a
commonly shared definition, but even a common name.  It has been variously
referred to as "free variation," "boundless variation," "eidetic variation," "free
eidetic variation," "free fancy," "free fantasy," and so on.1
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in difference in variation (p. 346) and the differences between variation and alternation (p. 347)
receive some attention.
In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl deals with variation under the heading "Universal
philosophical significance of the method that consists in uncovering constitution in consciousness" (p. 249).
He talks there about the "eidetic method," i.e. the method of revealing the eidos by the means of "ontic
variation of a suitable example."
Before I proceed, let me outline what I take the term "free variation" to
mean.  It is an activity of varying, in one's mind, certain aspects of a mental
image or an idea.  This sort of varying is free, first, because of its ideal character
- it is not limited by any concrete circumstances and its elements are not bound
by any concrete contingencies (such as the time, place, or details of its execution)
- and, second, because it can be continued indefinitely.
Take, for example, imagining a human face.  By attempting to change
more or less diverse details of that imagined face one soon discovers that it is
possible to vary it, for example, with respect to its race, gender, and age.  This
discovery sets the grounds for determining the essential qualities normally
associated with a human face.  We will see, later in this chapter, that Husserl
used the term "moment" to signify these essential qualities.
Determining which moments naturally belong to a human face is by no
means an a priori matter.  Some moments, such as race, gender, and age are
more typically and more saliently attributed to human faces.  Some other
moments, such as "nutritional physiognomy" (i.e. a human face may exhibit
various levels of nutrition ranging from obesity to severe undernourishment)
may be less typical and salient.  Perhaps one might argue that the moments
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such as "nutritional physiognomy" are less essential, since they are subject to
relatively quick change.
By choosing any of these "salient" moments one has implicitly made the
commitment to provide all the necessary adjustments of the secondary features
which are, by their nature, dependent on the essential qualities.  For example, if
one chooses to attribute oriental features to the neutrally imagined face, that
choice entails certain variations, i.e., shape of the eyes, position of the
cheekbones, colour of hair and so on.  As well, gender also entails different eye
shapes, lips, and the general structure of the facial bones.  Finally, if one
imagines a face of an elderly person, this invokes certain features of the skin,
somewhat enlarged earlobes and nose, etc.
At any point, however, one is free to change the original parameters of
free variation or to stop the process of varying altogether.  This at times cursory
and erratic manner of varying thoughts and images occurs also in everyday
situations.  Imagine seeing a vaguely familiar face in the crowd of people.  It is
quite customary to alter some features of this face or to vary some other faces
against it in order to determine the source of familiarity.  For example, one may
wonder which parts of that vaguely familiar face of a passer-by should be
modified in order to strengthen the familiarity.  So, one might say: "Look, this
person looks just like Wittgenstein.  It's just the colour and shape of his hair that
obscures the familiarity."  Alternatively, one can attempt to clarify what appears
to be a vague sense of familiarity in the following way: "Look, this face looks
47
familiar.  Does she remind me of a popular actress, an influential TV
commentator, or my former university professor?"  In this latter case, one would
apparently keep the original face constant in one's mind and attempt to vary the
possible sources of familiarity against it.
This latter kind of variation, which appears to be more fuzzy and casual
than the phenomenological one, implies that the salient features of variation
and the mode of varying depend on the various purposes.  To stay with our
human face example, consider some of the possible purposes of variation:
(1) Why does this face look familiar?
(2) What does a face lift do?
(3) What makes a face look oriental?
(4) What lipstick should I wear?
(5) What is the essence of a face?
Only the last purpose of variation, properly speaking, is of concern for a
phenomenologist.  I think that Husserl would probably consider the purposes
like 1-4 not to be purified and objectified enough in order to serve as a ground for
rigorous phenomenological investigation.
  In phenomenology, free variation is just one of the many possible
strategies that can be used in order to display certain essential features of the
process by which the human mind transforms and modifies the world of
experience.  The following chapter will attempt to examine this cognitive
strategy, its development, its nature, and its prominence in phenomenology.  I
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believe that Husserl's early work, Logical Investigations, set the foundation for
his subsequent and distinctive treatment of the notion of free variation.  In
particular, the Investigations  are crucially important to any attempt of
clarifying the roots of this notion in phenomenology.
It was in Logical Investigations where Husserl, for the first time,
envisaged the importance of free variation as an activity discovering certain
regularities in human experience and cognition.  The index of that book,
however, does not contain an entry "free variation" or similar notion.  Indeed,
Husserl refers to this cognitive operation only a few times, terming it
"boundless" or "free" variation.
It was only much later, in his Experience and Judgment, and to some
extent in Formal and Transcendental Logic, that Husserl developed his
conception of "eidetic variation" as an activity leading to the discovery of
essences.  In this latter conception, free variation is transformed into an eidetic
procedure which either involves "insight" into essences or provides the means of
"seeing" essences (Wesenserschauung).  All this naturally deals with the ideas,
image-like creatures of the mind.  In sharp contrast to this, Husserl's early
conception of free variation (implicitly contained in the Investigations) involves
conceptual matters and the methods of conceptual analysis (the notions of
ontological (in)dependence, isolability, unity, etc.).
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In this chapter, I will attempt to elucidate this shift in Husserl's
understanding of free variation.  Finally, I will discuss what appears to be an
aberration in Husserl's theory of free variation, namely some of his writings
other than Investigations and Experience and Judgment, where Husserl seems
greatly to widen his scope of inquiry and talk about "free fancy" instead of "free"
or "eidetic" variation.  I will argue that the notion of "free fancy," developed in
Ideas, involves issues which should be kept apart from Husserl's "central"
discussion of free variation and eidetic variation.
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(2) Free Variation in the Investigations
We have seen that the roots of the discussion of free variation can be traced to
Berkeley and Locke.  Both stressed the importance of the idea that there
necessarily exist certain limits to human imagination.  Put simply, the human
mind is capable of altering, in imagination, the structure of the sensory
experience it receives or has received only in certain ways.  We can, for example,
imagine a man with three heads or a horse with two wings.  Locke writes in the
Essay (2.30.5.) about our complex ideas of substances which are made up of such
collections of ideas as were really never united and never were found together in
any substance.  What we are not capable of imagining, however, are the ideas
that are by their nature not separable and isolable.  Certain parts of a presented
whole can only exist as unified with other parts.  Thus, it is impossible to
separate movement from a moving body even in one's imagination.  Berkeley
pointed out the latter in illustrating the difficulties in the claim that all words
stand for ideas:  "The word Blue stands for a Colour without any extension or
abstract from extension.  But we have not an idea of Colour without extension. 
We cannot imagine Colour without extension" (Berkeley, Philosophical
Commentaries 1948, 62).
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These reflections illustrate the historical context for Husserl's theory of
wholes and parts.  He begins his Third Investigation, which is devoted to
developing this theory, by discussing independent and non-independent
contents.  As the point of departure he takes Berkeley's polemic against Locke
where Berkeley claimed that "abstract ideas" are impossible to form since it is
impossible to separate the abstract idea from the actual experience.  For
example, it is impossible to separate whiteness from white objects.  This polemic
seems to lead one in two possible directions: either to the Platonic claim that
there are abstract ideas, but that they are not derived from experience alone, or
to the claim that the results of the process of abstraction still belong to the realm
of the empirical.  Both claims are difficult to defend.  Husserl sought to find a
middle ground between these two extremes by developing a novel theory of parts
and wholes.
The branch of logic which examines the part-whole relationship is called
mereology.  In this chapter, however, I am concerned with neither formal
properties of the part-whole relationship nor with any formal problems of
mereology.  Instead, I want to focus on the role which the part-whole
relationship, and some other notions related to that relationship, played in the
development of Husserl's notion of free variation.
(a) Parts and Variation
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For Husserl, the investigation into regularities of cognition is not an
investigation into some psychological phenomenon.  In opposition to various
forms of psychologism, Husserl held that the imagination reaches only far
enough to reveal certain objectively existing regularities.  Thus he understood
the limits of imagination as representing certain objective and immutable
properties of phenomena.
This is how he defines the notions of "part" and "whole" in the
Investigations:
We interpret the word `part' in the widest sense: we may call anything a
`part' that can be distinguished `in' an object, or, objectively phrased, that
is `present' in it.  Everything is a part that is an object's real possession,
not only in the sense of being a real thing, but also in the sense of being
something really in something, that truly helps to make it up: an object in
itself, considered in abstraction from all contexts to which it is tied, is
likewise a part (Husserl 1970, 437).
Husserl's theory of the parts and wholes was significantly influenced by
Bolzano's work on the logic of parts and wholes.  This Bolzanian influence is
particularly evident in Husserl's treatment of the further division of parts into
parts of parts:
An intuitively unified tone-sequence, e.g. a melody, is a whole, in which
we find individual tones as parts.  Each of these tones has further parts, a
`moment' of quality, of intensity etc., which as part of parts are also parts
of the melody.  But it is clear in this case that the mediacy with which the
qualitative `moment' of the individual tone enters the whole, cannot be
attributed to our subjective series of divisions or to any other subjective
ground (Husserl 1970, 471).
In this example the melody is a whole, the tone is a prior part and its intensity is
a later, mediate part.  Earlier treatments of parts and wholes can be found in
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Bolzano's Theory of Science.  Bolzano held that ideas which are part of an idea
must be somehow connected, since they form the parts of a whole.  Frequently,
the constituents of an idea occur in an order which is not arbitrary.  If this order
were changed, another complex idea would result.  This is how Bolzano accounts
for this taxonomy of ideas: "I claim that in a complex idea the constituents
sometimes occur in a certain order and sequence; hence we may call one of the
constituents the first, another the second, etc.  But I do not claim that this is
always the case (Bolzano 1972, § 58, 74).  Bolzano also warns that the order of
the constituents of a complex idea sometimes is arbitrary.  This is due largely to
the discursive nature of human thought, i.e. the fact that it cannot grasp various
properties at once, but only one at a time.
Husserl's attention, however, was directed to the non-arbitrary
arrangement of parts in a complex whole.  He particularly sought to strengthen
and further utilize Bolzano's "order" of the constituents of the complex idea by
transferring this kind of regularity from the realm of ideas to the realm of
phenomena.  For example, Bolzano would typically have orders like this in mind:
(1) English speaking Frenchman
(2) French speaking Englishman
whereas Husserl's order would involve sub- and super- ordination.  So, in a
typical example, the primary constituent would be tones (as "proper" parts of a
melody) and the secondary constituents would be intensity of these tones.
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Perhaps the most significant and most controversial characteristic of
Husserl's treatment of the part-whole relationship consists in his extension of
this relationship not only to ideas and propositions but also to virtually all real
and possible epistemic matters.  This is the point where Husserl departs from
Bolzano.  In the Investigations, Husserl ranks Bolzano in close proximity to
Leibniz and is full of respect for his systematic efforts in logic.  However, he held
that Bolzano's work lacked epistemological dimensions:
To mention only one point, one particularly feels his [Bolzano's] defects in
epistemological directions.  There are either no investigations, or else
quite insufficient ones, which give genuine philosophical intelligibility to
logical thought-achievements, and so provide a philosophical estimate of
logic as a discipline (Husserl 1970, 224).
Husserl's theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts was an important part of
his grandiose attempt to clarify and classify all knowledge.  In other words,
Husserl believed that certain kinds of regularity in logic and formal ontology
held a priori and moreover encompassed some aspects of the entire structure of
human understanding and experience.  Here is a discussion of the perception of
a pitch and a tone and the perception of a colour and a shape:
If we are right in holding that there is a part of the quality, e.g. the pitch
C, of the tone in question, which represents its generic `moment', what it
has in common with all tones, then this `moment' primarily inheres in the
quality, secondarily in the tone, and at least tertiarily in the whole tone-
pattern etc.  Just so the moment of colour or shape that inheres in an
extended part of what is visually intuited as such, is primarily attached to
this part, only secondarily to the intuited whole (Husserl 1970, 471).
In Husserl's theory, it can never be an accident that a phenomenon is a
part of something else, and moreover, the ways in which parts appear differ
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greatly, but never accidentally.  According to him, there are many kinds of
necessities and, respectively, many relationships of dependence between various
objects, concepts, and phenomena.  However, these matters are largely regulated
by a priori laws.  In Husserl's words:
To be a part, and, more exactly, to be a part of some determinate sort (a
metaphysical, physical, or logical part or whatever) is rooted in the pure
generic nature of the contents in question, and is governed by laws which
in our sense are a priori laws or `laws of essence' (Husserl 1970, 481).
Clearly, there seem to be Kantian overtones in this sort of discussion. 
One should note, however, that Husserl's belief that "the laws of essence" are
objective and independent of human cognition sharply discriminates the
phenomenological from the Kantian understanding of the a priori.
That all that is given to the human mind or, in other words, any sort of
content which may be subject to phenomenological examination, is necessarily
governed by the "laws of essence" is one of the most fundamental claims in
phenomenology.  In the same vein, the latter insight is one of the starting points
of phenomenology.  From there, phenomenology proceeds, in large part, by
discovering and explicating these laws of essence by engaging in a
phenomenological description.
In disclosing the "laws of essence" the role of free variation is pivotal. 
When it comes to parts and moments, free variation was conceived in the
Investigations as having a particular purpose.  It was designed to serve
primarily as a test of isolability.  As Husserl put it:
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Isolability means only that we can keep some content constant in idea
despite boundless variation - variation that is free, though not excluded by
a law rooted in the contents essence - of the contents associated with it,
and, in general, given with it (Husserl 1970, 443).
One  may be capable of isolating the particular idea, or parts of ideas, and
keeping it constant in one's mind despite all the possible changes that may affect
that idea and the ideas associated with it.  Consider his favourite example,
"head of the horse:"
The head of a horse can be presented `on its own' or `cut off', i.e. we can
hold it in our fancy, while we allow the other parts of the horse, and its
whole intuited setting, to alter and vanish at will (Husserl 1970, 439).
One may attach that head, in one's mind, to the rest of a human's body and form
a "horse-headed" human being.  In the same vein, one may imagine the horse's
head carved in wood and placed on a chess board, or some other possible
configuration.  Some other parts of the complex ideas, such as "the hue of the
colour," "intensity of the musical tone" are, however, not capable of being
imagined in isolation.  Hence variation shows that a head, or generally, a "thing"
has a different nature from a hue or intensity.
This discovery of isolability of the parts leads to some other discoveries.  If
one succeeds in showing that "head" is capable of being imagined in isolation
then its ideally graspable essence, its intrinsic structure, is independent from all
other contents.  For example, a sheet of glass would be a part independent of a
whole.  In contrast, if one imagines a sales representative as a part of the whole
(certain company) then it becomes clear that being a representative presupposes
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being a representative of the company.  In this sense, a part sales representative
is dependent on company as a whole.  I will further examine interdependence of
parts and moments in connection to Husserl's understanding of moments.
As we have seen, there are fine differences in various kinds of regularities
in phenomena.  Husserl introduced variation, in the Investigations, as the means
of exhibiting these regularities that may be discovered by the acts of
imagination.
(b) Moments and Abstraction
Regarding Husserl's attempt at the taxonomy of pure essences the
following question - a question much in the vein of the British empiricist
tradition - might be asked:  "How does one make sure that the essences one is
supposed to discover are not either a figment of one's imagination or simple and
casual empirical generalizations extrapolated from sense data?"  In order to
answer this question, he introduced the notion of moments.  This notion was
expected to solve the problem of the existence of abstract properties and
relations.
Here again we see that Husserl is greatly influenced by the British
empiricists in the Investigations.  This time, he is accounting for a dispute
between Locke and Hume concerning the problem of abstraction and appealing
to what he interprets as Hume's solution of this problem.
58
The question, as Husserl phrases it, is the following: "How can we
distinguish between the white sphere we have just intuited and whiteness (and
sphericity) since `whiteness' and `sphericity' cannot count as ideas in the
Lockean sense?"  One has to remember that, for Locke, the ideas such as
"whiteness" would have to be contained in the concrete idea as particular parts
separable from it.
Husserl points to Hume's solution to this problem, which is strikingly
similar to Carnap's "similarity circles" mentioned earlier in the Locke chapter:
If we compare a white sphere with a black sphere and on the other hand
with a white cube, we notice two differing resemblances.  Through
repeated comparison of this sort, objects sort themselves out for us into
"circles of resemblance" and ever strengthening habits teach us to
consider each object in "different aspects," according to the resemblances
which permit its placing in different, but definite circles (Husserl 1970,
408).
Hume talked, according to Husserl (although I was unable to find this in
Hume's writings), about "circles of resemblance."  Apparently, one is able to form
circles of resemblance by considering each object in different aspects.  In other
words, human beings discern, through habit and repeated instruction, typical
resemblances which permit placing objects in different but definite circles.  The
result of this is our ability to imagine a white cube and bring out a resemblance
(in respect of colour and shape) so that the white sphere is given a place in the
resemblance circles of colour and shape.  According to this reflection, it is
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possible to note different "moments" in the same intuitive object.  In other
words, the same intuition may serve as a basis for the so-called abstraction.
Remembering Locke's process of abstracting, one might claim that Hume's
process of abstracting proceeds in a different direction from Locke's.  Locke's
abstraction works by tacitly presupposing certain respects in which perceived or
imagined objects resemble each other and only then invoking the objects.
Hume's abstraction, at least according to Husserl, begins by invoking more or
less complete representations of the objects in one's mind.  Only then does one
proceed to examine these representations and to discover the moments that they
may comprise.
(c) Moments, Properties and Species
Husserl defines the notions of piece (portion) and moment (an abstract
part) using the notions of relative dependence and independence:
Each Part that is independent relatively to a whole W we call a Piece
(Portion), each part that is non-independent relatively to W we call a
Moment (an abstract part) of this same whole W (Husserl 1970, 467).
The gist of his contrast between moments and pieces is an attempt to deny that
the former are real in the sense in which independently existing objects are. 
Nevertheless, in maintaining that moments can not exist independently, he
would still like to claim that they have to be accounted for as objective entities. 
According to Husserl, pieces are individuals which are capable of having
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numerous temporal, spatial, and causal relations with each other.  They can be
isolated and taken separately as whole and real objects.  Moments, by contrast,
are separable only in imagination.  The latter are capable of appearing either in
the simple relations or in the most intimate mutual penetration but never in
isolation.  Furthermore, the same intuitive object (a piece) can be a basis on
which different moment-parts are noted.
In order to prevent a great confusion that may arise by conflating objects
of experience, pieces, moments, and species, Husserl attempted to clarify these
things in simple terms in the Investigations.  Suppose we have a red object
before us.  Clearly, this object is not the species "red."  Not only is this object not
the species itself, it also can not contain the species as a "psychological" or
"metaphysical" part.  To hold that objects contain the species in themselves
would involve multiplying abstract entities beyond any reasonable need.  How
would one explain, to use a contemporary example, that a bank card contains
the species "red" in itself, as well as "plastic," "rectangular object," etc.  When it
comes to moments, however, one does not have to speak of abstract entities
contained in some other, real, entities.  The moment (non-independent part) of
"red" is something individual, something capable of existing here and now.
The moment arises and vanishes with the concrete whole object.  The
particular moment of colour red (for example, the particular intensity or hue of
red) is alike red but not identical in different red objects.  In the same vein, the
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particular degree of softness or elasticity constitutes a moment of "being made of
plastic." 
However, this does not mean that moments should be confused with
properties of objects.  To illustrate this, consider whether "being a product of
communist economy" is a moment or not.  One could claim that since "being a
product of communist economy" once applied to a wide range of products (cars,
jackets, newspapers) it should be seen as a moment.  Take, for example, the cars
manufactured in communist countries during the era of the cold war.  All these
cars were quite unlike and they were produced by quite different countries, from
China to Hungary, but there was that one property clearly recognizable in all of
them.  They were all made by a communist country; that was what made them
comparable to each other.
What constitutes "being a product of communist economy" a property and
not a moment is its dependence on human ordinary and mundane perceptions of
objects which may be, and often are, subject to change.  In this particular case, it
can be easily imagined that people will not be able to tell, in the not too distant
future, whether a particular car was indeed produced by a communist economy
or not.  One has to remember that phenomenologists introduced "bracketing"
precisely in order to clear their descriptions from the effects of human ordinary
and mundane perceptions.
In contrast to particular moments of colour "red," "redness" is an
ideal unity, in regard of which it is absurd to speak of its coming into being and
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passing away.  The latter would be a category mistake; one could say that it
makes sense to say that the red in an object has a particular intensity, or comes
to be or passes away.  But the same cannot be said about redness.
(d) Moments, Foundation, and Interdependence
Let me give an example in order to illustrate the concepts of moments and
foundation.  Imagine a tone.  One can evidently vary a tone in a number of ways. 
It might be higher or lower, it might be louder or softer, it might be brassier or
brighter.  These fundamental ways of varying the general concept (or the mental
impression) of a tone leads to a discovery of moments.  Moment is an entity
which is founded on some other entity.  In the case of a tone, we take it to be a
foundation for various possible moments that tones may have.  We consequently
discover that there are at least three moments to tones: pitch, loudness, and
timbre.
This kind of variation, which leads to the discovery of moments, can be
distinguished from another kind where we take certain parts to examine their
relative independence from their respective wholes.  For example, we can take
the head of an animal and imagine it carved in wood or wrought in iron. 
Moreover, we can imagine a recognizable head of an animal in many kinds of
stylized form, e.g. made of matches, ceramic tiles, or Lego bricks.  Because we
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can do this, we have established that the notion, i.e. of a head, examined by free
variation is of independent nature, i.e. it is not "founded"  in any other concepts.
However, with certain moments, such as for example "the level of
exasperation in a gesture" we cannot form any independent judgment or mental
image without presupposing the notions they depend on.  If we discover that
certain notions, such as "exasperation in a gesture" depend on some other
notions - in this case on "human behaviour" - we can conclude that the former
are founded in the latter.  In cases like this one, it is even possible to reconstruct





(4) more or less exasperated gesture.
This may lead us to work towards disclosing, reasonably precisely and
exhaustively, the intricate web of moments and parts and the relationships of
dependence between the moments, parts and wholes.  By looking beyond the
appearances in this manner, Husserl believed, we disclose the hidden and
implicit regularities in cognition.
As I suggested earlier, moments and parts, by their nature, have pregnant
and essential relations of dependence with each other and with their respective
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wholes.  Husserl called these relations the relations of foundation.  This is the
way in which he defines foundation:
If a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist except in a more
comprehensive unity which associates it with an M, we say that an A as
such requires foundation by an M or also that an A as such needs to be
supplemented by an M (Husserl 1970, 463).
A "founded" concept obeys a pure law, or a law a priori, which makes the genus
of the "founded" concept dependent on the genera of the "founding" contents. 
Here is an example Husserl gives in Experience and Judgment:
We can also say: if, by varying the example, we construct the a priori
concept "sound," we find contained in it the partial concepts "quality,"
"intensity," and "timbre."  If we retain the concept of sound and think of
some individual particulars or others of this kind in thinking "in general,"
it belongs in general to this concept that it also participates in the partial
concept of sound (Husserl 1973, 376).
According to Husserl all these laws and regularities may be discovered with
respect to most phenomena.  As we will see later in this chapter, there are some
modes and domains of cognition which are indeed prone to disclosing this sort of
regularity - Husserl's examples with tones and colours are carefully chosen to
enhance this sense of regularity and order in cognition.
However, there is a vast number of phenomena and moments whose
interdependence is by no means an a priori matter (for example, "being made of
plastic" as a moment).  Moments of this kind would, most probably, have to do
with the contingent and typified understanding of certain historical, political,
artistic, or any other kind of potential aspects and properties of phenomena.
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Perhaps one would have to admit that there are some phenomena which
allow for rigid conceptual hierarchy and some which do not. Consequently, a
hierarchy of both conceptual and intuitive matters would largely apply to the
former kind of phenomena.  To see how this sort of hierarchy works, one has to
remember that the "particular triangular figure" is a species of "triangular
figure" which, in turn, is a species of "spatial figure."  However, these relations
of foundation are not to be continued indefinitely - if they were, Husserl would
be faced with the charge of infinite regress.  One is reminded of an ancient
philosophical fable about the way the Earth is supported by turtles which rest on
turtles which rest on turtles, and so on.  This is Husserl's account of how he
managed to escape infinite regress:
Our conception avoids these endless regresses of parts which are always
splitting into further series.  Nothing really exists - in the sense of being a
possible object of sense-perception - beyond the aggregate of a whole's
`pieces', together with the sensuous forms of unity, which rest on these
pieces conjointly.  Unity is conferred on the `moments' in the `pieces', as
also on the `moments' of unity and the `pieces', by the foundational
relations in the sense of our definition (Husserl 1970, 479).
(e) Aggregates and Levels of Dependence
By introducing moments, Husserl's theory can be seen to be closely
connected to the application of free variation.  First their affinity is evident in a
methodological sense.  Free variation is by far the most effective means of
revealing moments and parts and their mutual relationships.  Second, the
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notions of free variation and moment have a functional affinity.  The functional
affinity between free variation and moments is shown most effectively by
focusing our attention on "aggregate" as a form of unity of thought.
Thoughts may occur together and yet not form any new content, or
significant new whole.  In such a case we speak of an aggregate.  For example,
one may imagine in one moment two apples on the table and in the next moment
three pears on the same table.  In that case, thought would unite "pieces" and
not "moments."  This mode of variation would reveal no salient properties and no
relationships of dependence regarding any of its objects and ideas.  In an
aggregate, there are no essential features to be discovered by varying any of its
contents:
This is shown in the fact that the form of the aggregate is quite indifferent
to its matter, i.e. it can persist in spite of wholly arbitrary variations in its
comprised contents (Husserl 1970, 480).
The difference between the entirely arbitrary variation in an aggregate and
"free" variation, which may be used for the purposes of phenomenological inquiry
is fruitfully illustrated, I believe, by a mathematical analogy.
In the practice of elementary algebra there are two treatments of a free
variable, illustrated by the difference between so-called conditional and identical
equations.  An example of the latter is: x+y = y+x and the example of the former
is x²+2x-8 = 0.  Truths about the variable x in the identical equation are
generated differently from truths about the conditional equation.  For the
purposes of this analogy it might also be noted that, in the identical equation,
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one is free to substitute any number for x, without affecting truth or falsity of
the equation.  In other words, the activity of varying x does not reveal any
dependence of the variable x on the form of the equation.  In the case of
conditional equations, only the substitution of certain numbers will yield true
results.  Hence in the latter case, substitution seems capable of revealing that x
is dependent on the form of the equation.
Even in the case of wholes, which unite their constituents in forming a
new concept, it is possible to discern various levels of interdependence of their
moments.  On the one hand, moments such as visual quality and extension may
be varied independently.  Husserl remarks that to say, for example, that certain
constituents of the complex ideas cannot be imagined in isolation is not to say
that those (interdependent) constituents cannot be varied independently.  He
considers moments of visual quality and extension and their relation to the figure
which bounds (founds) them:
It is doubtless true in a certain sense that these moments can be
independently varied.  Extension can stay the same while colour varies
indefinitely, colour stay the same while extent and figure vary indefinitely
(Husserl 1970, 440).
This capacity of "varying the moments indefinitely" is limited by the assumption
that extension and visual quality are still there - they cannot simply be
eliminated.
On the other hand, there are much stronger relationships of
interdependence where varying one of the moments necessarily affects another. 
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An example of this kind of dependence would be the relation of intensity to
quality.  In Husserl's words:
The Intensity of a tone in not something indifferent or so-to-speak alien to
its quality.  We cannot keep the intensity just as it is, while the quality
varies at will, or is allowed to vanish (Husserl 1970, 441).
In other words, if one increases the brightness above a certain point, one
necessarily diminishes the saturation of a colour.  The very bright, "washed out,"
colours cannot be rich in pigment.
(f) Conclusion
The task of phenomenology is to capture the essence of these moment-
parts and their mutual relationships, by describing their nature.  The essence of
these entities was supposed to emerge, according to Husserl, through the
intricate, yet rigid, web of relationships of dependence and unity.  However, the
most effective way to isolate and to examine the properties of moments and
forms of their unity is by the means of "boundless" or "free" variation.  This was
the term which Husserl used in the Investigations on a very few occasions.
Since moments and moment-parts are not real entities, they are, by their
nature, not the objects of observation or empirical testing procedures.  In order to
examine and to capture their properties one has to set up in one's mind the
"laboratory" in which to perform the investigation.  Once that decision is made
in principle, the grounds for the use of free variation are ready.  The
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investigators need only set up in their mind the particular fraction of the world
on whose basis diverse properties and relations are to be varied.
As I have suggested, free variation in phenomenology emerged as a part of
Husserl's attempt to address both the problems of epistemology and logic in his
Logical Investigations.  Husserl held that there must be certain regularities of
thought and experience which may be discovered and described by a rigorous
philosophical inquiry.  Through the practice of this inquiry, it turns out that one
cognitive strategy proved to be particularly effective in phenomenology, the
strategy called "boundless" or "free" variation.
What I would like to suggest, and will discuss later, is that the
study of free variation can and should be extended beyond phenomenology.  This
particular phenomenological notion captures, I believe, a precise and elaborate
cognitive mechanism.
In fact, I would suggest in closing that free variation is directly applicable
to several contemporary questions.  Free variation may find its application in
the contemporary debates on thought experiments and nature of imagination.
In terms of cognitive science, the dynamic and complex initial gestalt
which is formed by the process of free variation may also help us gain some
insight into the ways in which the "Laboratory of the Mind" works.
Finally, free variation may help elucidate the intricate processes of
transformation between the pictorial and the discursive in human cognition,
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transformation which occurs, in some form or another, whenever the human
mind engages in manipulating its thoughts and images. 
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(3) Development and Refinement of Free Variation in Experience and Judgment
a) Introduction
As I have attempted to show, Logical Investigations provided the foundations for
subsequent development of free variation in phenomenology.  I hope that I have
revealed Husserl's great indebtedness to the British empiricist tradition on the
topic of manipulating ideas in one's mind.  Locke's manipulation of ideas in
human cognition, in particular, served as the ground for Husserl's treatment of
varying contents of one's thought.
Manipulation of ideas, however, may be placed in contexts other than that
of the Investigations, where Husserl took it only as an important element in
examining parts and wholes and their mutual dependence.  In his later work
Experience and Judgment, he attempted to show that the manipulation of ideas,
in the form of free variation, can be examined on its own.  One has to note,
however, that the Investigations and Experience and Judgment have a lot in
common.  For one thing, they both exemplify Husserl's broad and peculiar
understanding of logic.  In particular, parts of Experience and Judgment were
written in an attempt to solve some particular problems that arose in the
Investigations.  Some older parts of Experience and Judgment date from 1908. 
They were combined, by Ludwig Landgrebe (who edited this book), with some
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other manuscripts dating from 1910 to 1914 and some later material. 
Experience and Judgment was published quite late -- a short time after Husserl's
death in 1938, by Academia-Verlag of Prague.
The technique of variation was conceived, in Experience and Judgment, as
the vehicle of essential seeing.  However, in order to reach an understanding of
both free variation and essential seeing one first has, I believe, to consider the
role of two methods of generalizing in Husserl.
According to Husserl, who relies in these matters on a deeply rooted
philosophical tradition, there are two fundamental methods of generalizing:
empirical (non-essential) generalization and pure (essential) generalization.
Empirical generalization, by its nature, creates non-essential types.  In
the experiences of everyday life, this typification is quite stable and capable of
reliable judgments and predictions, but it may sometimes be erroneous and
superficial.  Husserl illustrates the latter by an example from zoology:  The
membership of whales in the class of mammals is masked by the outward
analogy which whales have with fishes.
Nevertheless, empirical typification is a basis for the natural sciences and
for what Husserl calls "empirical natural history."  Suzanne K. Langer, in her
Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, Volume I, devotes a chapter to pre-scientific
knowledge.  Her illustrations of the ways in which a pre-scientific typification 
proceeds are exceptionally perceptive.  Here is one of her examples:
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Ordinarily in the kind of thinking which civilized adults today call
"common sense," every familiar physical object has a stable dominant
gestalt according to which it is publicly classified, i.e., named; and how it
is named largely determines the way we experience it even privately.  One
may fancy a witch riding on a broom, but one thinks of the object she rides
on as a broom; it would be strange to thinks of sweeping the kitchen with
the bristly tail of a witch's hobbyhorse (Langer 1967, 61).
In Husserl's writings, there are numerous treatments of the acquisition of
empirical concepts.  Husserl has often emphasized the role of typification in
empirical generalization:
When we see a dog, we immediately anticipate its additional modes of
behaviour: its typical way of eating, playing, running, jumping, and so on. 
We do not actually see its teeth; but although we have never yet seen this
dog, we know in advance how its teeth will look - not in their individual
determination but according to type, inasmuch as we have already had
previous and frequent experience of "similar" animals, of "dogs," that they
have such things as "teeth" and of this typical kind (Husserl 1973, 331).
It may appear that this sort of generalizing is subject to random and contingent
influx of experiences that, over time, take the shape according to various
"external" and "internal" circumstances.  The internal circumstances might be:
frequency and regularity of certain experiences, history of the early and
primitive attempts at generalizing, etc.  The external circumstances might be:
social and cultural stereotypes and routines, idiosyncrasies adherent to
particular languages, etc.  These generalities, which I can only touch upon, have
been studied by more or less empirical scientific disciplines such as
anthropology, psychology, sociology, and linguistics.
Husserl's concerns, however, took a somewhat different direction.  He was
interested in pure laws and regularities in cognition which should be seen as
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distinct from the empirical typification.  One of their most important points of
difference is that pure laws of typification can always engulf empirical ones.  To
see how this works, it is sufficient to direct one's attention to certain processes of
thinking.
Any concrete individual, for example, is capable of being thought of, or
imagined, repeatedly.  In that case, the individual would become an example of
its sort, capable of being thought of independently.  This property makes this
individual a concept of the lowest generality, therefore the most independent
concept:
This universal, born of the repetition of like independent objects (that is,
from individuals) is lowest generality, the most independent; that implies
that it is one which is not founded in other generalities, therefore which
does not presuppose them (Husserl 1973, 335).
  In Husserl's terminology, this indicates that this concept is not founded on any
other concepts or generalities.  In opposition to this, there are numerous
concepts which by their nature presuppose some other, more general, concepts. 
For example, the concept "debt" presupposes at least some of the following
concepts: "value," "goods," "money," "private ownership," etc.  Generality can be
extended; Husserl offered, in Experience and Judgment, the following examples
of the most general concepts:  "unity," "plurality," "whole," "part," "difference,"
etc.
He explained that the difference between "higher and lower order"
generalities emerges largely as an effect of varying ideas in one's mind: "The
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higher generalities are obtained by variation of ideas (Husserl 1973, 359)." 
What he meant by this is that ideas do not simply display their level of
generality: something has to be done to them in order to discover their
conceptual "provenance."  Since all ideas depend, at least to some degree, on
sensory experience, even the ideas of highest generality cannot be entirely
divorced from the world of experience.  Indeed, Husserl stated that "the seeing of
ideas is itself an analogue of simple experience" (Experience and Judgment, 359). 
However, the seeing of ideas is a higher and actively productive form of
consciousness in which the mind becomes capable of grasping a new kind of
objectivity, the universal objectivity.  Inquiry into this sort of phenomenon and
this mode of cognition falls, according to Husserl, into the realm of pure, a priori,
forms of cognition.
The empirical and the pure generalizing may also be seen as constituting
two distinct, although interrelated, methodological approaches.  The first is the
approach of empirical science which routinely refines and redefines most of the
aspects of the empirical typification.  Science normally takes common sense and
direct perception as the loose check points for its theories.  Science, in this sense,
creates models for embracing and explaining phenomena in the most satisfactory
manner.  The second approach, mostly but not necessarily associated with
philosophy and logic, is concerned with the pure laws which govern all possible
typifications and generalizations.  This second approach, in phenomenology,
proceeds by seizing upon essences.  The method this approach has been using is
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called, in Husserl's terminology, the method of essential seeing
(Wesenerschauung).  He does not define the method of essential seeing per se. 
Instead, he notes the following about this method's execution:
It is based on the modification of an experienced or imagined objectivity,
turning it into an arbitrary example which, at the same time, receives the
character of a guiding "model," a point of departure for the production of
an infinitely open multiplicity of variants (Husserl 1973, 340).
It is clear that the most effective vehicle of essential seeing in phenomenology is
the activity of free variation.
(b) Basic Features of Free Variation in Experience and Judgment
As pointed out in the earlier part of this chapter, I believe that Husserl's
notion of free variation has its roots in Logical Investigations.  Through the
course of Husserl's practice of phenomenology, however, the notion of free
variation has become augmented and, in Ideas, conflated with that of free
fantasy.  I will attempt to show that there are notable differences between the
these two which are exhibited, most evidently, by the range of their application. 
As well, I believe that Experience and Judgment further develops the analysis of
the fundamental characteristics of free variation which were only hinted at in
Logical Investigations.
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In Experience and Judgment one can find, for the first time fully and
coherently elaborated, the doctrine of free variation.  I will now examine its most
salient features:
(1) Free variation is produced by an act of volition.  It does not occur
spontaneously in the manner in which pain, perception of objects, or a
sudden flash of remembrance might occur.
(2) Free variation produces ever new similar images as copies and similar
concepts as modifications of that which appears to be ideally common to
all of them.
(3) We have to retain a grasp of the things imagined earlier as a multiplicity
in an open process.
(4) Free variation discovers essences, the necessarily invariable, which
prescribes limits to all variation or, in other words, the essence without
which the object or the idea cannot be imagined as such.
(5) Free variation, in its course, reveals the open possibility of any number of
new multiplicities of variation - that is why free variation gives its chosen
objects a character of arbitrariness.
(1) The first feature of free variation, that of volition, is the feature which
constitutes free variation as an activity.  Volition implies at least some sense of
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active intervening in the contents of one's thought.  In other words, one has to be
attentive and constantly focused while engaged in the process of free variation.
This feature of free variation makes clearer a subtle difference between
free variation and freedom of fantasy.  Free fantasy is a capacity, whereas free
variation is an activity.  For one thing, it is possible to define variation as an
activity performed in fantasy.  To say that the reverse may be the case, i.e. that
one can define fantasy as an activity performed in variation does not make
sense.  Consequently, I claim that free variation presupposes free fantasy (or
freedom in fantasy) but free variation is neither identical with free fantasy nor
can it be entirely reduced to it.
An analogous case is made by Roy Sorensen in his book Thought
Experiments.  Sorensen draws a distinction between imagination and a thought
experiment, defining a thought experiment as an activity and imagination as
capacity.  Sorensen's distinction pertains to a difference between an act of
setting up a thought experiment in imagination (imagining it) and performing a
thought experiment (in imagination).  Imagining a thought experiment is a
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for performing a thought experiment.  In
Sorensen's words:
Another sign of the distinction between the thought experiment and the
imaginary experiment it depicts is the contrast between the variables
manipulated in each experiment.  It is one thing to imagine physical
things being manipulated and another to vary what one supposes.  The
varied suppositions are real, the varied physical conditions imaginary. 
Epistemologists suppose that a thirtieth-century delusionologist is
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experimenting on your brain.  This imagined experiment is part of
thought experiment, not the thought experiment itself (Sorensen 1992,
221).
(2) The second feature of free variation involves producing ever new
images of that which is ideally common to all of them.  When it comes to this
sort of activity, one is reminded of Locke's views on variation and abstraction. 
In Locke, there was always a sense of mutual dependence between concrete
ideas being modified and the general idea which serves as the ground for
modifications.  This sort of dependence was often a ground for criticisms
launched against Locke.  One has to remember that Locke always presupposed
some sense of generality which was already installed in the human mind
alongside received sense experience.  This "built-in" generality then served as
the respect in accordance to which ideas should have their parts modified.  But in
Husserl it is the other way around: one attains this sense of generality through
the very process of modification of ideas.
Husserl was not worried by this apparent circularity; he always
emphasized one's freedom to engage in the process of variation at any level.  To
use his example, one could either start by varying concrete objects in order to
discover a higher generality, namely a particular colour.  Thus one could say
that any number of given objects are variants of "red object."  At the same time,
one could choose to initiate the process of variation leading to the highest
abstract genus - to an abstract essence - one would vary several coloured objects
and discover that colour belongs to all of them as a highly abstract moment.  In
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other words, one would discover that colour is not an independent, real object; it
presupposes extension in order to exist.  For Husserl, Lockean dependencies
between general concepts and their variants merely serve as a vast playground,
or network of possible directions, for free variation.  He gladly embraced all
possible meanderings that the process of varying may take:
But in the case of variation, we can start out from the beginning from a
concrete, independent object.  Thus, for example, by the variation of this
fountain pen we come to the genus "useful object."  But we can also drop
this limitation and discover ever new possibilities of variation; we can, for
example, imagine the fountain pen changed into a stone, and there is still
something common which runs through them: both are spatially extended,
material things (Husserl 1973, 358-359).
(3) The third feature of free variation is our capacity of retaining in grasp
the things imagined earlier.  This is obvious: without some sort of common
thread, the modifications of ideas and images would turn into mere temporal
juxtaposition of ideas.  This feature of free variation also provides it with a sense
of direction:
....we must, despite the arbitrary nature of the activity of variation in
other respects, confine ourselves to one direction: if at the beginning of the
variation a common red lights up for us, we can then immediately arrest
it and intend nothing other than red in general, therefore that identical
red which any additional variation whatsoever would give us.  If we are
confronted with a green, we reject it as not belonging to this series of
variations, as entering into conflict with the seen red which continues to
be intended (Husserl 1973, 357).
This example shows "incongruent" variants being eliminated from the "normal,"
or intended, course of free variation. 
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(4) The fourth feature of free variation is its capability of discovering
essences.  In her study of Husserl's logic, Suzanne Bachelard remarked that
"Phenomenology employs only the data of pure intuition" (Bachelard 1968, 182). 
However, phenomenology is also engaged in eidetic analysis, by virtue of which
it strives to be both an intuitive and a priori discipline.  How does this a priori
dimension come about?  Phenomenology, according to Bachelard, does not
explain the nature of the human being through theories.  It uncovers, instead,
the profound sense of the world and of the human being.  This is how Bachelard
puts it:
But this uncovering makes essences appear which reveal a priori
structures.  And these a priori structures are revealed not only in the
objective world but even in the constituting subjectivity (Bachelard 1968,
184).
Bachelard's passage, dealing with a priori structures and the constituting
subjectivity, looks like an inverted Kantian position.  A Kantian would surely
have things this way round: A priori structures are revealed not only in the
constituting subjectivity but even in the objective world.
In Experience and Judgment, as well as in Ideas there are numerous
passages which suggest that all empirical experience is formed according to
certain a priori and necessary principles:
It will be necessary to show how, in contrast to these empirical concepts,
pure concepts are formed, concepts whose constitution does not depend on
the contingency of the element actually given as the point of departure
and its empirical horizons.  These concepts do not envelop an extension
which, as it were, is open merely after the event, but beforehand, a priori. 
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This envelopment beforehand signifies that they must be capable of
prescribing rules to all empirical particulars (Husserl 1973, 339-340).
The nature of these rules and regularities of all empirical particulars is
such that they are best discovered and isolated by the activity of free variation. 
Husserl was attempting to show how it happens that the particular necessities
in all experience and the conditions of conceiving certain objects and concepts in
imagination are brought out by free variation:
In other words, for its modification in pure imagination, we let ourselves
be guided by the fact taken as a model.  For this it is necessary that ever
new similar images be obtained as copies, as images of the imagination,
which are all concretely similar to the original image.  Thus, by an act of
volition we produce free variants, each of which, just like the total process
of variation itself, occurs in the subjective mode of the "arbitrary."  It then
becomes evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive
figures, that in such free variations of an original image, e.g., of a thing,
an invariant is necessarily retained as the necessary general form, without
which an object such as this thing, as an example of its kind, would not be
thinkable at all (Husserl 1973, 340-341).
This necessary general form is also an invariable according to which all the
variants coincide: it is a general essence.  Husserl admits that this eidos is to be
taken as an idea in the Platonic sense.  However, he warns against the
metaphysical interpretations of this notion and suggests that eidos should be
taken as it is given to us immediately and intuitively in the vision of the idea
which arises in the process of free variation.  Husserl also admits that the term
"seeing" cannot be avoided in these matters.  Of course, when he talks about
"seeing," he does not mean "sensuous seeing":
With this, we wish to indicate that we appropriate, directly and as itself, a
common and general moment of as many examples as desired, seen one by
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one, in a manner wholly analogous to the way in which we appropriate an
individual particular in sensuous perception; although, to be sure the
seeing is more complex here.  It is a seeing resulting from the actively
comparative overlapping of congruence (Husserl 1973, 348).
Remembering Husserl's treatment of parts and wholes and abstract
entities in the Investigations and comparing it to passages like this from
Experience and Judgment, one begins to notice significant, if not radical
differences in methodology.  Husserl's early analysis of free variation is largely a
conceptual matter whereas his eidetic analysis of free variation in Experience
and Judgment is largely image-based.  Is there a possibility for free variation to
embrace both eidetic as well as conceptual analysis?  We will see, latter in this
chapter, that free variation yields both kinds of analysis.  Husserl's
commentators indeed took both directions: Schütz talked for the most part about
eidetic nature of free variation whereas Mohanty emphasized the role of
semantics.
(5) The fifth feature of free variation is its open-ended nature, the
possibility of extending the multiplicity of successive modifications ad infinitum. 
This feature of free variation gives the character of arbitrariness to its chosen
objects and ideas.  Most commentators have devoted considerable effort to
elucidating the importance of this feature.  Richard Zaner summarizes the basic
points about this, made earlier in Bachelard's book, in the following way:
Closely following Husserl's works, Bachelard stressed that this
Beliebigkeit signifies (1) a consciousness that one is able freely to
substitute one example for another, or that any actual or possible example
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can serve as the point of departure, (2) that eidetic fantasy variation is a
"freeing from" all factuality and (3) that the method does not oblige one to
run through all possible cases in order for the invariant (the eidos) to be
made to "stand out" as such (due to the essentially appertaining
consciousness of the "and so forth according to option" which Husserl
stresses), this consciousness of "potency" being intrinsic to the method
(Zaner 1973, 203).
This last mentioned consequence of arbitrariness might lead one to believe that
the activity of free variation could be seen as nothing but a weakened form of
mathematical induction.  Mathematical induction is usually described in the
following way:
The form of proof mentioned in the last paragraph is known as proof by
mathematical induction.  Its two stages are known as Basis and the
Induction Step.  In the Basis of a proof by mathematical induction we
establish that the Theorem (whatever it is) holds for the minimal case (in
the present proof, the case where the derivation is one formula long: there
cannot be a more minimal case than this; a derivation has to be at least
one formula long).  In the Induction Step we prove that if the Theorem
holds for all cases up to an arbitrarily given point then it holds also for all
cases at the next higher point (Hunter 1971, 85).
Free variation may be seen as analogous to this; a basis for free variation
might be an original conceptual setting, or an original idea together with an
initial alternation (or modification) of this idea.  The Induction step would
further involve any number of arbitrary modifications made in the manner
corresponding to the initial modification.
However, both Husserl and Husserl's commentators reject the suggestion
that this feature of free variation is entirely a mathematical notion which has
been simply extended, and even perhaps significantly weakened by being so
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extended, to cover much wider empirical grounds.  Husserl did not believe that a
priori thinking is an exclusive property of mathematical reasoning:
There is not the slightest reason to consider the methodological structure
of a priori thinking, as we have exhibited it in its general essential
features in mathematical thinking, as an exclusive property of the
mathematical sphere.  Indeed in view of the general essential relationship
of actuality and possibility, of experience and pure imagination, even to
admit such a limitation would be completely absurd (Husserl 1973, 353).
In this view, mathematics is only a part of phenomenological reasoning,
explicated in terms of pure generalizations, pure laws, and pure essences.  It is
still an open question whether or not phenomenological reasoning, without the
benefit of the mathematical axiomatization, can claim mathematical rigour.
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(4) Enter Fantasy:Free Variation in Ideas
(a) The Phenomenologist's Attitude
I have claimed that Husserl's conception of free variation as "free fancy"
was an aberration from his "normal" discussion of free variation elsewhere.  I
will now attempt to elucidate what I perceive as the underlying motives for
Husserl's uncritical "opening" of the concept of free variation.  In short, I believe
that it was largely the vast scope of the phenomenological project and its
ontological commitments that made Husserl talk about free fancy instead of free
variation in his Ideas.
From what I said about free variation so far it is still difficult to
distinguish peculiarities of its nature and its execution from some other similar
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cognitive operations.  Let me begin this section by presenting the main reason
why it happens that free variation is such a difficult term to make operational.
It seems that there is nothing distinctive about either the nature of its
objects or the nature of its cognitive procedures.  This goes hand in hand with
the fact that phenomenologists never inquired into what free variation is.  The
reason for this apparent neglect in making this term operational is that free
variation in phenomenology has largely been based on a particular attitude of an
examiner, far more than on any concrete and testable, procedure.
The fundamental requirement for engaging in free variation is a shift in a
thinker's attitude.  This shift is minute and subtle and often misunderstood.  For
that reason phenomenologists have often dwelled on both its subtlety and its
importance.  The attitude which a phenomenologist assumes is primarily one of
disregarding or bracketing any question about the reality and non-reality of the
world.  A phenomenologist is aware that an acceptance of a seemingly innocuous
real/non-real distinction requires a complex nexus of acts positing reality,
whereas it is one of the most fundamental phenomenological principles not to
posit any entities before a careful investigation of them as pure phenomena. 
Alfred Schütz described this shift in the following way: 
Taking an empirical fact as our point of departure, we transpose the
factual experiences to the realm of irrealities, of the `as if', which
confronts us with the pure possibilities, purified, that is, of everything
bound to the particular fact and any fact at all (Schütz 1959, 160).
88
The phenomenological method leaves thus the objects of experience be
what they may be; instead, it focuses its attention on the way these objects
became what they appear to be through numerous acts of acquiring and
constituting objects of experience.  The attention of a phenomenologist is
therefore shifted from the objects of experience to the modes of their constitution
in cognition.  It goes without saying that this strategy of a phenomenologist has
a great lineage in the thought of Hume and Kant, among others.  If one reflects
on the nature of images, for example, then it would be wrong, Husserl
maintains, to consider them simply present in the human mind conceived as a
camera obscura:
One should not talk and think as if an image stood in the same relation to
consciousness as a statue does to a room in which it is set up, or as if the
least light could be shed on the matter by inventing a hotch-potch of two
objects.  One must rise to the fundamental insight that one can only
achieve the understanding one wants through a phenomenological
analysis of the essences of the acts concerned, which are acts of the
`imagination' in the wide, traditional sense of Kant and Hume (Husserl
1970, 595).
   This procedure of shifting one's attention from the objects of knowledge to the
activity of the mind is elaborated, quite often, in general commentaries on
phenomenology: "We do not, for example, will to entertain an object of
knowledge.  Yet the mind is active in the sense that it both relates the content to
itself and relates it as a certain kind of something" (Charles J. Dougherty 1980,
309).
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This, broadly speaking, "constructivist" approach to the phenomenological
treatment of epistemological and logical problems, has resulted in a shift of
emphasis: free variation is now viewed as a particular capacity rather than a
particular cognitive strategy.  I will now attempt to elucidate and discuss this
change of course in Husserl's Ideas.
(b) Free Fantasy and Free Variation
Most Husserl scholars, when writing about free variation, focus strongly
on one paragraph in Ideas.  That is paragraph 70, entitled The Role of Perception
in the Method of Eidetic Clarification.  The Primacy of Free Fantasy.  This
paragraph examines some features of the phenomenological method followed in
seizing upon essences.  Husserl first contrasts fantasy, as a kind of presentation,
with perception in general.  He recognizes that the external perception, when
not obscured or distorted, is endowed with perfect clarity with respect to all the
objective moments actually given in it.  Presentations, however, and free
fantasies in particular have a special role.  Husserl suggests that
phenomenologists should value free fantasies over the external perception.
Later in this chapter I will discuss Husserl's attempt to illustrate the
latter by invoking a "pure" geometer, i.e. the one who dispenses with algebraic
methods, and a sense of freedom which this geometer enjoys in fantasy.  It is
possible for the "pure" geometer to work by reshaping the figures at will and
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running through continuously modified shapings.  In a very fundamental sense,
the geometrical sketches and models are secondary to this fantasy-construction
and eidetic pure thinking.
Husserl further extends this sense of primacy which free fantasy enjoys in
"pure" geometry to any eidetic phenomenological formations.  A
phenomenologist, in a manner similar to the geometer's, works with the
numerous types of modifications of presentation in perception, memory, etc.  The
freedom of eidetic research, as Husserl says emphatically, demands from a
phenomenologist that he operate in fantasy.
What most commentators of this paragraph seem not to have noticed is
that it is not at all concerned specifically with free variation but with free
fantasy.  I will attempt to show that this difference is not one of terminology, but
of content.  Since the differences between these two terms seem to be rather
subtle I will, first, point out some of the characteristics of free variation and,
second, elaborate the nature and the conceptual background of the notion of free
fantasy.
Free variation, understood in the way it was presented in the
Investigations and Experience and Judgment, has the following basic
characteristics:
- It is aimed at seizing upon essences or discovering regularities in
cognition.
- It discovers essences by discovering the invariant structure in the
phenomena that undergo the process of variation.
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- It isolates a part of a certain complex idea which has to have the
capability of being isolated in imagination (and which is therefore of
independent nature).
Only the first of these basic concepts is explicitly found in paragraph 70 of Ideas. 
What Husserl seems to be saying in this book, and particularly in this
paragraph, takes, instead, the form of much more abstract and general
deliberations.  These deliberations concern largely the nature of the particular
modes of cognition which should be seen as the grounds of creativity, problem
solving, and the powers of imagination.
If this paragraph were about free variation then one would have at least
two difficulties maintaining that Husserl still referred to free variation while
introducing the notion of free fantasy in the Ideas.  First, if free fantasy were
free variation, Husserl would also have to grant "primacy" to free variation. 
This, however, would be quite incompatible with Husserl's understanding of free
variation.  As I have pointed out, this cognitive operation has been designed by
Husserl primarily as a vehicle for either discovery of essences or analysis of
relative independence of concepts.  In Husserl's treatment of free variation per
se, there is no indication of its supposed "primacy" over some other cognitive
activities like perceiving, imaging, etc.
Second, would it be correct to say that phenomenologists "fantasize" when
they vary images and ideas in their mind?  I think that this question should be
answered in the negative.  The correct answer would be to say that
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phenomenologists vary their images and ideas in the freedom of their fantasy. 
In other words, the capacity to freely vary one's images and ideas in fantasy is,
and should be seen as, fundamental to any phenomenological project.  This way
of looking at free fantasy should also help clarify the question of primacy of free
variation.  One's ability to freely vary images and ideas in fantasy can indeed be
seen as a precondition for experiencing and understanding phenomena.  One's
activity of varying ideas and images, however, is not a precondition for anything;
rather it clarifies and helps understand certain features of cognition.
Husserl's use of the term "fantasy" in the Ideas reinforces this
interpretation.  For example, Husserl states that "the freedom of eidetic research
also necessarily demands operating in fantasy" (Husserl 1982, 159, italics mine). 
From this it is clear that Husserl understands fantasy as primarily a necessary
condition for eidetic research.  Passages like the following suggest that free
variation, or some other related cognitive activities (such as reshaping), occurs
most importantly in free fantasy:
While on the other hand (and, again, as in geometry which not without
reason has recently attached great value to collections of models and the
like), naturally, it is necessary to exercise one's fantasy abundantly in the
required activity of perfect clarifications and in the free-reshaping of
fantasy-data, it is also necessary, before doing that, to fertilize one's
fantasy in originary intuitions which are as abundant and as excellent as
possible: whereby this is not to say that experience as experience has here
a function in grounding validity (Husserl 1982, 159-160).
Husserl talks about reshaping of fantasy-data as well as fertilizing one's
fantasy in experience.  Further endeavours in enriching one's free fantasy, as
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developed in this chapter of Ideas, would involve insight into history, art, poetry,
and artistic means of presentation in general.  Note the broadening of the scope
of Husserl's terminology, especially when we contrast the latter understanding
of fantasy with free variation as a particular cognitive operation.
(c) Free Fantasy and Neutrality Modification
In order better to understand the role of free fantasy in Husserl's
phenomenology one has to consider, I believe, the role of neutrality modification
in Ideas.  This book introduced the notion that there is the reproductive
modification in consciousness, or the act of presentation in general.  In this
sense, presentation simply modifies some earlier, and original, contents of
perception by reproducing them more or less completely and vividly.  This sort of
modification is normally called memory in psychology and phenomenology.  In
contrast to this sort of presentation, there are some other important modes of
presentation.  One of them is termed pictorializing modification, which Husserl
illustrated in an analogy with landscape painting.
One can have the landscape "in" the painted picture as an object of
perception.  One can subsequently produce the reproductive modification of that
whole painting, by remembering seeing the painting.  Or one can just imagine
looking at the painting.  Note that these modifications may or may not be of the
reproductive sort.  Even if one held that they were reproductive, one would still
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need some clarification.  The most important feature of pictorializing
modification, as opposed to reproductive modification, is that the former is not
directly dependent on perception.  In other words, if one imagines looking at the
painting or just remembers seeing the painting then in both cases one does not
have the "mere" perception of the "real" surface of that painting, i.e. the original
blots of the paint, mounted on the wall.
Numerous misunderstandings of the status and the nature of the objects
"in" the painting are possible, especially if these objects are generated by one's
memory or imagination.  However, most muddles about the reality and non-
reality of the objects of perception and memory, Husserl believed, were created
by the empiricist tradition.  The proponents of the empiricist tradition held that
the acts of direct and immediate perception should be allotted absolute epistemic
primacy, and that all modes of cognition should be, at least in principle,
reducible to them.  However, with pictorializing modification, for example, there
is never such a thing as "the acts of direct and immediate perception."  Its
original mode of presentation, in the case of the painting, is essentially rooted in
creating the artistic illusion, e.g. the illusion of virtual space.
In order to avoid further complications with the status or the nature of the
objects of pictorializing modification (which is one of the most important
modifications, but not the only possible, in human cognition) Husserl introduced
a manner of modification of the utmost importance in phenomenology -
neutrality modification.
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Neutrality modification takes its objects as "merely thought of" or as
"mere thoughts" and not as something actual.  Neutralized consciousness does
not get involved in making presumptions about the matters of existence and
non-existence.  Additionally, neutralized consciousness abstains from taking
things as "really" possible or probable.  In Husserl's words:
Neutralized positings are essentially differentiated, however, by the fact
that their correlates do not contain anything possible, anything actually
predictable; in no respect does neutralized consciousness play the role  of
"believing" for what is intended to (Husserl 1982, 259).
To take an interesting example, consider a phenomenon of a "talking" computer. 
A computer may be programmed to generate either strings of words or complete
sentences, using pre-recorded phonemes as the elementary sound patterns.  One
might ask whether or not one is hearing "someone" speak when listening to such
computer.  Of course, one would have to answer in negative to this question. 
The simplest way to reach this answer involves assuming the act of neutrality
modification of some sort.  In simple words, one knows that a computer
generated voice would does not really "belong" to anyone in particular.  For one
thing, this voice might be produced as a mixture of particular accents and other
voice qualities.  This "disembodied" voice is best seen as a product of neutrality
modification -- one simply ignores the question whether this computer generated
voice "exists" on its own.
(d) Modes of Presentation and the Art of Free Fantasy
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In paragraph 70 of Ideas, Husserl contrasted fantasy, as a fundamental
mode of presentation, with perception, as the primary source of presentation. 
First, Husserl acknowledges that the external, empirical, perception has, in
normal circumstances, the attributes of clarity and immediacy and should
therefore serve as a foundation for all phenomenological eidetic findings. 
However, Husserl claims that: 
There are reasons by virtue of which in phenomenology, as in all other
eidetic sciences, presentations and, more precisely, free fantasies acquire a
position of primacy over perceptions and do so even in the phenomenology
of perception itself, excluding, to be sure, the phenomenology of the Data of
sensation (Husserl 1982, 158-159).
To illustrate this, Husserl uses an example of the geometer engaged in
"investigative thinking."  Husserl's point is, roughly, this: In order to solve a
particular problem, the geometer does not work with the particular shapes on
the paper or on the blackboard.  Neither does the geometer work with the
particular shapes in reality, nor does he need to work with any actual shapes in
principle.  These actual shapes are drawn, generally, after  the problem has been
solved.  In fantasy, the geometer has the freedom to shape and re-shape the
figures in many possible ways.  This freedom of shaping and re-shaping of the
data in any mode of presentation (memory, imagination) is a necessary condition
for conducting any sort of eidetic research.
Husserl insists that phenomenologists should be aware of this freedom
and exercise, as it were, the powers of their fantasy.  There are many domains of
human thought, according to Husserl, which phenomenologists can investigate. 
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Gathering these new and enriched forms and patterns of thought helps them in
grounding the validity of their judgments.  But it also can help them "fertilize
their fantasy."  In Husserl's words:
Extraordinary profit can be drawn from the offerings in history, in even
more abundant measure from those of art, and especially from poetry,
which are, to be sure, imaginary but which, in the originality of their
inventions of forms, the abundance of their single features and the
unbrokenness of their motivation, tower high above the products of our
own fantasy and, in addition, when they are apprehended
understandingly, become converted into perfectly clear fantasies with
particular ease owing to the suggestive power exerted by artistic means of
presentation (Husserl 1982, 160).
This section ends with the well-known and very often quoted passage, which
claims that "feigning," or fiction, constitutes the vital element of phenomenology
by forming the source from which springs the cognition of eternal truths:
Thus if one is fond of paradoxical phrases, one can actually say, and if one
means the ambiguous phrase in the right sense, one can say in strict
truth, that "feigning" makes up the vital element of phenomenology as of
every eidetic science, that feigning is the source from which the cognition of
"eternal truths" is fed (Husserl 1982, 160).
Modern commentators of Husserl have often drawn on this quote in order to
support their anti-realist arguments.  However, if one rephrases this quote in
simple terms, it appears to be saying no more than this: "In order to see clearly
how it happens that anything may be true or false in reality, one has to be able




The remarks from Ideas, I would like to suggest, encompass a much wider scope
in phenomenology than that of free variation.  These remarks address the
necessary conditions of creativity, problem solving, and imagination.  They may
be seen as discussing the cognitive and conceptual grounds of free variation.  In
this sense, free fantasy should be seen as a primordial notion in contrast to free
variation which is, in my terminology, a particular cognitive strategy.  
Yet, most commentators conflate free variation and free fantasy in
Husserl's thought.  They skip back and forth in their analysis of these two
notions.  Suzanne Bachelard, in her influential book A Study of Husserl's Formal
and Transcendental Logic (Bachelard 1968), begins her discussion of free
variation quoting the most important passages from Husserl's Ideas.  She
proposes to examine the process of "varying" which characterises the
investigation of essences.  Bachelard then claims that "fantasy transforms this
example in whatever way it cares to; it `varies' it freely" (Bachelard 1968, 173). 
Later on, she states that "fantasized" figure does not have to remain self-
identical in the fullness of its particular characteristics.  In other words, a
phenomenologist must not be blocked by the particularity of examples he has
chosen.
As we can see from Bachelard's terminology, her understanding of
variation is inextricably tied to the notion of fantasy.  It is not always clear,
however, how this mixture of fantasy and variation works.  In one case, for
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example, fantasy is used in an active sense since it is capable of "transforming"
examples.  In the other case, whole figures as presented as simply "fantasized."
  Richard Zaner, in his article "The Art of Free Fantasy in Rigorous
Phenomenological Science" (Zaner 1973), seems to be using the term "free
fantasy" as if it were synonymous with "free variation."  He appears to follow
Bachelard in her investigations into free variation and/or free fantasy.  He
begins his article by explaining that "any actual or possible instance of the kind
in question could as well serve as the starting point of the variation" (Zaner
1973, 194).  Already on the next page, Zaner continues by discussing "freedom"
appertaining to "free fantasy."  Once again, it is not clear what exactly is the role
of free fantasy since Zaner keeps addressing only the properties of free variation. 
He claims, for example, that variation has the sense of free optionalness and
that it signifies that one is constantly free to start varying of any actual or
possible example.  Yet Zaner's article is titled "The Art of Free Fantasy in
Rigorous Phenomenological Science."
This confusion has partly been created by Husserl's use of both terms "free
variation" and "free fantasy" indiscriminately during various phases of his
phenomenological enterprise.  These two terms indeed have a lot of affinity. 
However, as I attempted to show, free fantasy is a much more primordial and
much less rigidly defined notion than free variation.  Additionally, Husserl
makes a number of assumptions in his treatment of free fantasy:
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- that the geometer, working on the particular problem, shapes  and re-
shapes figures in imagination
- that the eidetic pure thinking is largely either pictorial thinking or based
on intuition: it is modified and enriched by observation
- that creativity and artistic intuition, and not analysis, should guide and
influence eidetic research.
However, none of these assumptions necessarily applies to free variation.
It is one thing to claim that geometers discover the limits of their
imagination by shaping and re-shaping figures in their fantasy.  This claim
would represent a somewhat limited conception of free variation as a particular
cognitive strategy.  However, it is an entirely different claim to say that the
geometers investigate the problems, and solve them, by means of their fantasy. 
First, this latter sense differs from the notion of free variation.  Second, the
legacy of this assumption has been troubled by certain developments in modern
mathematics.  Most notably, much of the effort of mathematicians since the turn
of the century has been aimed at axiomatization and arthimetization of
geometry.  When Hilbert (Hilbert 1899), for instance, axiomatized geometry he
meant to eliminate intuition from the foundations of geometry.  Nevertheless,
these developments in the philosophy of mathematics do not exclude the
possibility that geometrical, and even mathematical problems, may be solved by
manipulating and varying some of their elements in one's mind.
Finally, I believe that I have shown that free fantasy in phenomenology
should rather belong to the general discussions about the grounds of creativity
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and about the complexity and open-ended nature of imagination.  I further
believe that free variation should be treated as a much more limited and
concrete notion, i.e. as a particular cognitive operation.
(5) Critical Assessment of Phenomenological Free Variation
(a) How Free is Free Variation?
Freedom to engage in free variation does not imply that variation is free
in itself.  By analogy, the freedom to make a decision is not the freedom in
making decisions.  To take a simple example: one may be free to vary any aspect
of the image corresponding to a general idea "car" choosing to keep that general
idea constant.  In doing that, one is engaged in an activity of free variation. 
However, the freedom to choose any parts of the idea "car" to be taken as a
variable does not imply the freedom to choose to vary all of its aspects at once. 
The same goes for our decision to vary parts of the image corresponding to "car"
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in some respects.  The freedom to choose in which respect parts of "car" should be
varied does not imply the freedom to vary them in all possible respects at once.
Given that there are many parts of the idea "car" and that any of these
parts can be varied in numerous respects, free variation requires certain
methods of implementation.  Human cognitive powers are too limited to perform
even a small fraction of all possible modifications of objects and respects of
variation at the same time.  For example, one may choose to vary "fender,"
"engine," "front door handle," etc. against the general idea "car" in respect of
their overall shape, colour, thickness, style, level of rust decay, etc.
As a result of these limitations, generally attributed to the human
cognitive capacity, free variation deals only with a small fraction of the vastly
complex world of experience.  Normally, free variation singles out  properties,
ideas, or objects, making them assume the role of either of two functional
counterparts: "variables" and "constants."  This basic functional framework of
the activity of free variation shows that free variation is free only in principle;
its application requires use of a highly ordered and constrained procedure.
It does not take much examination to realize that free variation in
phenomenology has its roots in the mathematical conception of a variable.  In
mathematics symbols may be classified as "constants" and "variables."  What is
meant by these symbols in the actual use largely depends on a context.  For
example, a given symbol may be used to stand for the same object and thus be
held constant - within a certain context.  However, from "outside" this context, it
103
      Assuming, of course, that one can attribute essences to the notion of "car."  I disagree with Schütz, who2
holds that the "empirical concepts" represent types only and cannot be attributed any essences.  After all,
Schütz is the one who suggests that the difference between type and essence is one of degree rather than one
of kind.
is indicated that the object may be any one (some one) object of some collection
or set of a given domain of objects.
In performing free variation in phenomenology, one begins with certain
concepts or objects which have been chosen to be the grounds of varying. 
Typically, this is only one element of the activity of variation: one still has to
decide in which respect to vary the features of the chosen whole.  Even that is
sometimes not sufficient to fully capture all nuances of free variation.  In some
cases, for example, the extent of free variation might be an important factor. 
Keeping the notion "car" an object of free variation, consider the following: 
Examination, by free variation, of the dependence between the notion "car" and
its wheels.   It goes without saying that one can easily imagine a car without its2
wheels - which have been, for example, removed, stolen, welded off, replaced by
wooden blocks, etc., in one's imagination.  However, the question remains
whether one can imagine "car" (all cars as such) without wheels.  The latter is
far from logically impossible.  It also suggests that the essence of the notion
"car," if there is such an entity, depends on typification and somewhat
contingent, technological development of the auto industry.
The latter suggestion may result in stipulating various degrees of
exactitude and rigidity which can be expected from free variation, depending
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primarily on the nature of its objects.  For example, the procedure of free
variation leading to discovery of moments which belong to "car" should perhaps
be distinguished from the procedure of free variation leading to discovery of
moments belonging to musical tones.  One might hold that the tone is a highly
structured phenomenon which has "stable" moments.  On the contrary, "car" is
an artifact - an entity whose moments are subject to historical changes based on
function, fashion, and technology.  Consequently, free variation applied to tones
would be of the "pure" and "proper" type, as opposed to "improper" free variation
applied to "cars."
In some ways, the "improper" free variation should still be interesting to a
theoretician.  It has an important role in shaping and structuring "folk"
imagination.  For example, people are nowadays quite capable of imagining cars
without wheels in a rather concrete manner, e.g. propelled by electromagnetic
power and moving on air cushions.  These reflections will be of importance in the
later part of this thesis, concerning the idea of free variation broadly construed
and termed "structured imagination" in cognitive science.
All of this should serve the purpose of suggesting that there are numerous
formal and structural limitations and constraints on free variation.  As I have
attempted to show, free variation is constrained both by the nature of its
execution and by the nature of its objects.  It also indicates the importance of
mathematical concepts and procedures in Husserl's phenomenology.  Free
variation is just one of numerous examples of implicit use of mathematical
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concepts in Husserl.  To mention another well known example, there is the
procedure of "bracketing" in phenomenology which has stemmed directly from
mathematics.  In mathematics, in a manner very similar to that of
phenomenology, to put a string of symbols in brackets is to put in suspense any
operations that may be performed with these symbols.
(b) How Different is Free Variation from Induction?
In answering the question concerning the relationship of free variation
and induction I will rely on David Michael Levin's article "Induction and Husserl
theory of Eidetic Variation."   Levin's article has been, in turn, significantly
influenced by some important arguments advanced by Alfred Schütz in respect
to the notions of type and essence in Husserl's philosophy.
In order to sketch Schütz's position allow me to briefly characterize the
nature of the notion of eidetic consciousness in Husserl's thought.  He portrays 
eidetic consciousness on a quite grand scale.  It was by means of eidetic
consciousness, as a mode of consciousness, that phenomenology hoped to secure
its rock-bottom foundations.  But how is it possible to acquire the eidetic mode of
consciousness?  As Maurice Natanson clearly and vividly explained, eidetic
consciousness shifts from facts to essences by so-called eidetic reduction.  Husserl
was convinced that a phenomenologist must be able, at least in principle, to
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engage in eidetic reduction with virtually any act of cognition.  Here is how
Natanson illustrates a typical procedure of eidetic reduction:
Each time I look out the window, I see once again the same sight, the
same buildings and foliage.  I know that they are reliable features of my
prospect, part of my world.  Now, in eidetic reduction, I choose to attend to
the scene in a different way.  I set aside the actuality of the houses and
the details of their ownership and history.  The house across the way has
a mortgage, a roof in need of repair, and a freshly painted door.  I concern
myself only with its being there for me and as a something seen and a
something noticed.  The mortgage drops away; the roof presents itself as a
patchwork; the doors gleam bluely.  That Haskall lives next to Immerbind
no longer is a part of my viewing - that knowledge has been set aside
(Natanson 1973, 66).
  Only through the possibility of achieving eidetic consciousness could
phenomenology expect to be the first and only genuine science; only through
eidetic consciousness a priori, apodictic necessity was to be gained. 
Schütz's major objective is to criticize such a lofty positioning of eidetic
consciousness in phenomenology.  He believes that the objects of eidetic
consciousness, although distinct from the empirical sphere, cannot be seen as a
totally idealized, self-sufficient, realm which would be fundamentally
independent from the factual realm.  Eidetic consciousness, Schütz maintains,
has its origins in facticity and builds upon its resources of typification. 
Consequently, the difference between two modes of consciousness, eidetic
consciousness and empirical consciousness, is one of degree rather than one of
kind.
Using the latter claim, Levin extends Schütz's primarily epistemological
point to methodological matters.  According to Levin, induction and eidetic
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variation are best conceived as continuous and complementary procedures.  The
most important ground on which Levin bases both the acceptance of Schütz's
position and his own extension of that position is the examination of the
complexity and peculiarity of the notion of "essence" in Husserl's thought. 
Levin's ultimate goal is to convince his readers that eidetic consciousness is
fundamentally  inadequate and non-apodictic.  If his claims are justified, then
eidetic consciousness, being neither adequate nor apodictic, does indeed
resemble the inductive mode of reasoning much more than the deductive, exact,
and absolutely certain mode of reasoning.
In which sense, according to Levin, does the process of eidetic variation
fail to yield adequate and apodictic results?  Levin points out to a very important
feature of eidetic variation: the fact that we can terminate our explorations at
any point, treating further variations as unnecessary.  This fact is the corollary
of the fact that the synthesized nexus of congruent elements presents that which
is essential and excludes everything that is presumed nonessential.  The crucial
question regarding this procedure is the following: How can we know with
apodictic certainty that amplification may not motivate an essential
modification?  In Levin's words: 
What justifies eidetic consciousness in affirming that further variations
cannot conceivably (possibly) introduce novel information - information of
such a nature and of such weight that it would be rationally compelled to
revise or even abrogate the authority of its original insight" (Levin 1968,
9)?
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Levin goes on to argue that eidetic consciousness cannot, by itself, be the
source of the apodictic certainty, since Husserl held that essences can be grasped
with varying degrees of clearness, fullness, and differentiation.  If the notion of
essence is neither fully given to eidetic consciousness nor entirely other than
eidetic consciousness, where should this notion belong? 
Levin's analysis of Husserl's "essence" reveals that this notion has been
expected to play a number of incompatible roles in phenomenology.  Essence is
expected to embody an object which is of transcendent (being other than
consciousness) nature and which also represents an objective entity.  If essence
is of transcendent nature then it should, by that very nature, be irrevocably
other than the consciousness and related to it.  Additionally, transcendent
objects are always "out there," i.e. they are accessible to recollection, attention,
and so forth.  As well, if the essence is an objective entity then it should
represent a unity, an enduringly identical pole of meaning which is set against
the acts of consciousness.  
Husserl's transcendence, however, precludes adequacy in the fundamental
sense.  Because objects are objective and transcendent, Husserl maintains, our
perception can only know them inadequately.  Levin points out the following:
"And essences have objective sense just as much as things, regardless of how
much this sense is to be characterized more specifically, in other words, as
transtemporal or, on the other hand, as spatiotemporal" (Levin 1968, 5).  
Husserl thus expects his essences to play two incompatible roles.  Eidetic
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consciousness is expected to achieve absolute, adequate and apodictic knowledge
of essences, since they are immanent to eidetic consciousness.  However, these
immanent essences remain transcendent in the broadest sense of transcendence
for Husserl, by virtue of their being "other" than consciousness.  Instead of
insisting on these two incompatible roles for eidetic consciousness Levin
suggests his solution to this problem, which is largely based on Schütz's views. 
In simple terms, Levin suggests that induction and eidetic variation should be
seen as two complementary procedures.
As I already hinted in this section, Schütz took great efforts to trace the
process of ideation back to the natural attitude.  The following rhetorical
question, asked by Schütz, best expresses his beliefs about the limiting role of
the natural attitude over the power of free variation in fantasy:
Is it possible to grasp by means of free variation in fantasy the eidos of a
concrete species or genus, unless these variations are limited by the frame
of the type in terms of which we have experienced in the natural attitude
the object from which the process of ideation starts as a familiar one, as
such and such an object within the life-world (Schütz 1959, 164).
Levin's solution to the problem of relating essentialist and empiricist
approaches to eidetic variation is supposed to mitigate Husserl's radical division
of immanent and transcendent essences.  Levin believed that these two kinds of
essences should not be seen in opposition but rather as continuous and even
complementary.
There would still be a small class of "exact" essences, i.e. those found in
mathematics, where the essences conform to a rigorously axiomatized system. 
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The "morphological" essences of phenomenology, however, are not determined by
axiomatic systems.  They are merely disclosed through a process of free
variation.  Although our eidetic knowledge of essences may be seen as operative
in an a priori sense (it does not involve positing any spatio-temporal reality), our
knowledge cannot have an absolute and apodictic grasp of the essences.
If Levin is to be taken seriously, it seems that there is a continuum of
essences, disclosed by free variation, with two extreme poles.  The first pole
would involve a priori laws of necessity and would concern certain phenomena
whose existence is either determined by the systems of definitions or divisible
into several distinct and ordered dimensions.  The second pole would involve
certain typified structures and concern phenomena dependent on a particular
society, language, technology, and culture. 
When it comes to free variation, Levin was convinced that its nature
comes much closer to disclosing what he calls "morphological" essences in
phenomenology.  Since these essences are of contingent nature and since one can
disclose them with different degrees of certainty and precision, Levin surmised
that the process of free variation cannot be all that dissimilar from induction.
It is sufficient to give just a few examples in order to show that there is
the affinity between induction and variation:
(1) All tones have some pitch
(2) All crows are black
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Both (1) and (2) can be used to illustrate either the process of induction or
free variation.  The only difference would be in the "direction" one is taking.  In
other words, one would proceed from accidents to general concepts in induction
and from general concepts to accidents in variation.  To take my second example:
inductive reasoning reaches a more general conclusion, i.e. "All crows are black"
based on numerous instances of observing crows of this colour.  Free variation
begins with a crow, understood as a representative of general "crow," and
subjects it to numerous changes in order to discover its essential properties.  For
example, one might ask whether a bird would still be a crow if were made of
brass, if it had scales instead of feathers, if it were white instead of black, etc.
(c) Does Free Variation Lead to Discovering Meanings Rather Than Essences?
The question that this section will attempt to discuss has, in large part,
been prompted by Mohanty in his book "Transcendental Phenomenology." 
Mohanty's treatment of imaginative variation (this is the term he uses for free
variation) is, in many ways, a continuation of the discussion of Husserl's free
variation initiated by Schütz and Levin.  Mohanty concedes that Husserl made
unnecessarily strong claims on behalf of free variation, i.e. that it yields an
apodictic insight into an essence.
He emphasizes, following Levin, that essences are of a transcendent
nature in the sense that they are other than the mental processes that aim at it. 
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There is a number of things which can go wrong with the mental processes
aimed at disclosing essences.  For example, one might start with a poorly chosen
example or one might give up varying prematurely.  Phenomenologists often
exaggerated in supposing that whenever an essence has been discovered, such
discovery must be certain and apodictic.
The most interesting property of free variation, and starting point of
Mohanty's criticism, is best illustrated by the charge of vicious circularity
levelled against this method.  In simple words, this charge amounts to claiming
that the method of free variations is not at all a method of discovery.  There is
nothing in the result of free variation that was not, in some manner, already
contained in the elements and the preparatory conditions of the procedure of free
variation.  Mohanty's own formulation of this problem is so well put that it
deserves being quoted in full:
First, about the alleged circularity: the method requires that at some
point in my imaginatively fabricating variants, I must be able to say `this
is not any longer a O'.  The feature, then, whose, elimination of variation
beyond a certain range makes me say so, must be (within that range)
essentially connected with one of O's essential features.  But how can I
say `this is not any longer O' unless I have already an acquaintance with
what something must be like in order to be counted as a O or what
something must lack in order to be ruled out from being a O.  For someone
who has no idea of what a O is (excepting the exemplar chosen by
stipulation), it is not clear whether such a deviant variant is or is not to be
counted as a O (Mohanty 1989, 33).
Mohanty's response to this charge is to admit that the vicious circularity
objection cannot be refuted.  But even if we accept this charge as being justified,
Mohanty maintains, that acceptance will not have damaging repercussions on
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the method of free variation.  On the contrary, admitting that this charge is
justified would only help us better understand the method of free variation.
Instead of saying that the method of free variation discovers essences we
should, Mohanty suggests, construe it as clarifying the sense of concepts and
ideas.  In using the method of free variation, therefore, we typically proceed from
an unclarified and muddled acquaintance to an explicit, clarified, and well-
defined formulation.  The main characteristic of this method is the following:
Free variation unfolds until it discovers a resistance to the series of variations. 
The impossibility of further variations along the same line becomes clear. 
Phenomenologists would account for such a limit of free variation by claiming
that these limits are used to trace objective and immutable essences.  That is
one of the reasons why Husserl used an analogy with a geometer to illustrate the
manner in which free variation works.
Mohanty suggests a different account: His view is that the limitations to
further variations represent one's implicit grasp of essences.  To say the latter is
to say that free variation is determined by the prior understanding of the sense. 
Mohanty's view of free variation seems to blend two, formerly distinct, senses of
"discovery" and "constitution."  In fact, Mohanty would like to claim that this
blend can be found in Husserl's thought.  And Mohanty is clear about the
implications of this insight:
The implication is that the very same process which claims to `discover'
the essence, is also the process by which that essence is brought into
being.  The essence is fixed by the very same decision which prohibits any
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further variant along that line.  If further inquiry shows the legitimacy of
admitting still more radical variants, we shall locate the essence
elsewhere, constitute it anew, revise our prior claim to discovery and
replace it by a new claim (Mohanty 1989, 37).
The advantage of this approach is its ability to account for the fallibility of
the procedure of free variation.  As well, this approach mitigates the dichotomy
of realism and anti-realism: one can still use both the realistic locution of
"discovery" and the anti-realistic locution of "constitution."  The essences are
seen, according to this view, as a product of a dynamic process of discovery and
constitution.  As Mohanty points out, the same decision which prohibits any
further variant along certain line serves the purpose of establishing essences.  In
other words, discovering "resistance" to further variation leads to constitution of
essences.  This process is open to revisions; discovery of the new loci of resistance
could lead to reconstitution of essences.
The disadvantage of this approach would be its inability to account for the
objective sense that the products of free variation may exhibit.  What if, in some
important cases, free variation is not determined by any prior understanding of
the sense?  One has a feeling that some important features of free variation may
be left out by Mohanty's account of free variation.
In particular, Mohanty's criticism of free variation proves to be
particularly biting in the case of cultural phenomena and human artifacts. 
Consider subjecting a term "civil litigation" or an object such as "watch" to free
variation.  It is clear that any discoveries made by free variation in the case of
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"civil litigation" and "watch" would only serve to disclose some aspects of our
prior understanding of both of them.  I will refer to this kind of free variation,
and the limitations it appears to have, as "Mohanty's problem."
However, Mohanty's criticism seems to be much less convincing in the
case of phenomenal objects, such as tones and sounds.  Husserl would probably
argue, contra Mohanty, that in case of phenomenal objects there is neither any
prior understanding revealed by free variation nor is such understanding needed
in order to launch the process of free variation. 
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Chapter Three
Reinach, Material Necessity and Free Variation 
(a) Introduction
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Adolf Reinach is a little known German philosopher.  He was born in 1880 and
died on the battlefield at the age of 34.  Despite a very short academic career -- it
lasted only slightly over four years in the capacity of Privatdocent -- he managed
nevertheless to produce numerous philosophical writings of the finest quality,
packed with brilliant insight and novel ideas.
Reinach was known by his colleagues as a follower of Husserl, but his
work on the theory of judgment, the material a priori, and the a priori structures
of social acts was largely overlooked by the main stream historians of
philosophy.  The systematic efforts of Barry Smith and Karl Schuhmann, who
have edited all of Reinach's published works and manuscripts and who wrote
extensively on Reinach and material necessity, helped rescue Reinach's thought
from oblivion, particularly in the English speaking world.  Reinach's
philosophical work fits with the central notion of my thesis, free variation, in a
manner which I will now attempt to sketch.
The philosophers and theorists I have presented so far, from Locke to
Husserl, who dealt with free variation in either an overt or a covert manner,
treated this mental activity almost exclusively as a cognitive tool.  This tool or,
perhaps better, this cognitive technique was seen as capable of disclosing the
order of things as they might appear in one's mind.  The relevance of this
technique to the states of affairs in the real world and the mutual dependence
between states of affairs and the technique of variation was seen by most
philosophers as a matter of secondary importance.  Particularly in more abstract
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      One is reminded of "Mohanty's problem" here: essences are disclosed in the case of phenomenal objets3
(tones, sounds) much easier than in the case of abstract, social phenomena.
      Logic, according to Husserl's belief adopted by Reinach, deals with the "pure" meaning categories such4
as truth and proposition, subject and predicate.  Formal ontology, in contrast, deals with the "object" meaning
categories such as object and property, part and whole, states of affairs, and so on (See Husserl's Third
Investigation, paragraph 11).
cases, it was difficult to see any relation between the techniques of freely
varying concepts and images and the states of affairs in the "real world."3
In Reinach's case, however, free variation applies not only to the cognitive
realm but also to empirical states of affairs.  This follows from Reinach's belief
that there are two basic kinds of necessity in logic and formal ontology.   The4
first kind of necessity is a classical understanding of modal necessity, which has
been given formal expression by logicians from C.I. Lewis to Saul Kripke.  The
notion of this kind of necessity has been present in the history of philosophy
since Aristotle and has been systematically explored, for instance, by Leibniz. 
The second kind of necessity, material necessity, is a much more controversial
notion.  It consists of certain necessary connections among the parts of states of
affairs.  This latter kind of necessity, inherent in the states of affairs, will prove
to possess many features in common with free variation.
One might want to know what, in fact, material necessity is, or at least
what are the manifestations of material necessity in empirical states of affairs. 
In order to illustrate this, let me take one of Reinach's typical examples: an act
of tearing a piece of paper.  It is common knowledge that a normal act of tearing
a piece of paper produces sound.  This kind of act may, at least in a loose sense,
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      Until Hume's attack on causality, this was a view quite commonly held in philosophy. 5
be seen as causally  connected with the sound it produces.  To put it in even
stronger terms, one might claim that tearing a piece of paper necessarily
produces sound.  We could approach this problem from the cognitive perspective
and reason in the following manner: thinking about tearing paper establishes in
principle, perhaps with the help of free variation, that the sound of paper being
torn depends on the act of tearing.  One can imagine, for example, a piece of
cardboard or cellophane or bond paper being torn to pieces.  In each particular
case, some sort of sound is bound to ensue unless, of course, one assumes that
the tearing is performed in a vacuum or that one's ears are sealed at that
particular moment.
However, Reinach would not limit these kinds of regularity to mere
thinking and imagining.  He would add that, in actually tearing paper or
burning wood, some necessary consequences of those activities must occur.  In
the first case, tearing a piece of paper would produce sound, and in the second
case burning wood would produce heat.  This sort of direct dependence, Reinach
argues, exists in empirical states of affairs.   In other words, he would have it5
that certain necessary relations pertain not only to ideas but also to things. 
Following some of the basic ideas found in Husserl's Logical Investigations,
Reinach believed that there is a wealth of essential a priori connections capable
of being discovered among the things, events, and processes of the material
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      Reinach (1989) and (1976).6
world.  Husserl did not explore the full range of possibilities implicit in this
broad conjecture.  Reinach felt that continuation of Husserl's idea was a novel
and a worthwhile project.
(b) Reinach on Kant and Hume
In "Kants Auffassung des humeschen Problems,"  Reinach gives an interesting6
and innovative interpretation of Hume's, Kant's, and to some extent, Locke's
accounts of the relations of ideas.  The central purpose of this paper, however, is
to show that Kant and Hume, in their accounts of causality and some other
possible relations of ideas, conflated two distinct aspects of necessity.
The main line of Reinach's argument deals with the kind of necessity that
should be attributed to causal and relational propositions.  Hume's insistence on
discovering the basis for the necessity of causal propositions in experience is
often contrasted with Kant's shift in the treatment of necessity.  One of Hume's
most important epistemic and metaphysical discoveries was that the mind is not
capable of determining the effect in the supposed cause.
In the first Enquiry, Hume presented a case of two colliding billiard balls
and asked whether or not the movement of one of them can be established as a
cause of the movement of another.  It was obvious, Hume surmised, that one's
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search for a cause of motion in the second ball by the means of inspecting the
motion in the first would necessarily be futile: "Motion in the second billiard ball
is a quite distinct event from motion in the first: nor is there anything in the one
to suggest the smallest hint of the other" (Hume, Enquiry, 18).  Let me add that
it was sufficient, in this case, to imagine two moving billiard balls in order to
understand Hume's point.
Kant, according to Reinach, used Hume's finding to infer that for a
relation to be a relation of ideas it is necessary for that relation to be of analytic
nature; i.e. for its predicate to be contained in its subject.
Kant's inference, Reinach maintains, was too hasty: the relation between
cause and effect is indeed a relation of ideas, but of a different kind.  This
particular relation of ideas is but one case among many other possible kinds of
relations of ideas.  It would be wrong, therefore, to expect causality to be
representative of all other relations of ideas to which Hume either explicitly or
tacitly refers in his writings.  As Reinach puts it:
Causality signifies a necessary connection in the successive existence of
two objects.  It is not therefore totally independent of existence, as
relations of ideas, in accordance with Hume's determinations, are wont to
be (Reinach 1976, 172).
Some other relations of ideas in Hume are quite distinct from causality.  The
resemblance between Red and Orange, for example, contains nothing of
existence, conditional or unconditional.  It may appear unclear what grounds
Reinach could have for distinguishing between causality and resemblance.  In
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particular, one might ask how we know whether any given relationship of ideas
is independent of, or dependent on, existence.  Reinach proposes a simple test:
If we can conceive an A, without at the same time conceiving a B that is
causally connected with it, then this A can in fact exist without B's
necessarily following upon it, i.e. it is not necessary that there be a causal
relation between A and B.  Or, seen from the other side: If the causal
relation were in fact what it at first claims to be, i.e., a necessary
connection between the existence of two objects, then the representation of
one would also be necessarily connected with the representation of the
other (Reinach 1976, 173).
One can imagine how this works in the case of colliding billiard balls, to stay
with Hume's example.  We can imagine a ball A hitting a ball B, without causing
B to move (let us assume that B is glued to the billiard table).  If we subjected
the case of resemblance to this test, we would get some interesting and
controversial results.  To imagine red, and to imagine at the same time that it is
not similar to orange would be contradictory to our understanding of
resemblance.  As Reinach stresses, this contradiction is quite distinct from
logical contradiction.  For example, stating "The colour blue is not similar to the
colour purple" does not involve a logical contradiction.  He further claims that
Hume's arguments regarding notions such as resemblance reveal that Hume
attempted to express this sense of impossibility which arises when one examines
certain combinations of ideas in one's mind.  Hume was aware that this was not
a purely logical contradiction, that is why, Reinach maintains (Reinach, 1976,
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      Reinach further points out that Kant seems to have read only a German (Sulzer's) translation of the7
first Enquiry which uses the term "Widerspruch" (contradiction) where the original Hume's text does not
contain the expression "contradiction."  For example, where Hume's text calls the ideas of gold and mountain
"two consistent ideas" (Hume 1993, 11), Sulzer's translation reads "zwey einander nicht widersprehende
Begriffe" (Reinach, 1976, 177). 
176), Hume used the terms "incompatible" and "incongruous" ideas to mean
"non-logical contraries."7
If one were to take the latter seriously, then one would cast serious doubt
on Kant's belief that in Hume's thought, as far as relations of ideas are
concerned, the predicate must always be contained in the subject.  For one thing,
it would be quite unreasonable to expect that the property of being similar to
orange should reside in the very idea of red.  Moreover, one has many reasons to
doubt that, in every possible case, denial of the predicate in the subject-predicate
relation involves logical contradiction.  A further consequence of Reinach's
argument would be that Hume never held that relations of ideas are analytic in
Kant's sense and that the propositions of mathematics are exclusively based on
relations of ideas.
Kant's belief that Hume was unsuccessful in providing any firm grounds
for necessity in experience led him to believe that necessity is to be sought solely
in relations among concepts.  Kant, according to Reinach, sought to identify
propositions expressing relations of ideas with judgments whose truth is
"grounded in concepts," i.e., with analytic judgments in his restricted sense. 
Thus Kant states in Prolegomena that:
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All analytic judgments are a priori even when the concepts are empirical,
as for example, "Gold is a yellow metal;" for to know this I require no
experience beyond my concept of gold as a yellow metal.  It is, in fact, the
very concept, and I need only analyze it without looking beyond it (Kant
Prolegomena, 267).
One of the consequences of this view is the following: the nature of necessity
which belongs to causal and relational propositions becomes much like the
nature of necessity shared by mathematical and logical propositions.  In other
words, necessity is only to be discovered in the formal and semantic realms and
not in the realm of empirical, contingent states of affairs.
It seems that taking Reinach's account of Hume and Kant seriously would
undermine the Kantian view that relations of ideas are analytic connections
among concepts.  But if not this, what are they?  Reinach puts forth a bold
suggestion: the relations of ideas are the reflections of the relations of things. 
He believed that Hume, had he believed that necessity resided in things
themselves, could in fact ground necessity in experience, a point completely
overlooked by Kant. What Hume really wanted, according to Reinach, is to
inquire into "necessary connections" which are determined by the nature of their
terms exactly as similarity is determined by the essence of two colours.  In other
words Kant and Hume were talking about two distinct realms of necessity. 
Kant's inquiries were directed exclusively towards modal necessity whereas
Hume's attention was mainly - although sometimes confusedly - directed
towards material necessity.  In Reinach's own words:
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According to Kant's interpretation, Hume inquired exclusively into modal
necessity, the necessity which causal propositions have in common with
mathematical propositions.  As opposed to this interpretation, we want to
defend the view that Hume's attention was mainly directed towards
material necessity, i.e., towards the necessity which does not at all belong
to mathematical propositions.  Naturally, we do not thereby mean that
Hume explicitly and consciously distinguished between the two concepts
of necessity; they were rather, thoroughly confused by him (Reinach 1976,
183).
Reinach's controversial claim opens the possibility that there are certain
categories of entity, both in experience and in imagination, whose instantiation
brings with it as a matter of necessity an instantiation of some other correlated
entities.  Before I turn my attention to the repercussions that this stipulation
may have on the notion of free variation, let me examine the problem of
presentation and meaning in Reinach's thought.
(c) Presentation, Meaning, and Free Variation
In his essay "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment" Reinach attempts to
dispel what appears to be the inherent ambiguity of the term "judgment."  He
stresses that, in most philosophical literature, "judgment" stands both for
"belief," "conviction," and "consciousness of validity" as well as for "affirmation"
or "assertion."  In the course of clarifying his own understanding of judgment,
Reinach begins with an important distinction of Brentano's between
presentation and judgment.  One of the best known features of Brentano's theory
of judgment constitutes an apparent paradox: Brentano strictly separated
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presentation and judgment from each other, yet at the same time brought them
closely together by postulating that of necessity every judgment has a
foundation in a presentation.  This is the way in which Brentano characterizes
presentation and judgment in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint:
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself,
although they do not all do so in the same way.  In presentation,
something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in
love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on (Brentano 1973, 88).
In order to see presentation as a foundation for any judgment one would, of
course, have to grant that presentation is in fact the very act of including
something as an object in cognition.  Later on in this book, Brentano makes an
explicit distinction between presentation and judgment.  He first states that we
speak of presentation whenever something appears to us.  For example, when we
see something, a colour is presented, when we hear something a sound, and
when we imagine something a fantasy is presented.  In contrast, when it comes
to judgments there is nothing "presented" as objects of judgments.  By making a
judgment, we either accept things (as true) or reject them (as false).
According to Reinach's interpretation of Brentano, any judged object
therefore figures in consciousness in two ways: first as something presented,
second as something accepted or rejected.  This is a consequence of Brentano's
thesis of the intentional nature of consciousness; its relatedness to something
objectual, with respect to which the conviction is held, is essential.  In
Brentano's words:
127
We may, therefore, consider the intentional in-existence of an object to be
a general characteristic of mental phenomena which distinguishes this
class of phenomena from the class of physical phenomena (Brentano 1973,
91).
Reinach approaches the relationship of presentation and perception in a
Husserlian manner.  Consequently, he attempts to describe presentation as a
phenomenon much broader than perception.  Presentation is much broader than
perception because the former includes various forms of memory, fantasy, and
other related acts.  This relationship between presentation and perception does
not appear to be very controversial.  But matters are much less clear when it
comes to the relationship between presentation and meaning.  Reinach attempts
to address this relationship in his essay on the negative judgment.
We are free, in principle, to turn towards our objects of presentation both
in reality and imagination.  First, we can abstract our contents of presentation
from their surroundings.  In Reinach's words:
Anything that is presented is such that we can turn toward it with a
specific interest, raise it up out of its surroundings, concern ourselves with
its specific traits.  In the sphere of meaning in our sense however there is
no possibility of such modifications (Reinach (In Smith, ed.) 1982, 324).
The sphere of meaning, Reinach maintains, comes alongside the sphere of
presentation: "It is, of course, precisely the same object which is at one and the
same time presented and meant" (Smith 1982, 324).  However, in determining
and clarifying meaning we can only advert attentively to that which is presented
(in some modification or other).  Second, and much more generally, we can alter
and manipulate most properties of the contents of our presentations both in
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reality and imagination.  If we did this within the sphere of meaning we would
simply have changed meanings.
The discussion of the presentation and meaning in Reinach's paper can be
used, I suggest, to cast some additional light on free variation.  I would like to
argue, following some basic claims of Reinach's, that free variation is only
possible in the case of presentation and not in the case of meaning.  Upon closer
examination of Reinach's distinction between presentation and meaning, it
becomes clear that one can perform numerous cognitive modifications and
transformations with one's objects of presentation.  In other words, one can
present what appears to be objectively identical meaning using quite different
means of presentation.
To illustrate this, let me give an example using Morse code.  Imagine the
situation in which one attempts to express the S.O.S. sign, using Morse code. 
The meaning of the S.O.S. sign is captured by the particular structure and
arrangement of the two basic symbols (dot and dash) of the Morse code.  The act
of grasping the meaning of structure and arrangement of the constituent
symbols is quite distinct from the act of presenting the signs.  One may, for
example, see dots and dashes since they can be presented graphically (...---...). 
One may listen to the shorter and longer tones played on a piano and still get the
very same message.  Alternatively, one can touch dots and dashes since they can
be represented as impressed on a sheet of paper.  The S.O.S. message is
129
presented in the visual, auditory, and tactile manner in the three cases
mentioned.
One might add that, depending on the nature of presentation, certain
structural properties of the phenomena which "embody" that presentation are
revealed by free variation.  For example, we can say that, in the case of visual
presentation of the S.O.S. sign, the dots and dashes may be darker or lighter,
larger or smaller, placed closer or more widely.  In the case of auditory
presentation, the sounds which are used may be louder or softer, their rhythm
may be faster or slower, etc.  Finally, in the case of tactile presentation, the
impressions used to represent the S.O.S. sign may be more or less massive, their
shape may be more or less sharp or rounded, etc.
In this case, Reinach would probably caution that the case of Morse code
is a rather rare case of a system of signs which can be effectively and univocally
presented by the means of several modes of presentation.  Typically, the full
significance of presented ideas, objects, or situations depends not only on their
sources of presentation but also on the manner in which they are presented.  As
we shall see, variation plays an even more prominent role in distinguishing the
manner of presentation from the content of presentation.
(d) Quality and Matter of Presentation and Variation
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Husserl was one of the first to examine explicitly both the manner of presenting
ideas and their content.  He discussed, in chapter two of the fifth Investigation,
what he termed the distinction between the general quality of cognitive acts and
their content.  This general distinction in cognition is rather subtle, so Husserl
resorted to the easiest and the simplest way of illustrating and operationalizing
this distinction -- variation.
Cognitive acts are classified by Husserl as presentative, judgmental,
emotive, etc. according to their quality.  I will call this feature of cognitive acts
their "act-quality," as opposed to their "act-matter" (the content of cognitive
acts).  The act-qualities may be concerned with the same act-matter or, in
Husserl's words, the same "intentional objectivity" of the cognitive acts.  Note
that Husserl includes all kinds of objects, such as real, ideal, genuine, possible,
or impossible ones in his understanding of an intentional object.
How does one go about discovering act-quality in cognition?  The following
is a simple procedure of disclosing possible act-qualities which may be associated
with the same intentional objectivity:  Husserl noted that it is possible to
present, question, hate, doubt, wish, judge, etc. the same intentional object. 
This phenomenon is a direct corollary of a simple cognitive technique -- keeping
the intentional object constant and varying different act-qualities against it.
However, this is just one special case of variation:
Such variation intersects with the other, wholly independent variation in
objective reference: one act may point to this, another act to that object,
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regardless as to whether the acts are alike or different in quality (Husserl
1970, 587).
Husserl's point is that every act-quality can be combined with every intentional
object.  This other "direction" of variation, which straddles the first one, discloses
some properties of cognitive acts which are plainly independent of act-quality. 
In particular, cognitive acts may differ in "manners of objective reference."  In
other words, cognitive acts of the same kind may be directed to quite different
objects.  For example, one might be making assertions about this or that
phenomenon.  To disclose this, one employs a technique of variation -- keeping
the act-quality constant and varying different intentional objects against it.
Husserl's example of varying act-matter and keeping act-quality constant
is the following: "2 x 2 = 4" and "Ibsen is the principal founder of modern
dramatic realism" (Husserl, Investigations, 586)  Apparently, both expressions
are assertions and their common feature is their act-quality.  His example of
varying act-quality and keeping act-matter act constant is the following:
A man who frames the presentation `There are intelligent beings on Mars'
frames the same presentation as the man who asserts `There are
intelligent beings on Mars' and the same as the man who asks `Are there
intelligent beings on Mars'?  or the man who wishes `If only there were
intelligent beings on Mars'! etc.etc (Husserl 1970, 587).
Husserl stresses that not all subtleties of variation are captured by the
act-quality and act-matter distinction.  It would seem reasonable to claim that
cognitive acts are unambiguously determined by their quality and the object
they intend.  However, there are still possibilities of further variation even if
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both act-matter and act-quality are fixed: "One can readily see, in fact, that even
if quality and objective direction are both fixed at the same time, certain
variations remain possible" (Husserl, Investigations, 588).  He gives the
examples of equilateral triangle and equiangular triangle and of what he
considered synonymous statements, such as "It will rain today" and "It may well
rain today."  Husserl concludes that these subtle differences in equivalent (but
not tautologically equivalent) expressions, discovered by variation, are in fact
subtle differences in act-matter.  He believed that "[t]here is not one piece of
matter corresponding to an identical object, another to the differing mode of
presenting it" (Husserl, Investigations, 589).  This view can be contrasted with
Frege's understanding of sense and reference, according to which the same object
(reference) can be described in various ways, according to different modes of
presentation. 
Husserl also warns us that act-quality and act-matter are two mutually
dependent moments of the acts.  In other words, they belong together: there is no
act-matter without some quality and no act-quality can be devoid of all matter.
The mutual dependence between quality and matter in variation also
imposes some constraints on their structure.  The most obvious result of this
interdependence is the existence of limitations on the sorts of modifications
which can be performed with the content expressed by a certain act of
presentation.  To be more specific, there are obvious limitations to the
modifications which can be made affecting the kinds of the acts of presentation. 
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For example, it makes very little sense to desire or to mourn geometrical
theorems.  Equally so, it makes very little sense to refute or to smell musical
scores.  This sort of regularity, however, is not always immediately apparent.
Husserl's distinction between act-matter and act-quality has been
independently rephrased by several philosophers in quite diverse fashion.  I will
provide just two examples: Henry Leonard's concern and topic of concern and
John Searle's propositional acts and illocutionary acts.
Leonard defines concern and a topic of concern in the following way: "The
concern of a purpose is that which the purposer wishes to accomplish; the topic
of concern is, roughly, that proposition relative to which he has this concern"
(Leonard, Principles of Reasoning, 140).  He adds that in order fully to
understand someone's purpose one must know both his concern and topic of
concern .  To illustrate this, Leonard offers the following examples:
Speaker A: Bill's house burned down last night.
Speaker B: Did Bill's house burn down last night?
Speaker C: Find out whether or not Bill's house burned down last night.
Speaker D: The price of butter went up one cent today.
Upon examination (using the "proper" kind of variation) it is found that the first
three speakers had the same topic of concern, but they had different concerns
with this topic.  The fourth speaker, however, had a different topic of concern
from the previous three, but his concern with this topic was the same as the first
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      Later in this chapter, I will say a few more words about Searle's and Austin's speech act theory. 8
speaker's concern with his topic, i.e both speakers A and D are concerned with
informing their interlocutors about certain states of affairs.
John Searle's Speech Acts made a distinction comparable to Husserl's and
Leonard's.  He detached the notions of referring and predicating from the
notions of asserting, questioning, commanding, etc.  His purpose in making this
distinction was to claim that in uttering sentences in the English (or any other)
language speakers in fact perform several distinct kinds of acts.  Searle believed
that referring and predicating perform "propositional acts" whereas asserting,
questioning, and commanding perform "illocutionary acts."   8
Searle lists the following four sentences in order to illustrate his
distinction between propositional acts and illocutionary acts:
1. Sam smokes habitually.
2. Does Sam smoke habitually?
3. Sam, smoke habitually!
4. Would that Sam smoked habitually.
Searle notes that in uttering 1, a speaker is making an assertion, in 2
asking a question, in 3 giving an order, and in 4 expressing a wish or desire.  In
the performance of each of these four speech acts the speaker performs other acts
which are common to all four, i.e. the speaker refers to a certain object Sam and
predicates the expression "smokes habitually."  In Searle's words:
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We thus detach the notions of referring and predicating from the notions
of such complete speech acts as asserting, questioning, commanding, etc.,
and the justification for this separation lies in the fact that the same
reference and predication can occur in the performance of different
complete speech acts (Searle 1969, 23).
As illustrated by Searle's four sentences, the reference and predication are the
same but they occur as a part of a complete speech act which is different in each
of the four cases.
Note the similarity of the technique used by Husserl, Leonard, and Searle. 
All use the technique of variation to disclose certain properties of language and
cognition.  To put it more broadly, one could advocate a much stronger role of
variation in philosophy and claim that this technique provides the means and
the justification for various philosophical attempts at integrating philosophy and
the theory of action.
In the case of Husserl, Leonard, and Searle, variation is employed in the
following manner: they used sentences which represent varied act-qualities
(concerns, illocutionary acts) while keeping act-matter (topics of concern,
propositional acts) constant.  Husserl and Leonard, but not Searle, noted that
variation can be performed "at the other end:" both of them varied act-matters
(topic of concern) while keeping act-quality (concern) constant.
Reinach does not discuss these matters.  He is concerned more with the
distinct ways in which phenomena may be not only presented but also received
by the human mind.  Reinach was convinced that there was a plethora of
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regularities to be discovered by studying the ways in which phenomena are
received by the human mind:
Colours are seen, sounds heard, things of the external world are perceived
by the senses, numbers are thought, values are felt, etc.  Thus even in the
case of tones and colours it is an obvious requirement that we everywhere
strictly distinguish the object of the act from the act itself, through which
it is brought to presentation.  Once given this distinction we recognize
that there exists an abundance of the most interesting essential
connections which correlate of necessity the various types of object with
corresponding types of presenting acts (Smith 1982, 325).
It seems that most cognitive operations neutralize the peculiarities and the
regularities of these "empirical import laws."  Thus, for example, people talk as
if they simply remember quite distinct phenomena, such as a musical piece, a
fictional event that took place in a novel, or a characteristic scent -- all this
without clear awareness of what the sources of presentations were and how they
might have affected some of the structural properties of remembered events and
the manner in which the events were remembered.
The role of variation, however, is still easily traced in this line of
Reinach's thought.  This becomes obvious if, for example, one asks how one
would examine "the most interesting connection" between various types of
objects with corresponding types of presenting acts.
Let me illustrate this by taking just one possible direction in which free
variation might proceed.  One could, for example, employ the technique of
variation to examine the case of numbers and their relationship with, or
dependence on, the various sources of presentation in cognition.
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As Reinach noted in the previous quote, numbers can be thought without
any particular representation accompanying that thought.  However, number
can also be represented by seeing a number of things, hearing a number of tones,
or touching a number of objects.  Sight, touch, and sound seem to be the non-
controversial cases.  Things get more muddled when one considers the possible
relationships between numbers and their representation in smell and taste.
One could talk as if one remembers a number of different tastes and
smells.  I would oppose this and claim that discussion, in these two cases,
naturally shifts from numbers to kinds of phenomena.  Thus, people normally
talk about sensing more or less characteristic, unpleasant, or thick smells rather
than sensing certain numbers of smells or numbers of its nuances.  Similar
considerations can be applied to the case of tasting a new combination of
flavours, for example.  In this case, one would be interested in classifying this
new taste rather than counting its ingredients.
This is just a brief illustration of the possible ways in which one can
disclose, by means of variation, Reinach's "essential connections and
dependencies" between various types of objects and various types of presenting
acts in cognition.
The most general result of Reinach's distinction between meaning and
presentation is that it discloses the dependencies of modes of presentation on
their shared objective meaning.  For example, the meaning of a mathematical
theorem may be presented visually (printed in a book).  The same meaning
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might be presented in a radio lecture (auditorily).  Reinach also emphasized that
there could be talk about the dependency between the modes of presentation and
their respective sources in the sensory receptors.  In more general terms,
Reinach believed that there was a vast network of laws and regularities by
means of which the basic structures of nature and the social world become
intelligible to the human mind.  Equally so, he believed that there are laws and
regularities by means of which the basic experience of nature and the social
world becomes available to the human mind.
In the next section, I will move from the structural and cognitive aspects
of Reinach's theory of material necessity to some of its broader consequences and
its interesting connection with speech act theory.
(e) Reinach, Speech Act Theory, and Variation
In what follows I will examine some of the broader implications of Reinach's
views on material necessity.  In particular, I will discuss his implicit use of free
variation and the potential application of some of his ideas to more recent
discussions, specifically that of speech acts in analytic philosophy.  Throughout
this section, I will rely significantly on Barry Smith's and Kevin Mulligan's
interpretation of Reinach's thought and its similarity to speech act theory.
The view that "out there," there exists an intricate web of dependencies in
numerous kinds of social, material, linguistic, legal, factual, and behavioural
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phenomena has been held, to a greater or lesser extent, by numerous
philosophers.  However, the need to postulate such kinds of dependencies is by
no means self-evident.  Consequently, this view requires some sort of
justification and grounding.
A number of explanatory strategies can give this view some credibility. 
For example, one could resort to a version of pragmaticist argumentation and
assert that human beings require some sort of structure in their understanding
in order to get by in the world and to make sense of it.  Alternatively, one could
resort to some kind of transcendental epistemology and claim that certain
structures in human understanding render that very understanding possible.
Despite the particular strategies of justification, however, such claims
would still amount to saying, in very rough terms, that certain structures of
knowledge are "hard wired" in the human brain.  Not only are these structures
"hard wired" but they are also intricately and significantly connected to
numerous other features and properties of the human mind.
One of the consequences of this view would be the claim that the most
basic structures and relations in cognition possess some kind of intrinsic
intelligibility.  As Barry Smith puts it:
It is such intrinsic intelligibility of the basic structures and interrelations
of shape and motion, colour and sound, for example, which makes it
possible for us to learn language and to acquire that sort of a posteriori
knowledge on which empirical science is based (Smith 1992, 302).
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This view goes hand in hand with the phenomenological view that the empirical
and social world of experience is quite complex and intricate.  It takes one
additional step, i.e. assuming some kind of order or system, to surmise that the
nature of phenomena is multi-categorical.  It then becomes natural to claim that
phenomena of distinct sorts are compounded to form more and more complex
structures.  Quite complex processes can thus combine linguistic, factual, legal,
and numerous other kinds of phenomena.  From all these phenomena ever new
structures are formed.
A further consequence of this view would be the integration of the various
kinds of social acts into the very stock of the world of experience.  Social acts
would be seen as interwoven into the other kinds of phenomena and, in some
cases, seen as clearly dependent on some other kinds of phenomena.  One
example of this sort would be necessitation in social acts, i.e. the inference from
promise to obligation.
One of the most convenient ways to operationalize this kind of dependence
has been the use of the terminology of speech act theory.  I cannot develop the
nature and the history of this theory in this chapter.  Instead, I am assuming
that the readers are familiar with the basic versions of speech act theory
developed by John L. Austin and John Searle.  In a nutshell, speech act theory
emphasized the role of the interdependence of utterances and actions in human
communication and understanding.
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Austin's theory of speech acts arose mainly from his conviction that a
considerable number of utterances, even those which seem to assert things, were
such that in most cases it would be impossible to characterize them as either
true or false.  His distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts in
language is a consequence of this general idea.
The locutionary utterance "The door is open" is normally made with
reference to a particular door.  An illocutionary act, in contrast, may be
performed in, or perhaps even better, by means of performing the locutionary
act.  Thus, one can imagine an influential politician performing the illocutionary
act of officially opening a prospect of negotiations between two states by
uttering: "The door is open."
John Searle made certain methodological and terminological changes to
Austin's speech act theory, primarily by replacing the distinction between
locutionary and illocutionary acts with the propositional acts/illocutionary acts
distinction.  Nevertheless, Searle shares most of Austin's fundamental beliefs
concerning speech acts.  Most importantly, Searle believes that the units of
human speech behaviour consist of linguistic expressions already integrated into
speech acts.  To avoid misunderstandings, Searle stressed that a speech act still
is, and should be, the "basic" or "minimal" (Searle, Speech Acts, 16) unit of
linguistic communication.  To use Husserl's terminology, Searle believed that a
propositional act and an illocutionary act, for example, are distinct but not
independent parts of a speech act whole.
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One can gather from this short sketch of Austin's and Searle's basic ideas
that the role of context and background knowledge is crucial in speech act
theory.  The linguistic (or propositional) contents of utterances are coupled with
numerous possible actions and contexts, in speech act theory, in order to capture
an enriched notion of human verbal communication.
For a speech act to become fully functional, it is essential that all the
surrounding circumstances obtain along with the utterances which convey the
"elementary" linguistic message.  Thus it is necessary to have all the "proper"
circumstances, attitudes, contexts, etc. in order for a promise, for example, to
attain a full legal and social sense of obligation.
The category of promise, in contrast, seems to be prior to any factual
instantiation.  The necessary laws governing promises can be grasped even in
the absence of any factual instantiation.  Moreover, it takes some mental
variation in order to realize that the category of a promise can be placed in a
number of possible contexts and situations: e.g. insincere, jestful or fictional
promises.  What one has done in this case is to employ a technique of variation
and vary possible contexts, voice intonations, and circumstances against the
basic category of a promise.
Moreover, it becomes clear that grasping a general category, a promise for
example, renders certain modifications (variations) unacceptable.  For example,
it would not affect the category of promise if one were to say that one's promise
was given in a dream.  This promise would still be a "promise" which simply has
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to be accepted as a fictional promise and which can not be the ground of an
obligation.  However, if one were to say that "I hereby promise something" can
be modified to be: "I am playing music loudly in my dreams" anyone who
understands what the term "promise" means would know that the latter is
absurd.  Discerning that certain modification to the general category of
"promise" cannot be made, according to Smith, has to do with one's a priori grasp
of the range of interpretations that certain abstract notions can have.
(f) Modification and Discovery of Essential Structures
The appeal to the realm of the a priori may have to do with the limits of
modification.  Related discussions concerning the problem of accounting for some
kind of "essential kernels" in the linguistic, ontological, and cognitive realms
also fall under the rubric of "modification" in the philosophical literature.
The root of the latter discussions are found in Husserl's fourth
Investigation, paragraph 11: "Modifications of meaning which are rooted in the
essence of expressions or meanings."  Husserl points there among other things to
the suppositio materialis, a scholastic term attributed to William of Occam.  This
kind of suppositio, later revived as the "use" and "mention" distinction, was used
to account for the fact that every expression can also function as its own name,
i.e. will name itself as a grammatical phenomenon.  If one says "`The Earth is
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round' is a statement" one is concerned not with the fact that the earth is round
but with the indicative sentence (Husserl, Logical Investigations, 514).
Husserl explained that what happens in cases like this is a subtle change
the meaning undergoes, or more precisely, a subtle modification of that
meaning.  He held that: "What we have in mind here is not a verbal but a
semantic compounding, or a compounding of words in which meanings remain
constant" (Husserl, Logical Investigations, 513).
One could compare this sort of modification to Leonard's and Searle's
modifications mentioned earlier in this chapter.  Using Leonard's terminology: 
1. (One is claiming that) "The Earth is round."
2. (One is examining the indicative sentence) "The Earth is round."
Both sentences have the same topic of concern.  The concerns of the purposer(s) 1
and 2, however, are quite different.
Husserl further compared these modifications of meanings to arithmetical
talk of "transforming" arithmetical patterns.  This analogy might have
motivated Husserl to claim that there are a priori laws which allow meanings to
be transformed into new meanings, while preserving some kind of essential
kernel intact.
As Kevin Mulligan points out, Husserl's Investigations were largely
concerned with a felt need to develop a theory which could explain numerous
kinds of dependencies.  For example, one might want to explain what it is for a
modified and unmodified form to have something in common.  Husserl believed
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that this was only possible if one allowed a vast number of deeply rooted
dependencies in one's ontology.  In Mulligan's words:
Not only do sign-uses fall under different meaning categories, by virtue of
which they can combine to form higher-order unities that stand in
relations of dependence, they also exhibit or contain syntactic, semantic,
and morphological features.  These features in their turn stand in
relations of dependence to one another (Mulligan 1987, 74).
This sort of dependency has been examined by, among other philosophers,
Twardowski.  He employed what appears to be a technique of variation par
excellence in his essay "Issues in the Logic of Adjectives" (Twardowski, 1979). 
Twardowski begins this short piece by reminding his readers that
adjectives are sometimes divided into two categories: determining and modifying
adjectives.  Determining adjectives, when added to a noun, attach either a
positive or a negative characteristic to that noun (Twardowski's examples are "a
learned man," and "inexperienced person").  Modifying adjectives, when joined to
a noun, take away at least some of its original meaning.  Additionally, a noun
combined with a modifying adjective may become a name of an object to which
the noun, taken in its original meaning, no longer applies (Twardowski gives
examples such as: "artificial limb," "forged banknote").
Twardowski explained that a seemingly simple process of modifying
certain nouns by certain adjectives in fact conceals quite complex functions.  The
case of "forged" added to "banknote," for example, seems to remove from the
content of one's representations of a banknote precisely those characteristics
which apply to genuine banknotes and replaces them by the characteristics
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       There is a drink in England, called Babycham, which is advertised as "The genuine champagne perry."9
This advertisement implies that this drink is the only genuine imitation of champagne.
which are attributed to forged banknotes.  Some properties of banknotes,
however, remain constant in this process of modification.  For example, both
forged and non-forged banknotes are pieces of paper of the appropriate size,
displaying an appropriate text, graphics, and numbers.
Twardowski defined the modifying function in the following manner:
The function of modifying includes, first the function of a partial removal
of the content of the idea expressed by a given noun, and second, the
function of replacing that removed part of the content - which is a result of
combining a given adjective with a given noun - by other positive or
negative characteristics (Twardowski 1979, 28).
One should add that this kind of modification may operate on several levels.  It
is quite possible to imagine that, due to poor minting technology, a country
produces banknotes which look as if they were forged.  These banknotes are then
called "look-alike forged banknotes."  In this case, there is a double process of
modification: first of a noun "banknote" by an adjective "forged" and second of
the adjective "forged" by an adjective "look-alike."9
Leaving Twardowski's main purpose of classifying adjectives aside, the
similarities between the technique he used to test characteristics of adjectives
and Husserl's free variation are striking.  Also, as we will see in the next
chapter, the analysis of "conceptual combinations" by cognitive psychology is
clearly foreshadowed by Twardowski's analysis.
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      In his recent book, Austrian Philosophy, Barry Smith lists several characteristics of this "brand" of10
philosophy.  For the purposes of this chapter, the two most important characteristics are:
- A rejection of the Kantian revolution and the various sorts of relativism and historicism which came
in its wake.  Instead we find different forms of relativism and "objectivism."
- A concern with ontological structure and more especially with the issue as to how the parts of
things fit together to form structured wholes (Smith 1994, 3).  
(f) Conclusion
In conclusion, let me summarize the most important aspects of Reinach's theory
of material necessity and its potential relevance to free variation.
Put in a nutshell, Reinach was the first modern philosopher to suggest, in
an explicit manner, that a priori knowledge relates first and foremost to the
relations - most importantly, relations of necessitation - which obtain between
certain categories and objects.  Reinach further believed that these relations
exist objectively.  One should note that this strong realist inclination is
characteristic of a number of philosophers working throughout the Habsburg
Empire.  Recently, Rudolf Haller and Barry Smith introduced a "new" tradition
in philosophy, "Austrian philosophy."10
Examples of this sort are readily found in Reinach's writings.  Apart from
a couple of his articles mentioned earlier in this chapter, which deal extensively
with the nature of relations between objects and the concept of necessity, he left
scattered remarks on necessary relations in his shorter essays which have been
published posthumously.  For example, he addresses the problem of necessary
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       Reinach (1989) p. 353.11
relations in his short piece "Necessity and Universality in States of Affairs."   In11
attempting to solve this problem, Reinach introduced a special kind of necessity,
not previously formulated in the history of philosophy.  According to this
interpretation of necessity, certain relations ground their universal validity in
states of affairs.  Reinach states that the claims such as: "Orange belongs
between Red and Yellow" are universally valid without being analytic.
One may, following Barry Smith, extend Reinach's point and talk about
relations in a much broader sense.  One might see relations as enabling one to
handle, classify, and operationalize basic categories such as colour, sound, or
shape as well as some other, more complex, socially conditioned categories.  In
Smith's words:
Man, it is suggested, is born with an innate capacity to discriminate
between instances of categories of the given sort - for this is not itself
something that could have been learned - and hand in hand with this
innate capacity goes the ability to grasp the associated relations of
necessitation (Smith 1992, 320).
If this view is taken seriously then the activity of free variation must enjoy a
special status in one's theory of cognition.  Variation serves the purpose of
discovering, testing, and clarifying the domains of necessary laws which are to
be found in nature and in the social world.
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Moreover, the activity of free variation is helping to reveal a vast network
of possibilities which constitute, for example, fundamental distinctions between
the domains of the normal and the absurd in society.  As Smith put it:
Thus there could be no culture or society in which the validity of contracts
is in general made conditional on the parties' undergoing painful surgery,
or on the finding of a proof for some hitherto unproved conjecture in
mathematics.  The absurdity of such modifications is grasped immediately
by anyone with even a cursory familiarity with entities of the sort
involved.  It is an a priori necessity (Smith 1992, 312).
This augmented role of variation would make it work on a quite fundamental
level, helping people shape the very possibilities of, for example, contracts in
society.  Variation would also work in an essentially negative fashion, by
constantly eliminating certain absurd configurations in the process of
manipulating certain contents of one's thoughts.  In this sense, one could claim
that variation is essentially a technique which discloses the limits of certain
semantic and ontological structures.
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Chapter Four
The Role of Variation in Cognitive Science:




What is the role of free variation in cognitive science?  I will attempt to answer
this question, as it often happens in philosophy, by dividing it into two separate
questions: (1) What role does free variation already (implicitly) play in cognitive
science? and (2) Would cognitive science benefit by inquiring (explicitly) into the
role of free variation?
I will attempt to show that free variation already plays an important,
although not always explicit, role in cognitive science.  Additionally, I will
suggest that explicating the role of free variation in cognition may be seen as a
vital component of maintaining the strength of certain approaches and "schools"
of cognitive science.  To illustrate this, let me present the relevance of variation
in disputes between the connectionist and more traditional theories of cognition.
The dispute between more traditional (propositional and "language of
thought" based) understanding of cognitive science and recent connectionist
theories may be seen as centred, in part, on the role of variation (manipulation)
in cognition.  More traditional account would appeal to the fact that the
correspondence between formal languages and propositional content may be
seen as dependent upon the combinatorial structure of strings of symbols.  Thus,
one may claim that sentences have parts with both fixed and adjustable
meanings and that we form new meaningful sentences by rearranging these
parts in new combinations.  In this case, the ability to vary parts of structured
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sentences may be seen as quite significant: this ability would help us account for
our understanding of propositions we never encountered before.
Instead of appealing to the paradigms of cognition which involve either
strings of symbols or some sort of propositional structure, connectionists would
rather appeal to some type of neural architecture.  They argue that the
properties of some sort of functional networks in cognition represent the
properties of neural activity much closer than the properties of any sequential
symbol-processing system.  The problem of variation, however, did not go away. 
It still remains to be solved, only transferred to the level of motor processes and
image transformation.
(b) Free Variation, Structured Imagination, and Conceptual Combinations
I began my treatment of Husserl's Logical Investigations by remarking that
while his book does not deal directly with the notion of free variation, a thorough
grasp of this notion is nonetheless required to understand some of the
fundamental problems of phenomenology.
In a similar manner, I want to begin my treatment of structured
imagination and conceptual combinations in cognitive science by noting that one
would not encounter the notion of free variation directly and explicitly if one
were to inquire into either of them.  However, I would like to argue that the way
in which cognitive science understands "structured imagination" and "conceptual
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combinations" implies tacit use of principles and structures of a complex
cognitive strategy -- which has been much used in phenomenology, logic, and
general epistemology namely, the strategy of free variation.
It should be noted, however, that I am not claiming that inquiry into "free
variation" by phenomenologists should be seen as identical to the inquiry into
"structured imagination" and "conceptual combinations" by cognitive science. 
There are notable differences between the three notions, differences which will
be discussed later in this chapter.  Nevertheless, behind both of the notions
there is, I believe, an elementary and primitive activity of the mind, namely, the
activity of free variation.  This activity can be described in simple terms: varying,
in one's mind, some aspects or elements of a compound structure, while keeping
some other aspect or elements of that structure constant.
In the course of examination of this activity, we will see that neither the
underlying structure nor the elements being varied need always be specified or
made explicit in thinking.  On the contrary, the activity of free variation appears
to be a mostly automatic and unconscious mechanism both in real-life and in
experimental circumstances.
Before I present the notion of structured imagination as developed in
Creative Cognition by Finke, Ward and Smith, let me sketch my basic
understanding of contemporary cognitive science.  Cognitive science can be
characterized as a relatively new field of research, straddling the disciplines of
philosophy, psychology, computer science, linguistics, neurology, and
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neuropsychology.  Cognitive science, in general, attempts to test and advance
the "functional" and "computational" models of thought.  As Johnson-Laird
remarked, in The Computer and the Mind, the advance of the "age of
computability" has resulted in the following conjecture: "Perhaps the mind
stands to the brain in much the same way that the program stands to the
computer" (Johnson-Laird 1988, 8).  This conjecture, based solely on a powerful
and heuristic analogy, has led to a large number of computational theories about
various functions and properties of the mind.
In order to achieve its primary goal, the scientific explanation of mental
phenomena, cognitive science adopts the naturalist and empiricist approach to
mental phenomena.  Alvin Goldman, in his Philosophical Applications of
Cognitive Science, clearly and succinctly sums up the empirical grounds of
cognitive science: "How people ordinarily represent or understand mental
concepts (a central problem in philosophy of mind) is ultimately an empirical
problem requiring theoretical and experimental investigations appropriate to
cognitive science" (Goldman 1993, 63).
155
      In order to clarify what this term "known reality" may possibly mean, it would be interesting to12
compare this view to Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic.  In this book, Frege claimed that the imagination
does not go beyond the bounds of geometry.
(2) Structured Imagination and Free variation
The first problem that cognitive science encounters in its treatment of
imagination is conceptual or definitional.  In other words, cognitive science
needs to sketch the limits of the concept of imagination.  In order to do this,
cognitive scientists adopt, overtly or covertly, several assumptions about
imagination.  Here are some of the more important characteristics ascribed to
imagination in Creative Cognition:
(1) Imagination involves the generation and experiences of ideas that go beyond
what is currently known (114).  However, it is important to add that the
imagination does not go outside the bounds of known reality.   12
(2) Imagination results in some tangible product - in contrast to fantasy,
dreaming, and so on.
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(3) Imagination is not a mysterious process through which new ideas spring into
being full blown and with no obvious link to existing cognitive structures.  On
the contrary, imagination is influenced by existing knowledge frameworks.  That
is why the authors of Creative Cognition use the term "structured imagination."
(4) Imagination is different from mental imagery in being both more global and
more restrictive than mental imagery.  This is how the authors of Creative
Cognition put it:
Imagination is the process by which people mentally generate novel
objects, settings, events, and so on.  It is more global than mental imagery
in the sense that although these imagined entities might take on the form
of mental images, they need not.  Imaginative products can also exist in
the form of verbal description.  Imagination is also more restrictive than
mental imagery in the sense that it must involve the generation of
something new, whereas certain manifestations of mental imagery can be
purely recollective (Finke, Ward, Smith 1993, 115).
As we have seen from this sketch, the understanding of imagination in Creative
Cognition is based on several assumptions.  The most fundamental one,
however, is the assumption that imagination is necessarily productive.  Once
this assumption has been made, the others follow naturally. For example, the
claims that imagination needs to be innovative and that imagination has the
tendency to be predictable can both be seen as a consequence of the assumption
that imagination is productive.
These assumptions about imagination are readily justifiable since they
stem from general methodological requirements.  Cognitive science relies on
empirical data and it needs certain testing procedures in order to theorize about
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imagination.  Research involving empirical data is only possible if there are
some empirically testable phenomena "out there."  However, one may remark
that insistence on empirical data in theorizing about imagination should not be
attributed exclusively to cognitive science but to any other philosophical or
theoretical approach concerned with imagination.  Consequently, one may
express doubt about any serious sense in which imagination could be taken as
non-productive.  In order to illustrate at least some senses in which imagination
can be seen as non-productive, let me elaborate the two cases: imagination in its
"adverbial" usage and imagination in the "constructivist" sense.
(a) Some Alternative Views on Imagination
One usage in which imagining is not seen as a purposive action with
tangible results could be defined in this way:  one could understand imagining
not as a verb but as an adverb.  Instead of talking about an activity of
"imagining" or "imagination" per se one would see actions, events, designs, and
writings as produced, induced, or brought forth "imaginatively."  For example,
one would be able to say that a solution to a mathematical problem has been
worked out imaginatively, or that an ice skater has performed some of the
necessary moves imaginatively.
A generation ago, some philosophers might have argued that the
adverbial use of "imaginatively" is the core or central use.  "Ordinary language"
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philosophers, influenced largely by Wittgenstein's later writings, refused to
acknowledge the existence of any intrinsic qualities, states, or dispositions in
human cognition.  Influenced also by behaviourist approach to human
psychology, ordinary language philosophers tended to characterise human
cognition by the effects it produces in human behaviour.  Consequently, the
activity of "imagining" would, properly speaking, not exist.  There would only be
certain actions or events brought forth in an "imaginative" manner.
Take, for example, Ryle's discussion of intelligence in The Concept of
Mind.  In this book, Ryle criticizes the belief that there is "intelligence" behind
one's "intelligent behaviour."  According to Ryle, there are neither special
prescriptions for intelligence nor is there a special place for intelligence in one's
mind.  This is how he characterizes a person who reasons logically:
He reasons with a correct method but without considering the
prescriptions of a methodology.  The rules that he observes have become
his way of thinking, when he is taking care; they are not external rubrics
with which he has to square his thoughts (Ryle 1949, 48).
Ryle proposes that to say that a person argues intelligently is to adjudge
that person by certain criteria (such as being cogent, clear, and so on).  Silent
argumentation falls into the same category, although it is not subjected to the
criticism of audience and readers.  Furthermore, argumentation is always
unique: the argumentative setting, the particular issues are never the same.   
Imagination, understood in this sense, would be much more difficult to
describe and analyze than the notion of structured imagination.  Additionally, it
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would be very difficult to see what the products of such notion of imagination
would be.  What is the problem with attempting to square Ryle's and cognitive
science approaches to human intelligence and creativity?  A misunderstanding
or some sort of a category mistake?
Instead of pointing out the shortcomings of "ordinary language"
understanding of imagination, it is much more important, I believe, to point to a
change in methodology.  This change is implicit in most non-productive
interpretations of imagination.  Such interpretations require that the
methodological approach becomes normative much more that theoretic and
descriptive.  In other words, imagination would have to be oriented towards an
implicit or explicit norm, or the basic criterion, for ascribing the term
"imaginatively" to actions and events instead of relying on products of the
process of imagination.
Another essentially non-purposive and non-productive approach to
imagination can be found in thought of Nelson Goodman and Jerome Bruner. 
Bruner follows Michael Halliday in dividing the functions of language into two
superordinate classes - pragmatic and mathetic.  The pragmatic class contains
functions such as the instrumental, regulatory, interactional, and personal.  The
mathetic class contains the heuristic, imaginative and informative functions. 
The mathetic class is an interesting one for the purposes of this chapter.  The
heuristic function of language is to gain information and correction from others. 
The informative function of language presupposes intersubjectivity;  that
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somebody has knowledge I do not possess and vice versa, and that there are
ways of communicating this kind of knowledge.  The imaginative function of
language is defined by Bruner as "...the means whereby we create possible
worlds and go beyond the immediately referential" (Bruner 1986, 125).  Bruner's
understanding of imagination and its link to possible worlds has been largely
inspired by Nelson Goodman's understanding of possible worlds.
Goodman argues that what we call the "world" is a product of a mind
whose symbolic procedures construct it.  In the case of perception, for example, it
has often been claimed in philosophy that the world of appearance, the very
world we live in, is "created" by the mind.  Imaginative creation of possible
worlds would be, therefore, just one of the means of constructing reality,
although an extremely important one.
In this second case we see that the notion of imagination appears
integrated into a much broader world view, one which relies on numerous
metaphysical assumptions.  The role of imagination in this world view is
undoubtedly significant.  However, this kind of imagination lacks precise
definition and cannot be empirically tested.  If it became abstracted from its
metaphysical background, this understanding of imagination would lose most of
its meaning.  Additionally, since the focus of this chapter is variation and some
other related concepts in cognitive science, it would be difficult, at the same
time, to keep this focus in mind and to retain Goodman's "large metaphysical
picture." 
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(b) Structured Imagination Empirically Tested
The authors of Creative Cognition began their examination of structured
imagination largely influenced by the research in structured imagination
conducted by cognitive psychologists.  This research revealed that attributes of
real-world categories, instead of co-occurring randomly, tend to occur in distinct
clusters.  "For example, feathers and wings occur much more often together than
do fur and wings" (Finke, Ward, Smith 1993, 118).  The traditional tests
indicated, additionally, that correlated attributes are so inherent to human
cognition that even infants as young as ten months of age appear sensitive to
them.
Thomas Ward conducted a number of experiments in 1991, results of
which were presented in a paper under the title "Structured Imagination: The
Role of Conceptual Structure in Exemplar Generation" to the meeting of the
Psychonomic Society in San Francisco.  Ward's research was largely integrated
into the chapter "Structured Imagination" in Creative Cognition.  What follows is
a short description of the first of Ward's several studies:
In the first study, Ward gave fifty college students the task of imagining a
planet that exists somewhere in the galaxy but is similar to earth in size,
terrain, and climate.  They were then asked to imagine and draw an
animal that lived on that planet.  Because the planet was described as
similar to earth, the properties of the exemplars served as a baseline
against which to compare exemplars from subsequent studies in which
that planet was described as being very different from earth.  In addition
to providing the initial drawing of their imagined animal, subjects
responded to questions about the diet, habitat, sensory organs, and
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appendages of the creature.  The questions were designed to provide
information about nonvisible properties of the creatures and to help
clarify ambiguities in interpreting the visible properties of the drawings
(Finke, Ward, Smith 1993, 119).
The results of the study indicated that a large majority of subjects drew
creatures with highly predictable features, such as bilaterally symmetric
individuals with at least one major sense organ and at least one major type of
appendage.  In other words, the way in which the tested subjects used their
imagination indicated a strong influence of familiar and characteristic features
implicitly correlated to certain categories:
Rather than being idiosyncratic and unpredictable, the use of imagination
to generate new exemplars of a category appears to be highly structured
by the characteristic attributes of known category members (Finke, Ward,
Smith 1993, 120).
Furthermore, Ward showed that subjects could be expected to structure their
free variations in imagining, both within and between categories.  For example,
subjects would typically vary shape across species but not within species.  In
simple words, a fish, imagined or drawn on paper, would appear to have an
entirely different shape from a bird.  However, once a fish-like creature has been
chosen, the extent of variations within the chosen species becomes greatly
limited.  Finally, if the subjects were asked to generate a second member of the
same species, it is most likely that they would vary just its size.
(c) Categorization Models and Schemes
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Categorization models are important not only in recognizing categories but also
in generating new members of a given category.  The person appears to evaluate
an entity against some stored representation of the category in deciding whether
the given entity is a member of some known category.
However, categorization may depend on the initial set of requirements or,
in other words, the initial restraint parameters.  To illustrate this, consider
what I have termed interspecies and intraspecies variation.  One might begin
the process of free variation with a broad, abstract category.  For example, one
might begin with the more general category of an animal, "mammal," which is
associated with a number of salient properties and generate a fitting concrete
exemplar by varying different kinds of animals against this category.  One may
produce a dog, a cat, a cheetah, etc. by this kind of variation.  Finally, one might
produce a novel kind of animal by combining some known properties of
mammals.  This kind of categorization might be termed categorization by inter-
species variation.  Second, one might begin with a concrete example of an animal
and mentally vary some of its parts.  For example, one might produce different
breeds of a species "dog" varying some of its parts: ears, tail, hair length, etc. 
Combining the known breeds, one may produce a novel breed of dog.  This kind
of categorization might be termed categorization by intra-species variation.
Schemes are even more complex knowledge structures than categories. 
They have also been called "scripts," "frames," and "concepts."  Categories, in
contrast, consist of single kinds of objects that share certain taxonomic links. 
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People recognize that more abstract categories might be divided in various ways,
following different taxonomic features.  Thus we speak of time-measuring
devices, among which are sundials, hour-glasses, clocks, watches, and stop
watches.  Notice that there may be very little actual similarity between the
objects that fall under the abstract category of time-measuring devices. 
Moreover, hour-glasses and watches, for example, may alternatively be defined
as each falling under separate and distinct categories, e.g. the former under
glass art objects and the latter under mechanical devices.
Schemes are even more complex entities, and somewhat more arbitrary
structures then abstract categories.  They tend to straddle taxonomic
boundaries.  This is how Creative Cognition contrasts schematic and categorical
thinking:
In contrast, schemes specify the relations among several discrete
categories, and these often cut across standard taxonomic boundaries.  A
schema for a living room might contain not only chairs, televisions,
paintings, and other discrete categories but also the typical relations
among them (Finke, Ward, Smith 1993, 134).
Cognitive science makes use of schemes in the following manner:  plausible
inferences and problem solutions are generated by means of schemes, or clusters
stored in memory.  These clusters can be accessed as large units which contain
information about the likely properties of the environment.
Schemes, in general, have an important impact on encoding new
information, retrieving old information, and inferences based on that
information.  Schemes also guide and limit imagination.  For example, a
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characteristic hat and pipe still constitute a "Sherlock Holmes" schema.  It is
interesting to note that neither of the two objects, in the form in which they exist
in common perception, have been introduced by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.  They
are the product of the imagination of subsequent Sherlock Holmes illustrators. 
However, generations of readers of Sherlock Holmes have had their imagination
shaped by such a schema.  Schemes are stubborn; it usually happens that people
form exception rules for cases that do not fit existing schemes rather than
change the more general schema.
Ernst Mach wrote about the inherent need for "economy of thought" in
human cognition which is particularly evident in scientific thought experiments. 
This general regulatory principle requires that people employ the maximum
number of typical, routine problem solving techniques even in ordinary thinking
processes.  However, people are often faced with atypical events and objects.  "In
everyday life we are often faced with inputs that do not readily fit any prestored
category representation" (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard 1986, 13).  In
cases like these, people introspect the novel situation and solve the problems by
the simultaneous activation and integration of multiple schemes.
However, the role of schemes in cognitive processes is by no means
exhausted by problem solving.  Schemes may, for example, be employed to serve
a humorous function.  Cartoonist Gary Larson has created funny situations in
his "Far Side" series by juxtaposing mutually exclusive, or extremely distant
schemes.
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(d) Structured Imagination and Variation
Let me now turn to what I believe to be one of the most important feature of
structured imagination, namely, the activity of free variation.  Most of the
experiments concerning structured imagination in Creative Cognition employ the
following strategy:  the subjects were asked to extend a property, for example
"intelligence," of a creature living on earth to some, slightly altered, imaginary
instances of that creature living somewhere in the universe.  It appears that the
subjects were supposed, although tacitly, to produce the creatures which would
be different from humans to some degree.  In other words, the subjects were
asked to imagine variants of the known and familiar category "intelligent
creature living on earth."  Thus, the process of free variation kept most of the
typical properties of "intelligent creature" or "human being" constant, while
placing this imaginary creature, in the process of variation, in a slightly altered
environment:  "living on a planet similar to earth."  There was a degree of
freedom, of course, left to decide how and where to implement variation in
imagination.  First, the concrete features of this imaginary planet were not
specified -- the only thing specified was its apparent similarity to earth.  Second,
the typical features of the earthly human creatures to be kept constant in
imagination were not specified.  One could keep certain typical human features
constant and vary some others.  For example, one could choose to attribute to
this imagined creature two human-like legs and to give it several antennas
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instead of arms.  However, the subjects of those experiments seem not to have
exploited this freedom of variation in structured imagination to a great degree. 
They have largely chosen to keep most typical features associated with
"intelligent creatures" constant by default processes of cognition, as it were.
In contrast to phenomenology, which appears to be oriented towards pure
contemplation and discovery of essences, cognitive science is practical and
theory-oriented.  Its understanding of imagination involves the notion of
intervening in the process of free variation.  This intervention serves the role of
rendering the products of free variation interpretable and useful to the process of
theory formation.  Consider, for example, varying some aspects of the notion
"car," which was mentioned earlier in the chapter on phenomenology. 
Phenomenologists would resort to "armchair" mental experimentation and vary
different aspects of a phenomenon "car" in their minds in order to examine
which features (or which combination of features) are essential for it to still be a
car.  A cognitive scientist would almost certainly intervene in the process of free
variation with two basic motives in mind.
First, a cognitive scientist would strive to better structure the process of
free variation, limiting it by some additional constraints.  Second, a cognitive
scientist would primarily set a process of free variation in a manner such that it
results in a tangible product, e.g. in drawing. 
If a cognitive scientists had to deal with subjects imagining anything
about "car" their procedure would be quite different from the phenomenological
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one.  The subjects would likely be asked, for example, to imagine a planet
similar to earth where human-like intelligent creatures "see" things by using
ultrasound.  Their vision does not depend on light.  What would their cars look
like?  Subjects would probably keep, in their imagination, constant most of the
known properties of cars, such as engine, wheels, passenger and driver seats,
etc.  However, they would probably, in their imagination, remove glass
windshields and windows and replace them, for example, with some sort of
ultrasound "ears" or radars placed on the front and the back of that car.  To
make this product of the imagination more intuitive, one could perhaps call it
"batcar."  Finally, the final product of this process of free variation would be
drawn on paper.  Consequently, the results of such an experiment may be used
as material for the statistical analysis and interpretation.
In this short discussion I have indicated, I believe, close dependence
between "structured imagination" and "free variation."  It appears that
structured imagination in cognitive science makes use of free variation as a
vehicle, or as a primitive cognitive procedure.  In the next section, I will attempt
to show that the process of "conceptual combinations," as presented in cognitive
science, makes use of free variation in a manner similar to what structured
imagination does.
(3) Free variation and Conceptual Combinations
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(a) Introduction
Inquiry into combining of concepts in cognitive science has been prompted
by the attempts to characterize the structure of conceptual knowledge in human
behaviour.  The problem to be solved has largely consisted in giving an account
of the employment of what were considered relatively static pockets of
information (definitions, schemes, frames) in greatly varying contexts.  These
packets of information, however, appear not only capable of fitting the diverse
contexts but the concepts within the packets of information have the capacity of
being combined in various manners.  This latter phenomenon just adds to
complexity and dynamic nature of the human conceptual knowledge which
emerges in the concrete process of cognizing.
In order to illustrate the approach which cognitive psychology adopts in
order to inquire into conceptual combinations I will examine some issues
presented in the paper "Context and Structure in Conceptual Combination" by
Douglas L. Medin and Edward J. Shoben, though I will not go into the particular
theoretical background which this paper seems to be addressing.  I will focus on
the extent to which inquiry into conceptual combinations by cognitive psychology
makes use of the basic and primitive cognitive operation, that of free variation.
In cognitive psychology, conceptual combinations are the best
demonstration of the basic need for concept flexibility:
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One of the basic properties of the categories is that they can be combined
to form more restricted concepts.  Thus, we can restrict birds to songbirds,
water birds, predatory birds, and migratory birds.  In addition to these
combinations, we can construct and understand novel combinations such
as gregarious birds or noisy birds (Medin and Shoben 1988, 160).
Cognitive psychologists, striving to give an empirical account of human
conceptual knowledge using the computational models of explanation, have to
grant that it is extremely unlikely that people have a stored representation for
every possible conceptual combination.  This is not just because there would be
too many possible combinations but also because the pairing of terms involves
some sort of augmentation of their initial "semantical mass."  For example, the
pairing of adjectives and nouns does not involve mere conjunction of attributes of
two constituents.  In Medin and Shoben's words:
For example, although most friendly people are warm and outgoing, it
seems silly to describe a computer in this way.  Moreover, in conceptual
combinations such as pet fish, the constituents often have competing
values on some dimensions; most pets have fur as their body covering, yet
pet fish have scales (Medin and Shoben 1988, 160).
However, in order to understand how people structure and remodel categories
and schemes, one seems compelled to examine conceptual combinations.  One
particular case combining the elements of language and cognition, that Medin
and Shoben chose to examine in their article, is the combination of adjectives
and nouns.
Research in cognitive psychology has already indicated that concepts are
generally organized on the basis of their typicality which, in turn, is based on
common similarity standards.  For example, pictures of typical examples (e.g.
171
robins) are identified more rapidly when preceded by a category label (e.g. bird). 
When it comes to combination of nouns and adjectives, one of the models adopted
in order to account for conceptual combinations in cognitive psychology was the
modification model.  This is a short description of the modification model:
The modification model postulates a pair of simple mechanisms  by which
the meaning of a conjoined category can be derived from the individual
meanings of the adjective and noun constituents.  The basic idea is that
the adjective directs the knowledge restructuring in a straightforward
manner by restricting the range of acceptable values and by increasing
the importance of the corresponding dimension.  If one considers the color
of an apple, for example, one notes that most apples are red, but that
some are green or yellow and that a few are brown.  According to the
modification model, for the conjoined category red apple, the acceptable
values are restricted to red and the dimension of color is given more
weight or importance than it has in the simple concept of apple.  The
typicality of potential instances of the red apple will be a function of their
similarity to the newly created prototypic red apple (Medin and Shoben
1988, 161).
However, Medin and Shoben argue that models that attempt to explain
combined categories by adding or changing a single feature have largely been
unsuccessful.  It appears that attributes are interdependent and that
correlations of the attributes are a matter of common knowledge and largely
dependent on the context.  It seems that one of the most difficult hurdles to any
"single feature modification model" of explanation of conceptual combinations is
solving the problem of centrality.  Let me present this problem in the next
section of this chapter.
(b) Centrality and Conceptual Combinations
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Medin and Shoben approached the problem of centrality in conceptual
combinations in the following way: they generated concept properties that would
always or nearly always be true of two different concepts but perhaps more
important in one concept than another.  Here is their own account:
For example, we felt that the shape of a basketball was central to the
meaning of the concept.  If a basketball is not round, then it cannot be a
basketball because it cannot be dribbled, passed, or shot in the manner
that is characteristic of the game.  On the other hand, we believed that
shape was relatively less important for a cantaloupe.  Although square
cantaloupes never occur in nature, by our intuitions there is nothing
essential about the shape of a cantaloupe (Medin and Shoben 1988, 175-
176).
The shape of a basketball appears to be central to the meaning of this concept. 
One may claim that its weight is central to the notion of a basketball to a
somewhat lesser degree.  For example, one can imagine a statue of a basketball
player holding an iron or brass basketball in his hand.  This kind of a ball would
be too heavy in order to be actually played with.  However, one can still grant
that this objection does not affect its status of being a basketball.  If one were to
continue such queries in one's mind, it would be possible to establish that the
colour of the ball probably figures as one of the least central of all the potential
properties of the basketball.  All those different "perspectives" of free variation
may serve the purpose of illustrating the possibility of disclosing the inherent
degrees of centrality of properties throughout various concept combinations.
Consequently, it soon becomes clear that centrality is almost exclusively
tested in the mind, by the process of free variation.  In this particular case,
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examined by Medin and Shoben, of combining adjectives and nouns it appears
that there is some kind of a structure among attributes that guides reasoning by
means of adjective-noun pairs:
Consider again flying whales versus flying ostriches.  For flying whale,
one must make changes to a large number of attributes.  One must add
some kind of wings, slim down the body considerably, and find some
means of propulsion to get our redesigned whale into the air.  In contrast,
a flying ostrich requires fewer and less drastic changes.  Shortening the
legs and neck, for example, might very well enable this hypothetical
ostrich to fly (Medin and Shoben 1988, 179).
In this example, one can see that the extent to which free variation ("making
changes to attributes" in Medin and Shoben's words) establishes the level of
typicality embedded in certain concepts and discloses the regularities inherent
in the way certain concepts "hang together."
(4) General Summary
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As I attempted to show in this chapter, inquiries into concept
combinations in cognitive science revealed and thematised the importance of
context and background knowledge in human cognition.  The research in
structured imagination disclosed the importance of known properties and
background information in imagining novel entities.
However, the main goal of my chapter was to provide plausibility to the
claim that in testing, analysing, and disclosing the regularities both in the
context combinations and the process of structured imagination cognitive
psychology employed variation quite frequently.  Variation in this usage was, I
suggested, a simple and easily employable device.  This device was not always
used explicitly in cognitive psychology.  However, I claimed that it was used
earlier in philosophy, although in a somewhat different manner.  Following this
claim I pointed to similarities and dissimilarities of the notion of variation as







Thought experiments in natural sciences and philosophy are a matter of
growing interest among philosophers of science, cognitive scientists, and
philosophers of mind.  Let me mention just a few: James R. Brown, Nancy
Nersessian, John Norton, Roy Sorensen, and Kathleen Wilkes.  The main
concern of this chapter will be to show that understanding the technique of
variation may prove to be quite relevant to inquiry into thought experiments. 
More specifically, I will show that variation figures quite prominently in the
earliest modern account of thought experiments, that offered by Ernst Mach.
Let me begin by sketching several basic characteristics of thought
experiments:  First, they are performed in the mind in such a manner that they
not only originate and are entirely executed in the "laboratory of the mind," but
they also make it unnecessary to carry out the actual experiment once the
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thought experiment has been completed. Indeed, in several cases, it is only
possible to imagine the situation described by means of thought experiments.
Take Einstein's chasing of a light beam: an actual experiment is in this case
inconceivable. Second, thought experiments are indeed experiments, since our
mind actively manipulates the circumstances and preparatory conditions for
them. Third, they clearly have empirical relevance: once successfully
established, they may open our eyes to new theoretical possibilities, making
manifest empirical consequences that were not discernible in our existing
representation. Finally, thought experiments may reduce to absurdity a set of
assumptions and thereby refute a certain explanation or law.
Alternatively one can, with John Norton, characterize thought
experiments as arguments.  Norton claims that thought experiments in physics
"provide or purport to provide us information about the physical world" (Norton,
in Horowitz and Massey (ed.) 1991, 129).  He goes on to infer that since thought
experiments are not physical experiments, this information does not come from
the reporting of new empirical data.  Where does this information come from,
then?  Here is Norton's answer:
Thus there is only one non-controversial source from which this
information can come: it is elicited from information we already have by
an identifiable argument, although that argument might not be laid out
in detail in the statement of the thought experiment (Norton, in Horowitz
and Massey (ed.) 1991, 129).
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For most commentators, a thought experiment is a mental activity which
has more significance than merely thinking about an illustration or an
interesting case study.  If successful, thought experiments boast a notable level
of integrity, independence, and intrinsic value.  This is exemplified in the
tendency of certain thought experiments to outlive the actual arguments they
were devised to support or to undermine.  For example, virtually any
philosopher can nowadays recount the story about Schrödinger's cat, as part of
the famous quantum mechanics thought experiment.  But how many of these
philosophers can, in fact, recount the theory behind this thought experiment?
In order to illustrate the power of thought experiments, let me present a
rather convoluted and fascinating one, drawn from Albert Einstein by Roy
Sorensen in his Thought Experiments:
Suppose a train travels six-tenths the speed of light.  One observer is
stationed on the middle car while a second observer stands on an
embankment.  Lightning bolts now strike each end of the train, leaving
burn marks on the train and the ground.  The light from the bolt striking
the locomotive and the light from the bolt hitting the caboose reach the
ground observer at the same time.  Hence, the events look simultaneous to
him.  To be sure, the ground observer measures the distance to each of the
burn marks on the ground and verifies that he was standing exactly
midway between the two events.  Now consider the observer on the train. 
Since he is travelling toward the light emanating from the locomotive and
away from the light of the caboose, he sees the locomotive bolt before the
caboose bolt.  He, too, is situated exactly midway between the burn marks
left on the train.  So he infers that the bolts were not simultaneous.  Who
is right?  Einstein amplifies the query by supposing that another bolt hits
the locomotive so that it is measured as simultaneous with the caboose
bolt by the train observer but as later by the ground observer.  We have a
number of options here.  We might draw the moral that light should not
be assigned a central role in our tacit definition of simultaneity.  We have
assumed that two distant events are simultaneous if the light emanating
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from them reach their midpoint at the same time.  However, Einstein
urges us to stick with this aspect of the definition and instead relativize
`simultaneous' to reference frames.  Thus Einstein's answer to `Who is
right about whether the bolts struck simultaneously?' is `Bad
question!'"(Sorensen 1992, 178).
Broadly speaking, there are two methods of accounting for thought
experiments: empiricist and rationalist. For the former, thought experiments are
just a set of problem-solving techniques. As Mach would put it, thought
experiments largely utilize the reflex motion of thought. Their main virtue
consists in their ability to reduce the time and effort required as compared to the
actual performance of the experiment. In that sense, the laboratory of the mind
is the cheapest experimental crash-test facility. Roy Sorensen, following Darwin
and Mach, is even willing to entirely naturalize the phenomenon of thought
experiments and consequently extend it to some other species; as he puts it,
"People have no monopoly on abstract ideas" (Sorensen, 1992 33). The ability to
perform thought experiments may be an inborn trait of many living creatures,
akin to their ability to play with things.
The empiricist approach to thought experiments was stimulated by
growing interest in experiments and experimentation.  Thought experiments,
according to this understanding, are to be considered a species of "real"
experiments, although they are executed in the mind.  This is evident from
Sorensen's short definition of thought experiments: "A thought experiment is an
experiment that purports to achieve its aim without the benefit of execution"
(Sorensen 1992, 205).
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  In Sorensen's account, it seems that thought experiments owe their
existence to the fruitful convergence of induction and fiction.  This is the motto
of his Thought Experiments:
I argue that thought experiments evolved from experiment through a
process of attenuation.  This builds inductive momentum behind the
theme that thought experiments are experiments.  My commitment to
viewing them as limiting cases of experiment is solidified by defining
thought experiments as experiments that purport to deal with their
questions by contemplation of their design rather than by execution.  But
in the course of this analysis another reduction is endorsed: in addition to
being experiments and paradoxes, thought experiments are stories.  This
brings one of the book's minor themes into prominence: many of the issues
raised by thought experiments are prefigured in aesthetics and the logic of
fiction'(6).
Rationalist understanding of thought experiments is typified by James
Brown's approach.  Brown stresses the fact that any successful thought
experiment unfolds in the same manner in anybody's mind. Once this is
accepted, we naturally seek the laws responsible for such objective phenomena.
In the case of thought experiments, such laws do not depend on any new
empirical data. Brown suggests that "[this] is almost true by definition; being a
thought experiment rules out new empirical output" (Brown 1992, 77).  Brown
then divides thought experiments into constructive, destructive, and Platonic
ones.  Specifically, in the case of constructive ones, they work in the following
way: "The burden of any constitutive thought experiment consists in
establishing (in the imagination) the thought-experimental phenomenon. This
phenomenon then acts as fairly conclusive evidence for some theory" (Brown
1992, 45). This establishing of the thought-experimental phenomenon is readily
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applicable to the "constructive" and "destructive" types thought experiments; but
what happens with "platonic" ones, which are the truly intriguing ones since
they are simultaneously constructive and destructive?  
  "Platonic" thought experiments work by allowing us to grasp what
Brown names "the relevant universal."  Brown uses Galileo's "falling bodies"
experiment, described in the introduction to my thesis, as a paradigmatic case of
a platonic thought experiment.  Brown claims that, in experiments like that one,
science comes close to mathematics. That is, "The epistemology of thought
experiments is similar to the epistemology of mathematics. Just as we
sometimes perceive abstract mathematical entities, so we sometimes perceive
abstract universals" (Brown 1992, 86).
Recently, philosophers of science, and particularly cognitive scientists,
have made advances into the phenomenon of thought experiments, using both
empiricist and rationalist strategies. Nancy Nersessian, examining the way
scientists form their hypotheses, argues that a thought experiment is at first a
sort of direct mental simulation. That simulation is then followed by the
narrative form of presentation which serves as a guide for the construction of a
structural analog of the prototypical situation described in the thought
experiment (Nersessian 1992).
(b) Mach's Understanding of Thought Experiments
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Mach's interest in thought experiment grew out of his fascination with a
striking tendency of the human mind to manipulate its own thoughts.  In simple
terms, the mind does not passively reproduce the sensory impressions it
receives; to use a modern analogy, it does not replay a sequence of sensory
impressions in the manner in which a VCR would replay stored electronic input. 
On the contrary, the mind routinely alters the sequence, length, and quality of
received sensory impressions.  What is more, this manipulating activity does not
necessarily pertain merely to the past; the mind may, apparently at will, access
a vast "universe" of experiences (including not only directly acquired
experiences, but also experiences mediated through other minds) and thereby set
up a fictional world of future objects, events and actions.
In his theory of thought experiments, Mach came to value the importance
of such activity of mental manipulation, or variation.  Being a natural scientist,
he considered this general tendency of the human mind with respect to a single
activity -- experimenting.  Consequently, Mach employed the term
Gedankenexperimente to signify this tendency of the human mind.
Mach thought of nature as the inexhaustible source of abundant, wild and
obscure forces, and these forces never ceased to intrigue and excite him.  He
insisted that all human thoughts and theories originate from nature, or, to be
more specific, exclusively from sensory experience.  But nature is, in Mach's
opinion, too complex and dynamic a phenomenon to be encompassed by any
conceptual schema: "Nature exists once only.  Our schematic mental imitation
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alone produces like events.  Only in the mind, therefore, does the mutual
dependence of certain features exist" (Mach 1943, 199).  That is to say, theories
exist only in the mind of the natural scientist.  Yet without a source in sensory
experience, there would be no theories.  Looking carefully at Mach's genetic
approach, it becomes clear why the patterns of thought must be homologous to
the patterns of nature.  By its origin and structure, thought is nothing but a
lasting shadow of nature:
But man alone attains to the faculty of voluntary and conscious
comparison.  Man alone can, by his power of abstraction, rise, in one
moment, to the comprehension of principles like the conservation of mass
or the conservation of energy, and in the next observe and mark the
arrangement of the iron lines in the spectrum.  In thus dealing with the
objects of his conceptual life, his ideas unfold and expand, like his nervous
system, into a widely ramified and organically articulated tree, on which
he may follow every limb to its farthermost branches, and, when occasion
demands, return to the trunk from which he started (Mach 1943, 231).
This does not imply that thoughts and theories in general play a
secondary role for the natural scientist.  On the contrary, they form the vast and
inexhaustible reservoir of all past and present experiences.  They contain all
knowledge, whether genetically inherited, learned from sensory experiences or
intuitively grasped.  In that sense, there is nothing entirely new for any
particular theorist to discover.  Mach uses a zoological parallel to illustrate his
understanding of the origin and complexity of human thought:
The animal cannot construct new members to perform every new function
that circumstances and fate demand of it.  On the contrary it is obliged to
make use of those it already possesses.  When a vertebrate animal
chances into an environment where it must learn to fly or swim, an
additional pair of extremities is not grown for the purpose.  On the
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contrary, the animal must adapt and transform a pair that it already has
(Mach 1943, 229).
Given such a point of view, Mach's comments on Plato's theory of recollection
come naturally: "Recalling how much in the building up of knowledge is
contributed to memory, we can understand Plato's view that all inquiry and
learning is remembering (from an earlier life)" (Mach 1975, 142).
All this shows that Mach believed in the biological necessity of conforming
thought to fact and thoughts to each other.  As well, he assumed that the very
integration of thoughts and facts arises as a consequence of that biological
necessity.  Roy Sorensen is, to my  mind, perfectly justified in starting the
chapter devoted to Mach in his Thought Experiments  by explaining how this
necessity affects thought experiments.  Sorensen shows that biological necessity
in Mach's theory works mostly in a negative way by eliminating implausible
predictions: "Rather than announcing what must happen, instinctive knowledge
brutely waves off what cannot happen" (Sorensen 1992, 99).  Biological necessity
is therefore, according to Mach, reflected in scientific accounts of experience. 
Instinct should be a vital part of every scientist's sensibility.  It guides a
scientist, making it possible to smoothly develop his genetically inherited
inclination to variation and experiment:  "We can hardly doubt that there is no
sharp dividing line between instinctive and thought-guided experiments" (Mach
1975, 134).
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What is more, Mach believed that arguments from principle always have
greater value then mere inductive procedures.   First, in economic terms, they
have a much lower cost of production: "Our ideas are more readily to hand than
physical facts: thought experiments cost less, as it were" (Mach 1975, 136).  Also,
Mach preferred the scientist's pure play with principles drawn from "our own
reservoir of ideas" over the blind collecting of data.  As Paul Feyerabend pointed
out in his paper on Mach and Einstein, Mach held that "The adaptation of facts
and ideas 'can proceed in many different ways.'  Idealizations arising from
different areas or from different principles in the same domain occasionally clash
and give rise to paradoxes" (Feyerabend 1984, 9).
According to Feyerabend's view of Mach's position, thought must conform
to sense sequences, but can do so in different ways.  Just how this conformity
comes about cannot be explained or determined by thought itself.  This comes as
no surprise because thoughts are (as we have seen, in Mach's opinion) just
adapted reflections of the sense sequences.  That is why Feyerabend claims that
Mach's physical arguments are carried out while Mach completely ignores the
epistemological argumentation.  In other words, thinking about experiences is
just an extended pattern of these very experiences.  For example, the following
phenomenon is simply a physical fact for Mach: "The stone we hold in our hand,
when dropped not only falls to the ground in reality, it also falls in our thoughts"
(Mach 1943, 220).  The problem with this position, as Feyerabend points out, is
that: "There exists no stage in history, or in growth of the individual that
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corresponds to the 'first stage'; there is no stage when, surrounded by 'a
labyrinth of sense impressions' we 'mentally and arbitrarily' select special
bundles of experience, 'freely create' concepts and correlate the concepts with the
bundles" (Feyerabend 1984, 12).  This interpretation makes Mach appear to be
an anti-foundationalist, since he simply assumed the existence of both
experience and instinct and did not explicitly attempt to correlate them with the
fundamental epistemic concerns.
Sorensen rightly points to the excesses that followed from Mach's
postulation of instinctive knowledge and his attempt to support the claim that
instinctive knowledge can be converted to explicit scientific principles by thought
experiments.  The role of thought experiments in this respect is best described as
one of "filtering".  Instinct, being "hard wired" into the human brain, is always
an echo of past primitive myths and rituals.  It preserves within itself a certain
amount of magic and the task of the scientist is to convert that obscure intuition
into explicit knowledge.  This whole idea shows Mach's admiration for Darwin. 
But it also shows that Mach developed a somewhat simple social Darwinian
concept of the organism's passing on traits to its offspring.  Based upon that
concept, some untenable claims are drawn, such as the claim that children
inherit technological techniques.
Upon a closer look, all the basic concepts of the Darwinian theory of
evolution can be found in Mach: adaptation of thoughts to nature and to each
other, sustaining of the already existing elements throughout the process of
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adaptation and adjustment, varying the circumstances of the environment in
order to see how this change will affect the "thought organism," etc.  On Mach's
view, variation leads to a process of mental selection:
By varying the conditions (continuously if possible), the scope of ideas
(expectations) tied to them is extended: by modifying and specializing the
conditions we modify and specialize the ideas, making them more
determinate, and the two processes alternate (Mach 1975, 139).
The ideas (expectations) create conditions and conversely the conditions create
ideas.  All this serves the purpose of further reconstruction of more complex facts
in terms of their combinations.  Sometimes, the process of variation may reduce
to absurdity a particular set of antecedent ideas.  (As Mach pointed out, such
examples as Galileo or Stevin are landmarks in the natural sciences).  The new,
adapted set of ideas is then integrated into a general physical concept or law.
In any case, Mach has been given credit for coining the term
Gedankenexperiment, and he has equally been praised for his account of the
most important traits of thought experiments.  According to Mach, thought
experiments are ranked higher on the evolutionary ladder, and are even
theoretically "stronger," than physical experiments.  First, they eliminate
superfluous and extraneous variables.  Second, they attenuate our own
subjective interpretation.  As scientists performing thought experiments, we rely
on that immense reservoir of past human experiences which necessarily
conforms to nature in some way.  Nonetheless, thought experiments may be used
wrongly and may be used with more or less skill.  This is where the heuristic
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aspect of Mach's treatment of thought experiments comes into play.  By using
thought experiments, the student will learn to separate the sort of "guesswork"
which yields useful results from that which does not.
Mach was well aware of the immense force that habitual thinking imposes
upon human life.  He employed the suggestive analogy of a piano player who
always has to follow some preset sequences, even while improvising, in order to
play properly: "Like a piano-player with previously prepared sounds, a speaker
excites in his listener thoughts previously prepared, but fitting many cases,
which respond to the speaker's summons with alacrity and little effort" (Mach
1942, 192).  This "habitual thinking" is a somewhat mysterious topic, yet it is of
undoubtable philosophical relevance.  Unfortunately, however, this relevance
has always been inversely proportional to the clarity with which the idea of
"habitual thinking" is expressed in philosophical accounts trying to reach an
understanding of it.  For Mach, this phenomenon represented a necessity and a
danger at the same time:
Physically, no one could exist, if he had to guide and regulate the
circulation, respiration and digestion of his body by conscious and
purposive acts.  So, too, no one could exist intellectually if he had to form
judgments on every passing experience, instead of allowing himself to be
controlled by the judgments he has already formed.  Prejudice is a sort of
reflex motion in the province of intelligence (Mach 1943, 232).
This is where it becomes clear that Mach's idea of thought experiments is
extended too far in one sense and is too vague and limited in another.  It is
simply not correct to equate "a thought experiment" with "an experiment which
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is planned and executed in thought".  To say, for example, that imagining a piece
of litmus paper immersed in acid would also involve imagining change of its
colour is not to engage in a thought experiment.  The latter case only succeeds in
coming very close to thought experiments by virtue of disclosing a natural law or
regularity by mere thinking.
Strictly speaking, even physical, operational experiments are, in some
sense, planned and executed in thought before coming to the laboratory.  It is
relatively easy to understand how the difficult and often unpredictable
engineering problems of the actual scientific experiment unfold effortlessly in a
scientist's mind.  Given this, how are we to judge when thought experiments
stop and "real" experiments start?  What really does happen in the laboratory? 
How can a product of a natural scientist's guessing (which was, in Mach's mind,
a perfectly acceptable scientific procedure) be distinguished from scientific
discoveries that originate by pure chance or, for example, by misuse of certain
elements in a previously set scientific experiment?  In other words, why claim
that scientists experiment in their minds when so many elements of scientific
experimentation involve the chaos and unpredictability of nature?
What Mach has in mind when talking about thought experiments in most
cases stands much closer to something that can be termed a "trial and error test"
or, better, a specialist's or student's "short hand thought probe", something
closely related to problem-solving techniques.  But one of the problems with such
an approach is that there are some domains of human thought where theoretical
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enquiry starts and ends with such probes and never directly touches upon
"sensory experience."  For example, if we define thought experiments as widely
as Mach, certain aspects of ethics could simply be taught as ethical thought
experiments.  These experiments usually take the laws of nature and sensory
experience to be entirely irrelevant to the case they want to prove.
Furthermore, what happens not only to ethical thought experiments but
also to "pure" fantasy, dreaming, meditation, story telling and hallucination? 
This objection is, I believe rightly, made by Sorensen.  Here, Mach's principle of
thought conforming to nature turns out to be highly questionable (or else one
would have to defend the claim that ethical theories may be read from the
physical patterns of the Earth or from instinctive animal behaviour).  In order to
defend his position, Mach would either have to disallow non-scientific thought
experiments from his theory, or admit that there are many phenomena in
human intellectual history that have not resulted from practical problem
solving.
(c) Variation and Thought Experimentation
The ability to vary the content of one's thoughts is seen by Mach as the
principal requirement for thought experimentation.  This is how Mach
characterizes the basic method of both thought experiments and physical
experiments, that of variation:
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As we see, the basic method of thought experiments, as with physical
experiments, is that of variation.  By varying the conditions (continuously
if possible), the scope of ideas (expectations) tied to them is extended: by
modifying and specializing the conditions we modify and specialize the
ideas, making them more determinate, and the two processes alternate
(Mach 1975, 139).
Although varying occurs in one's imagination, the process of variation is
not unrestrained.  Mach warns that the natural scientist's activity "of variously
combining conditions" (Mach 1975, 137) differs from free fiction -- the former
activity is conditioned, most thoroughly, by reality.  In other words, the
experimenters are compelled always to turn their thoughts towards reality. 
Since the thought usually contains less than experience, i.e. the thought is a
mere schematic presentation of reality, even the simplest thought of the
experimenter does not coincide entirely with reality.  However, this does not
prevent one to learn "[how] accurately experiences are represented by thoughts
and how far the latter agree with each other" (Mach 1975, 137).  This exercise in
"intellectual transformation of the contents of experience" is not just an idle
game of mimicking nature.  On the contrary, the process of varying one's
thoughts is a powerful cognitive tool in piecing together a coherent picture of
reality:
What will determine success, what hangs together and what is
independent, all this becomes much clearer through such a survey than it
could become through individual experiences.  This makes it plain to us
how we can combine convenience with the need to do justice to experience,
what are the simplest thoughts that can be most comprehensively squared
with each other and with experience.  We achieve this by varying the facts
in thought (Mach 1975, 137).
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There are numerous strategies which can be employed in the process of
mental variation.  The most illustrative one is the strategy of gradually
increasing or decreasing particular elements of the initial setting of thought
experiments.  Mach stressed that this strategy often diminishes to zero certain
conditions which qualitatively affect the result.  Consequently, the remaining
factors become much more perceivable; as it were, by the mental "pop out" effect:
An important process consists in mentally diminishing to zero one or
several conditions that qualitatively affect the result, so that the
remaining factors alone must be taken as of influence.  Physically, such a
process is often impossible to carry out, so that we may speak of it as an
idealization or abstraction (Mach 1975, 140).
   Gradual variation of this sort may affect the various properties of the objects
and phenomena presented in thought experiments, such as: speed, weight,
angle, and temperature.
In Knowledge and Error Mach uses the example of the law of inertia: he
points out that thought experiments, made possible by continuous variation,
have led to discovery of this law.  However, in order to discover the law of inertia
one needs to understand an idea of uniform movement.  How do we reach the
idea of a body moving uniformly without resistance when a case like that does
not square with our past experiences?  We need to give up the expectations that
this case can be realized in reality: instead we resort to mental variation.  We
first consider the retardation of a body moving up a very slightly inclined plane. 
We vary the angle of this plane until it becomes vanishingly small.  Second, we
consider the resistance to motion of a body impelled on a horizontal plane.  We
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vary the elements of this resistance (friction, air, etc.) until they become
vanishingly small.  Finally, we form the idea of a body moving uniformly
without resistance.
Another, more informal, example of this kind of variation involves
answering the following question: Why we get more rain on the windshield when
the car is moving than when it's stationary?  Consider a thought experiment
published recently in the Globe and Mail:
Imagine for a minute that the rain is falling very slowly, so slowly that it
stands still, like a flat mist.  You would get no rain at all on a stationary
windshield.  Start to drive through this hovering rain, and the windshield
will start to get wet.  Double your driving speed, and you will collide with
twice as many raindrops in as given time -- your windshield will get twice
as wet (The Globe and Mail, Thursday, June 1, 1995, Section A13).
The ability to vary, in one's imagination, both the speed at which the rain is
falling and the speed of the car is a central feature of this thought experiment. 
It then becomes very easy to explain that we get rain on our windshields for two
reasons: it falls on us and we drive into it.  One infers from the latter that we get
more rain on the windshield when the car is moving.
Yet another example of this sort is the question: When a hubcap falls off a
car, why does it accelerate ahead of the vehicle for a short distance?  In order to
answer this, one has to imagine holding a disc in one's hand, spinning it and
dropping it to the floor.  For example, one could imagine doing this in a
stationary car, leaning out the window and dropping the spinning wheel on the
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ground.  As soon as it hits the ground the disc will shoot off in the direction it's
spinning.  This is what happens at the second stage of this thought experiment:
Now imagine that you are in a car leaning out the window with that 
same spinning disc in your hands.  The car, you and the disc are all
moving forward with the same velocity.  When you drop the spinning disc
it will hit the ground right beside you because it is still moving forward
with that same velocity.  If the disc, like a hubcap, has forward spin on it,
it will temporarily accelerate away from you (The Globe and Mail
Thursday, July 6, 1995, Section A11).
The technique of variation, in this case, helps understand why a hubcap
accelerates ahead of the vehicle when it falls off.  The phenomenon that was
supposed to be explained involves two types of movement:  the forward
movement of the car and the rotational movement of the hubcap.  It was much
easier to understand how the two movements get compounded in the case of the
hubcap if one gradually reduced (using the technique of variation) the speed of
the car to zero, while keeping the rotational movement constant. 
(d) Conclusion
As I have suggested in this chapter, Mach saw the process of varying one's
thoughts as a basis for thought experimenting in natural sciences.  What I would
like to suggest in closing is that this understanding of variation may also be
relevant to the contemporary thought experiments debate.
Most importantly, Mach's understanding of variation provides a
significant criterion for evaluating thought experiments -- coherence.  One can
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argue that thought experiments which employ Mach's variation of thoughts fare
much better on the coherence scale than many other kinds of thought
experiments.  The main reason for this is the fact that, with variation, one is
obliged always to make additional adjustments to maintain the coherence of the
"new" (and somewhat altered) picture of the world one is offering.  In order to
illustrate this, I will borrow an example from Galileo, the true master of
variation based thought experiments.  Galileo explained that imagining an
animal increased in proportion in all dimensions, and preserving geometrical
similarity, also requires significant changes made to the structure of that
creature's bones.  In any other case, that creature would collapse under its
weight. 
Alternatively, in the manner quite common in contemporary philosophy,
one might begin a thought experiment by supposing that one has one or several
identical twin brothers or that there might be one or several identical Twin
Earths.  The problem with this thought experimentation is that it seems not to
require any concrete adjustments in order to maintain a coherent picture of the
world.  Even worse, there seems to be no great difference in saying that there
might exist hundreds or thousands of Twin Earths if one allows the possibility of
one Twin Earth.
Kathleen Wilkes, in her book Real People, has addressed numerous
problems with what she calls "fantastical" philosophical thought experiments. 
She lists several examples of the latter kind of thought experiments and points
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that their structure appears perniciously open-ended.  But their loose structure
is not Wilkes's concern.  She points out that their most serious flaw is the fact
that they do not help to disclose any salient properties of the real world. 
Instead, they offer conclusions which apply largely to counterfactual,
"fantastical" worlds.
For example, one test suggested to discover certain fundamental traits of
morality is to ask "[w]hat if we all had a Gyges' ring to make us invisible at
will?" (Wilkes 1988, 5).  We proceed imagining a possible world in which people
may turn invisible.  Given that in such circumstances nobody would remain
moral it looks as thought morality is based rather on self-interest than on
something grander.  "The imaginary state of affairs is the invisibility, one
conclusion may be that morality must be based ultimately on self-interest"
(Wilkes 1988, 5).
Wilkes goes on to list several typical examples of "fantastical" thought
experiments, which seem to have mushroomed in philosophy, and particularly in
moral philosophy:
There are statues that come to life (today, more commonly, we tend rather
to postulate robots with many or most of our distinctively human
characteristics); non-human animals with human intelligence; people who
split like amoebae or fuse like clouds; brain transplants, mind transplants
(i.e. wiping the "program" out of the hardware of one brain and
programming a "blank" brain with it); transplants of the left and right
hemispheres of the brain into two different bodies; and so on and so forth
(Wilkes 1988, 6).
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The main weakness of this kind of thought experiments is lack of their
relevance to reality.  The scientific thought experiments, in contrast, take place
in a carefully designed, experimental context.  Their role is:
to fix the ceteris paribus/absentibus conditions that surround any attempt
to generalize from one sort of thing to another.  To repeat: as far as is
practically possible, the experimental set-up operates to identify all the
potentially relevant factors, and then to exclude certain variables
completely, and to hold other fixed (Wilkes 1988, 45).
Wilkes concludes that we are taken too far from the actual world by the
"fantastical" thought experiments: they do not attempt to identify, restrict, or fix
the ceteris paribus conditions.  One of the major faults of this kind of thought
experiments is that they do not make it clear which kind of variation was
involved, and what was the extent of that process of variation: "This means that
we are left with no clue as to what has been varied in thought and what left
(supposedly) untouched" (Wilkes 1998, 45).
Moreover, the "fantastical" thought experiments force us to abandon the
hope of making them relevant to the actual world.  They are fine as fantasies, as
"mere" works of fiction; as such, they are quite fun to read.  But, they do not
allow for philosophical conclusions to be drawn, because in a world
indeterminately different we do not know what we would want to say about
anything.
Following Mach's and Wilkes's understanding of thought experiments, it
seems indeed that many poorly structured thought experiments do not involve
continuous variation (at least implicitly).  However, it would be quite hasty to
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conclude from this that variation provides a necessary and sufficient condition
for good thought experiments.
Consider, for example, Stevin's thought experiment concerning the
properties of an inclined plane.  The imaginary state of affairs is of two perfectly
frictionless planes joined at an angle so that there is one steep, and one less
steep incline down.  Would a chain draped over such a plane remain put, or
would gravity pull it down one side or the other?  The answer is obvious the
moment one makes the chain circular (joining the two ends under each bottom
edge of the planes); for, if it is to slide at all, it would evidently have to slide for
ever.  Given that there are no perpetual motion machines, the chain in the
original thought experiment would have to remain in equilibrium.
This thought experiment, which makes a perfectly reasonable case
concerning the laws of mechanics, does not seem to involve variation.
Instead of saying that variation is a necessary and sufficient condition for
good thought experiments, I will conclude that variation has an important role
to play in thought experimentation.  The technique of variation, when employed
properly, helps produce "realistic" thought experiments which are capable of




(a) Mental Activity in General
Bruce Aune's entry "Thinking" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy divides
thinking, following Aristotle, into two categories: contemplation and deliberation. 
Contemplation, when successful, terminates in a conclusion.  Successful
deliberation, in contrast, terminates in a decision.  This division was largely
responsible for dividing reasoning into theoretical and practical, although day-
by-day reasoning seems to be an untidy mixture of both these basic forms.
Aune adds that thinking, less generally, is commonly understood as a
largely covert activity, i.e. taking place in one's mind.  As well, thinking is
conceived as "intentional" in Brentano's sense of "being directed towards an
object."
Theories of cognitive activities have generally been variants of one or
more of the prevalent philosophical views: thinking has been conceived as a
dialogue of the soul, a spiritual activity of recollecting Forms, an act by means of
which essences of things are shared by the human mind, an activity of bringing
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concepts or ideas before the mind, a "habitual" activity of invoking images or
moving from one image to another, or merely the overt activity of speaking
thoughtfully.
One can see, from this sketchy list, that quite distinct metaphors, such as
"speaking," "recollecting," "invoking," etc., served as the basis for capturing the
nature of cognitive activities.  There was little overall agreement on describing
the basic activities of the human mind.  I will present two rival "traditions,"
influential schools of thought, to illustrate this lack of agreement on the nature
of mental activity.  The first tradition might be called Aristotelian, represented
here by Aristotle, Drummond, and Brentano.  The second might be called
empiricist, represented by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.
In broad terms, Aristotle's Categories, De Interpretatione and Prior
Analytics deal with representing, judging, and inferring respectively.  Aristotle
held that "A sentence is a significant portion of speech, some parts of which have
an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance, though not as the
expression of any positive judgment" (Aristotle De Interpretatione, 16b).
Aristotle contrasted the mere act of understanding or uttering of sentences
which is neither true nor false, saying a prayer for example, with understanding
or producing propositions which are endowed with either truth or falsity.  Thus
the act of grasping sentences, or meaningful and grammatical clusters of words
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(representing), is contrasted with the act of either affirming or denying
something about something (judging).
Inferring was the third kind of cognitive, or better discursive, activity in
Aristotle.  Inferring was described in terms of syllogistic inference:
A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things being stated, something
other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.  I mean
by the last phrase that they produce the consequence, and by this, that no
further term is required from without in order to make the consequence
necessary (Aristotle Analytica Priora, 24b).
The Aristotelian tradition was sustained by many generations of logic
textbooks and scholarly tracts.  Consider, for example, Drummond's logic
textbook (1723) and Reid's treatise on the Intellectual Powers (1785).  Emily
Michael recently translated a passage from a student dictate made for
Drummond's 1723 logic course at Edinburgh.  This passage lists three distinct
operations of the mind -- apprehension, judgment, and discursive reasoning:
Apprehension is the naked mental representation of something without
affirming or denying, as when we consider the sun, or anything else you
may wish....but only by contemplating and as if by intuiting.
Judgment is the assertion of the mind about its own ideas compared
among themselves, as when the mind compares the earth with the idea of
round and either affirms or denies that the earth is round.
Discursive reasoning is the operation of the mind by which we elicit one
judgment from another, as when we judge that which is best is above all
things, loving God is the best, and hence we infer that loving God is above
all things.  (Proemium, 3-5 Institutiones Logicae, from a presentation of
Emily Michael, University of Western Ontario, May 20, 1995).
Thomas Reid examined the Aristotelian understanding of the intellectual
powers and noted that the classical division of the intellectual powers into
simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning had received a very general
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reception and the authority of antiquity.  But he stressed that these three
activities are not independent of each other; without apprehension of the object
there can be no judgment, as little can there be reasoning without both
apprehension and judgment.  Reid further pointed out that this division of the
intellectual powers corresponds to the traditional understanding of successive
steps by which the mind proceeds in the acquisition of its knowledge.  First,
there are senses which furnish the mind with simple apprehension, notions of
ideas.  Second, the mind compares its ideas, and by perceiving their agreements
and disagreements, it forms its judgments.  Third, from two or more judgments,
the mind deduces conclusion of reasoning (Reid 1971, 69).
This classical picture of the human intellectual powers was revived in
Brentano's account of the elementary cognitive activities.  Brentano proposed
the following three cognitive activities as basic -- referring, affirming, and
valuing:
To state our view at the outset, we, too, maintain that three main classes
of mental phenomena must be distinguished, and distinguished according
to the different ways in which they refer to their content.  But my three
classes are not the same as those which are usually proposed.  In the
absence of more appropriate expressions, we designate the first by the
term "presentation," the second by the term "judgement," and the third by
the terms "emotion," "interest," or "love" (Brentano 1973, 197-198).
Brentano thus collapsed the second and third acts, inferring becoming a
special case of affirming.  This way of characterizing cognitive activities is also
the expression of a traditional philosophers' desire to discover some fundamental
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      Perhaps one should note that, when it comes to discussing mental activities, and particularly to13
justifying one's belief, vision is typically given the lion's share of authority and responsibility.  Other sources
of perception (tactile, auditory, etc.) appear to merely "reaffirm," or "enhance" the findings which would
normally be observed visually.  There is a huge number of ordinary language expressions which can be used
to illustrate this point.  For example, it is said that someone is "in the dark" if one doesn't understand
something.  By contrast, if things are clarified and properly accounted for, one typically claims that the "light
was shed" on things or that "things are seen in proper perspective."
and simple operations of the mind to which all other operations can be reduced. 
In Brentano's words:
Among the investigations having primary and universal importance we
must include the investigation of the ultimate mental elements out of
which more complex phenomena arise (Brentano 1973, 45).
Locke, Berkeley, Hume and others had different ideas regarding activities
of the human mind.   Locke was the first to offer the "dark chamber" as an13
analogy for the human mind,
For, methinks, the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut
from light, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible
resemblances, or ideas of things without: would the pictures coming into
such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon
occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in
reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them (Locke Essay,
2.11.17.).
This particular aspect of Locke's understanding of cognition makes the mind
appear as a mere "container" of sense impressions, but this is not the whole
story.  In fact, Locke painted a picture of an active human mind in his Essay. 
Most importantly, and in sharp contrast to Aristotelian understanding of human
cognition, Locke's account of cognition introduced images and their impression in
the mind.  In Aristotle "phantasmata" are merely epiphenomenal
accompaniments of mental activity.  Locke spoke about the understanding in
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terms of incoming pictures which lay their patterns on the mind much in the way
shadows are cast on the barren land.
Besides receiving these simple and vivid impressions, the Lockean mind is
constantly engaged in manipulating, associating, and mixing them and appears
able to split and blend various parts and aspects of them.  The repeated and
systematic exercise of these activities, I suggest in chapter one, eventually leads
to variation.
Berkeley, following Locke, explained that the mind either receives ideas as
imprinted on the senses or perceives them by attending to its own passions and
operations.  In his Principles, Berkeley lists compounding, dividing, and
representing as the primary activities, rather than representing, judging, and
inferring, which enable the mind to form complex from simple ideas by help of
memory and imagination.  The mind is distinct from the ideas it perceives -- the
existence of the ideas consists in being perceived, while the existence of the mind
consists in exerting diverse operations, i.e. willing, imagining, and remembering.
Berkeley further believed that there were no general ideas.  Instead, the
mind forms ideas of things by associating various sense impressions:
Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes, and hearing
conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. 
And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come
to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing (Berkeley
Principles, 41).
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       Hume's conception is, of course, not a "simple survey of ideas."  It always precedes the understanding;14
where conception fails the understanding must also fail (Treatise, 164).
This kind of association is designed in direct opposition to the traditional
procedure of hypostatising of abstract ideas.
Hume was the most vocal critic of the traditional account of the
understanding:
We may here take occasion to observe a very remarkable error, which
being frequently inculcated in the schools, has become a kind of
establish'd maxim, and is universally received by all logicians.  This error
consists in the vulgar division of the acts of the understanding, into
conception, judgment, and reasoning, and in the definition we give of them
(Hume Treatise, 96).
He pointed out that conception had been described as the simple survey of
one or more ideas; judgment as the activity of separating or uniting of different
ideas; and reasoning as the separating or uniting of different ideas by the
interposition of others, which show the relation they bear to each other.  He
proposed, instead, that acts of the mind be seen as nothing but simple
conception .  When we infer a cause from its effect, we infer it immediately; and14
this kind of inference is the strongest of all species of reasoning.  An opinion, or
belief, is thus described as "A lively idea related to or associated with a present
impression" (Hume Treatise, 96).  The human reasoning is guided by custom or a
principle of association; only custom and association determine the passage from
the impression of one object to the idea or belief of another object.  However,
belief is something more than a simple idea -- it is a manner of forming an idea. 
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      Cf. Robert B. Pippin, "Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Volume15
17, No. 2, 1987.
Variation, as applied to simple ideas, provided Hume with a good analogy to
make his point regarding belief:
And as the same idea can only be vary'd by a variation of its degrees of
force and vivacity; it follows upon the whole, that belief is a lively idea
produc'd by a relation to a present impression, according to the foregoing
definition (Hume Treatise, 97).
I intended this sketch of two opposing traditions in describing mental
activities to serve as an illustrative, rather than exhaustive, depiction of the
ancient desire to unravel the secrets of mental activity.  There have been several
other interesting conceptions of what goes on in the mind, of which apperception
deserves to be mentioned.
Apperception is usually defined as the mental process which raises
subconscious or indistinct impressions to the level of attention and at the same
time arranges them into a coherent intellectual order.  One has to note that this
term has been used ambiguously, sometimes to mean consciousness or
awareness, at other times assimilation or simply attention.
Kant's understanding of mental activities has been significantly
influenced by the constant presence of the "I that thinks" in all acts of thinking. 
Kant made use of diverse acts of the mind: "understanding," "apperceiving,"
"judging," and "synthesizing."  He also used the term mental "spontaneity"15
when referring to thinking.  In particular, he distinguished between empirical
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apperception (the person's awareness of oneself, dependent on the changing
conditions of one's consciousness) and transcendental apperception, or "pure
reason," inner, unchangeable consciousness.  The latter is constituting the
"transcendental" unity of consciousness which precedes all data of perception
and makes possible their inner order and meaning.
Herbart's understanding of apperception differed from Kant's in his
attempt to provide an empirical interpretation of the transcendentalist position. 
Herbart held that the gift of apperception is one of the qualities that distinguish
man from animal because it gives him the power of reflection.  In the human
soul, there are series of presentations, combinations, and whole masses of
perceptions which are sometimes completely and sometimes incompletely
interwoven.  They is part conform to each other and in part oppose each other. 
It is the function of apperception, according to Herbart, to assimilate the various
and often divergent ideas.  Thus the older apperceptive mass, consisting of
concepts, judgments, etc. will tend to assimilate more recent and less settled
impressions.
Recent advances in epistemology work with less broad categories and pay
more attention to various types, forms and nuances of mental activities.  Alvin
Goldman's Epistemology and Cognition, for example, conscious of recent
important developments in cognitive science, boasts a rich vocabulary of
cognitive activities: abstracting, matching, calibrating, computing, representing,
retrieving from memory, structuring, perceiving, imagining, inferring,
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processing information,  concept forming, producing memory, reconstructing in
memory, transforming, and unit information processing.  This list suggests that
cognitive science takes the minute and diverse activities of the human mind
much more seriously than the traditional epistemologies. 
(b) Variation as a Special Kind of Mental Activity
I would like to contrast these accounts with mental variation, keeping in
mind one fundamental trait of variation: I suggest that variation involves more
active intervention into the content of one's thoughts than most other cognitive
processes which are, by their nature, more receptive, i.e. passive.  This applies
particularly to the "traditional" philosophical understanding of human cognitive
activities. 
Variation involves activities analogous to replacing, rearranging, and
altering objects and ideas and their parts.  All of those procedures are by their
nature active, resembling the practical and attentive encounter with the objects
and phenomena which occur in the physical world.  Consequently, variation has
much of the flavour of trial and error problem solving techniques.  Varying
things and ideas in one's mind may be seen as analogous to doing things with
one's hands, for example.
One might find this approach too simplistic to discover any interesting
properties of the human mind and consequently reject the proposed inquiry into
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variation as trivial.  However, one is often reminded that there is nothing wrong
with employing simple analogies in attempting to learn about the nature of
things.  As Ian Hacking pointed out in Representing and Intervening,
philosophers typically tell fables in order to teach philosophical lessons.  A
glance at history of philosophy suffices to convince one that philosophers, to a
large extent, have always been story tellers.  Bringing variation into philosophy
should not, therefore, be seen as something new and controversial.  Moreover,
there are reasons to believe that simple cognitive techniques, such as variation,
should be welcome in philosophy.  They are capable of revealing, both
intentionally and inadvertently, interesting properties of the human mind, and
even more importantly, of the essences of things.  In Hacking's own words:
"There may be more truth in the a priori fantasy about the human mind than in
the supposedly disinterested observations and mathematical model-building of
cognitive science" (Hacking 1983, 131).
On the surface, the activity of variation may indeed appear too basic,
primitive, and philosophically uninteresting to deserve serious scrutiny. 
However, this simplicity may be deceiving because the level of complexity
associated with variation depends partly on the examples which are chosen to
represent it.
Let me illustrate the technique of variation by making two points.  First,
variation can be described in quite simple terms: varying, in one's mind, some
aspects or elements of a compound structure, while keeping some other aspects or
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elements of that structure constant.  This kind of variation, more empirical in its
nature, may be attributed to Ernst Mach.
Thus, for example, fashion designers might vary in their minds the styles,
colours, length, and fabrics of a shirt in order to create a new shirt style.  They
would, in that case, hold constant in their mind that they are dealing with a
shirt, varying some or all of the accidents that may potentially be attached to it. 
Instead of the shirts, they might think in terms of "casual evening wear."  In this
case, our designers would be holding constant in their mind that they are
dealing with "casual evening wear."  Consequently, the different clothing items
such as shirts, t-shirts, blouses, for example, will be varied as potentially fitting
the particular "casual evening wear" style.
Certain procedures employed in thought experiments may be perceived as
this kind of variation.  Take, for example, the famous thought experiment
designed by Galileo.  Galileo set out to prove that all bodies fall at the same
speed regardless of their weight. First he noted Aristotle's view that heavier
bodies fall faster that light ones (H , L). This is what happened afterwards:
We are then asked to imagine that a heavy cannon ball is attached to a
light musket ball. What would happen if they were released together?
Reasoning in the Aristotelian manner leads to an absurd conclusion.
First, the light ball will slow up the heavy one (acting as a kind of drag),
so the speed of the combined system would be slower than the speed of the
heavy ball falling alone (H , H+L). On the other hand, the combined
system is heavier than the heavy ball alone, so it would fall faster (H+L ,
H). We now have the absurd consequence that the heavy ball is both
faster and slower that the even heavier combined system. Thus, the
Aristotelian theory of falling bodies is destroyed. But the question
remains, "Which falls fastest?" The right answer is plain as day.  The
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paradox is resolved by making them equal; they all fall at the same speed
(H = L = H+L) (Brown 1991, 1-2).
Arguably, one of the cognitive activities involved in the performance of this
thought experiment is variation.  One may test the falling speed of both objects
by varying, in one's mind, the length of the string used to attach the light ball to
the heavy one.  One may start with a reasonably lengthy string (imagining the
light ball as a drag) and vary its length until it becomes infinitely short (and
makes the two balls into one object).  The ability to vary; i.e. shortening the
length of that imagined string freely and as many times as possible is an
essential requirement of this thought experiment (Galileo 1974).
Second, variation might be used in much more abstract and tacit manner. 
Understood in this sense, variation involves a subtle shift in one's thought,
comparable to a gestalt shift, which enables one to test various essential
properties and regularities of certain abstract phenomena (tones, for example). 
This kind of variation was first discovered by Edmund Husserl.  It plays an
important role, for example, in the analysis of Twardowski's general concepts.
There are certain kinds of general presentation, i.e. indirect
presentations, which require other presentations (the auxiliary presentations) in
order to be awakened.  This was first discovered by Bolzano.  In paragraph 63 of
his Theory of Science, Bolzano showed that if an object falls under a complex
idea, then it is not necessarily, or even normally, the case that the parts
(constituents) of the complex idea designate parts of that object.  He gives as
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examples: "A land without mountains" and "The eye of the man."  If one holds
that an idea of an object should have a certain agreement with an object, then
one would expect mountains to be a part of a mountainless land and the whole
man to be a part of his eye.
Since the latter is not possible, Twardowski later inferred that when it
comes to names which are intended as indirect presentations, we find that they
are called up through the auxiliary presentations.  From Bolzano's examples it
also follows that the structure of individual presentations is not necessarily
replicated in general presentations, although it has been quite common to
assume this.  Aristotle, for example, had said that in sensual knowledge the
sense contains the sensual object without its matter.  Kant held that there can
be no knowledge without a blend of concept and intuition.
Barry Smith gives the following account of Twardowski's general
presentations.  He begins by stating what general presentations are not for
Twardowski:
General presentations are not, Twardowski argues, to be understood by
relating concepts or other immanent entia rationis, and nor are they to be
understood as presentations of a set or list of individual objects falling
under the relevant concept (as if a general presentation were some sort of
summation of a number of individual presentations) (Smith 1994, 162).
This is highlighted by the fact that we can, with the aid of a general
presentation, make judgments which accomplish more than the individual
judgments in their totality.  Twardowski maintains, instead, that general
presentations refer to a special kind of object -- general objects.  In other words,
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general presentations refer to what results when those marks of features
common to all the objects of the relevant individual presentation are ordered and
combined in presentation in such a way that they are unified as a whole.  The
general lion, for example, shares with any particular lion the features common
to all lions.
This is how Twardowski characterized general presentations: "What is
presented through a general presentation is a group of constituents which are
common to several objects.  This group of constituents is presented as a whole
that belongs together; this is the object of the general presentation" (Twardowski
1977, 100).
The object of the general presentation, however, should not be confused
with the object of the individual presentation.  This is particularly difficult
because general presentations depend on individual presentations.  Whoever
conceives of man in general cannot do so (unless this presentation is merely
symbolic) without conceiving of an individual man.  In this case, presentations of
judgments play the role of mediating between the presentation of the individual
man and that of man in general.  In contrast to Bolzano's indirect presentations,
this would be an example of direct mediation between the individual and
general.
The direct presentations, as well as indirect ones like "the eye of the
man," are therefore made possible by the arbitrarily chosen individual
presentations.  Those individual presentations, serving as auxiliary
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presentations in forming the general ones, are by no means different from
"normal" individual presentations.  The only difference lies in the mode of in
which they are presented: they become representative of the general idea.
In order to understand how it happens that several individual
presentations may represent the same general idea and that several general
ideas may be represented by a single individual presentation, one needs to think
in terms of variation.
On the one hand, one can take a particular presentation of a human eye to
represent several general presentations: "an animal's eye," "a human organ," "an
eye-like shape" etc.  When one actually looks at a human eye in this manner, one
is not simply perceiving it.  Instead one becomes aware of the possibility of
varying general presentations and keeping the particular presentation constant. 
In simple words, one might ask: "What all can a human eye stand for?"
On the other hand, one can take any number of particular presentations
of the human eye to represent the single general presentation, e.g. "the eye of
the human being."  In reality, one is perceiving a constant individual
presentation, but is aware of how it might be varied, i.e. how particular
exemplars of the "human eye" may differ in colour, shape, etc.  In the latter case,
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